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1. Introduction 
 
W. Warren Wagar discusses the world of the future in his book A Short History of the 
Future (first edition published in 1989, with the later editions of 1992 and 1999 adding 
post-Cold War elements) on the next two hundred years until the Small Revolution of 
the late 22nd century. Wagar (1999, 41-42) writes that “[the Vienna conferees, in light of 
the historic 2001 agreement] met again in the same city in 2026. They now elected to 
take a step toward true world government by reconstituting the United Nations as the 
Confederated States of Earth and the countries within the various zones of special influ-
ence as trust territories of the CSE. (…) All were severely tested by the depression that 
started in 2032, but (…) the world order did not begin to break down until 2040.” Wa-
gar introduces The Catastrophe of 2044 – a nuclear conflict between Europe and the 
United States ending in a Socialist world government – is on an absolute scale not com-
parable to the imagination of science fiction novels. Although Wagar reclaims dysto-
pian elements in his story about the future, he eventually reveals his utopia hundred 
years after the nuclear disaster. In 2140, global elections are held and constitutional law 
is restored. In that sense normality is achieved but the costs have been tremendous.  
Based on lessons learned from science fiction novels and Wagar’s plot, what even-
tually remains is the never-ending trial of finding a better life and solutions to ultimate 
questions concerning human life and nearly everything. Unfortunately this sometimes 
results in major disasters, since one’s desires might conflict with the ones of fellow hu-
mans. The presence of the Cold War burden is evident in Wagar’s account, which is not 
very striking since the book was written during the Cold War. The Cold War constella-
tion is still present, and the Soviet Union seems to have survived the 20th century and 
still exists in the reality of the story. What is astonishing is the issue of a major disaster 
taking place on Earth and leading to forms of cooperation of further deterrence between 
world powers. The ultimate question is whether we can arrive at a plausible future space 
without undergoing catastrophes.  
In this Master’s thesis, the aim is to discuss models of the world parliament as future 
scenarios and analyze their feasibility based on the prevailing reality.1 In the analysis, 
17 models are examined from which only a few count as scenarios. The selection of the 
data for the thesis was based on the discussion of global democracy, international law 
and parliamentary assemblies. The material that forms the 17 models of the thesis con-
sists of two journals, Global Society (2006) and Widener Law Review (2007), a volume 
                                               
1 The aim is not to conduct a comparative study between the models. However, weaknesses, strengths and 
interpretative differences on global democracy and world politics may be discussed comparatively. 
 2
 
of essays by the Center for UN Reform Education, A Reader on Second Assembly and 
Parliamentary Proposals (2003), and two publications by the Committee for a Demo-
cratic United Nations (KDUN, a think tank based in Berlin), The composition of a Par-
liamentary Assembly at the United Nations and Developing International Democracy – 
For a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations by Andreas Bummel (2010). The 
individual models will be divided into four thematic categories based on their outline of 
the world parliament.  
A scenario is a causal process that leads to a conclusion and results, whereas a mod-
el or a proposal only pictures a possible option for reaching the issue at hand. The ma-
thematical models under consideration in this thesis are not scenarios. In summary, 
models answer HOW questions and scenarios imply both the HOW and the WHY. In a 
strict sense, only scenarios can be considered feasible, although the distinction is looser 
in the analysis. Also the models give insightful background information for the discus-
sion of the world parliament. Feasibility refers here to the degree of realization and cre-
dibility, i.e. what kind of a world parliament could be plausible and possible taking cer-
tain matters into consideration. The second aim is to form a conclusive normative sce-
nario, using the material provided by the models under analysis. The scenario considers 
both short-term and long-term alternatives of a world parliament. Feasibility is inter-
linked with the concept of time span. The aim is to conceptualize a future world parlia-
ment with the time frame of thirty years: within three decades, obtainable and probable 
measures can be taken in the cycle of approximately ten years. Thirty years is the abso-
lute minimum time for the realization of a world parliament according to gradual steps 
in the present circumstances. Models of dystopian character are the opposite of feasible 
scenarios. From a normative perspective, any feasible scenario considering a possible 
future within a few decades should not be dystopian. Otherwise the world parliament 
might remain short-lived.  
In the contextual sense, the goal is to review the impact of cosmopolitanism, globa-
lization and global democracy on state sovereignty in the theoretical framework. This 
discussion forms the background for the analysis and the feasibility aspect. Ten research 
questions of this study have been formulated: 
1) What makes a normative scenario feasible, credible and desirable?  
2) How much cosmopolitan ideals can be invested in the world parliament? 
3) What functions and jurisdiction could a global body occupy, how does it receive its powers from 
sovereign entities and should the world parliament be located inside or outside the UN system 
(causal reasoning)? 
4) What are the powers and the structural extent of the parliament as a global actor? 
5) Which issues are possible future challenges of the world parliament and which elements of in-
ternational law enable and hinder the establishment of this body?  
6) In what extent would the establishment of a feasible world parliament change the ways of global 
democracy, citizen representation and also the role of nation-states?  
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7) Should citizens have the right to vote for individual parliamentarians directly, and should the 
parliament employ national quotas or other restrictive mechanisms? 
8) Why would governments, parliamentarians, NGO’s, prominent individuals, the corporate sector 
and others invest their expertise in the constitution of a new global institution? 
9) Is the retreat of the state theory fictional or factual and in what sense has the modern state trans-
formed towards a postmodern statehood?  
10) How much transformation of the Westphalian system is needed to establish a world parliament? 
 
These main questions are general guidelines of the thesis but they imply secondary con-
siderations that are also discussed. The premise of the thesis is that a global parliament 
is necessary. Therefore, the ontological issue of whether or not it should be established 
in the first place is not relevant. Reflecting on the future of the world parliament, the 
assumed loss of sovereignty for the nation-states poses an interesting challenge for or-
ganizations primarily based on bilateral relations. The hypothesis is that the role of the 
state is in transformation as portrayed by multi-level governance.  
The methodology of the thesis is based on futures studies. As the emphasis is on the 
feasibility of a world parliament2, considerations of a world government are excluded. 
However,  at  times the two might overlap.  The models on world parliament are unique 
and do not constitute common starting points. Some of the models take a stand on the 
United Nations (UN) system in the sense that the global parliament is seen as part of the 
UN apparatus, especially the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), whereas oth-
ers take a more macro perspective on the world system as such. Futures studies is a 
broad field, but in this thesis, the main emphasis is on the normative aspect of futures 
studies, since the purpose is to present potential platforms for the future (see Manner-
maa 1986, 45). This thesis belongs to the prospective group of futures studies, because 
the scenarios are intended to offer realizable forms of the world in the future. According 
to prospective scenarios and futures studies in general, the future cannot be anticipated 
or predicted like fortune-tellers do, but proposals on the potential form of it can be 
made. Thus, futures studies may be personal and imply wishful thinking for the re-
searcher. In the end, everyone reads between the lines from a wishful perspective: one 
anticipates what one wishes for the future to take actual forms. Therefore, feasibility is 
connected to desirability. One should keep in mind that scenarios and models can also 
function as warning mechanisms, and offer philosophical advice for the reader to pond-
er upon. Scenarios are solutions to uncertainty: although the future as such is unpredict-
able, it may be formed from the possible scenarios. There is only one possible future in 
the real world, but it may be influenced by current considerations of the future. In this 
thesis, the future serves as the learning mechanism for the individuals inhabiting this 
                                               
2 In this thesis, the concepts of global parliament and world parliament are used as synonyms, although 
individual models may differ in the substance of the parliament.  
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planet in the 21st century. Futures research is fascinating, since the opportunities are vast 
and the boundaries thin and room is left for idealism. The challenge remains in the 
scientific nature of the subject. It is important to accurately study scenarios in depth, to 
consider their impact and to view the future as a source filled with opportunities. One 
must, nonetheless, remain distant from too much wishful and “anything goes” ways of 
thinking.  
Since the beginning of the new millennium the UN has entered a phase of renewal. 
The end of the Cold War in 1991 constituted a new beginning for the discussion on the 
role of state sovereignty, global democracy and the United Nations reform. The ending 
of the ideological bipolarity of the world has enabled democratic projects to gain deeper 
ground. It might be that the bipolar world system hindered the proposals to set footing, 
and as time progressed, the UN system established in 1945 became the norm, difficult 
to amend in the fragmented world of the 21st century. Still, future scenarios written in 
times of multi-polar world hegemonies differ from the ones portrayed during the Cold 
War. The advantage of the present day scenarios is that they are not bound by the so-
called simple burden of the Cold War, but the task is at the same time more difficult in 
the fragmented world order. Several models on the reform of the UNGA have been de-
signed, ranging from a federalist world parliament into international virtual parliaments 
or a WTO Parliamentary Assembly. The debate on parliamentary assemblies and a 
global parliament is wide and often philosophical. In the UN context, differing versions 
of the reform of the UNGA have been presented: some emphasize a People’s Assembly, 
others a Parliamentary Assembly or the dimension of a world parliament. All these ver-
sions stress alternative viewpoints on the form of global parliamentarianism. Enhance-
ment of global democracy in the multi-polar world, however, is not intended in a nar-
row  sense:  the  worldwide  democracy  is  not  a  self-evident  project.  Liberal  democracy  
has not reached its final point, as the American author Francis Fukuyama (1992) rough-
ly states in his book The End of History and the Last Man. Democracy continues to de-
velop and find new paths, but democracy is not arbitrary. Someone always channels its 
flow and it does not exist without the guidance by persons. The perspective of the thesis 
is both actor-oriented and system-oriented, since the two are interlinked.  
Another debate concerns the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) as a potential candi-
date for the second chamber in the UN. The IPU, with its long history in parliamentary 
cooperation between states, could eventually lead the UN to a different direction than 
the ones campaigning on the United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA). None-
theless, the IPU itself has not given any input into its potential future role as a second 
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chamber of the UNGA. Some of the more recent models have concentrated on the fea-
sibility  of  a  global  parliament  outside  the  UN realm,  therefore  making  the  parliament  
more flexible, and somewhat imaginative, when not restricted by existing boundaries. 
This is mostly true of the models in the Widener Law Review. Any form of global par-
liament, be it UN-related or not, will affect other organizations and most importantly, 
the global perspective at large.  
This thesis consists of six chapters. Following this introduction, the second chapter 
contains the theoretical and methodological framework with terminological considera-
tions  and  major  concepts  of  the  thesis.  The  first  part  of  the  second  chapter  discusses  
cosmopolitanism and the methodology of futures studies, whereas the second part con-
sists of the examination of international and multi-level governance in the context of 
globalization, democracy and sovereignty. The third and fourth chapters form the analy-
sis of the models, the fourth mainly focusing on the feasibility of the scenarios. The fifth 
chapter  considers  the  question  of  what  is  possible  to  achieve  in  the  current  circums-
tances within the next thirty years. Chapter six consists of conclusions and suggestions 
for further research are also presented at the end of the thesis.     
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
In this chapter the aim is to illustrate the main theoretical concepts, futures research as a 
methodological tool as well  as the background for the analysis.  The larger picture be-
hind the idea of a world parliament needs a complementary background based on cos-
mopolitan thinking, changes in state behavior and the larger context in world politics. 
The assumption is normative since scenarios and models mirror issues that are antic-
ipated from the future, thus making the future world desirable. The beginning of this 
chapter is devoted to futures studies and its impact on scenario making and to the cos-
mopolitan framework. In the sub chapters terminology and concepts regarding the 
change in statehood receive considerable attention. It is important to give a detailed ac-
count of the images peculiar to statehood as specific to the current period, since only by 
understanding the facets and characteristics of the present day can an accurate picture of 
the future be formed. The formation of any global institution requires the consent given 
by sovereign entities. Therefore changes in the Westphalian state apparatus will receive 
the attention it deserves, although the analysis here is intended as background informa-
tion. The methodology and initial theory are adopted from futures studies, but supple-
mentary theoretical tools are adopted from a larger pool of world politics.   
To get a comprehensive picture of the relationship between the present and the fu-
ture, Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s outlining of the Black Swan problem should be dis-
cussed. “How can we know the future, given knowledge of the past; or, more generally, 
how can we figure out properties of the (infinite) unknown based on the (finite) known? 
(…) What can a turkey learn about what is in store for it tomorrow from the events of 
yesterday? A lot, perhaps, but certainly a little less than it thinks, and it is just that ‘little 
less’ that may make all the difference.” (Taleb 2008, 40) This offers an interesting 
thought, although futures studies is not linked to predicting based on induction. Accord-
ing to Taleb, a Black Swan3 is an event composed of three attributes. ”First, it is an out-
lier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can 
convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite 
of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after 
the fact, making it explainable and predictable.” (Ibid., XVII-XVIII) Using the turkey as 
a further protagonist, the animal could calculate the possibilities of its future that may 
                                               
3 The discovery of the very first black swan after the “discovery” of Australia presented a surprise not 
only to ornithologists, but to the problem of generalization. “It illustrates a severe limitation to our learn-
ing from observations or experience and the fragility of our knowledge. One single observation can inva-
lidate a general statement derived from millennia of confirmatory sightings of millions of white swans. 
All you need is one single (and, I am told, quite ugly) black bird.“ (Taleb 2008, XVII) 
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imply outliers and partial predictions on its further path. It makes assumptions about the 
future based on past experiences, until Thanksgiving. (Ibid.) The Black Swan is a chal-
lenge, since some parts of it can be exploitable, although the world parliament does not 
present a challenge of a rare, retrospectively predictable and extreme impact. Futures 
studies implies a degree of cumulatively significant shocks that shake our beliefs and 
justify changes and reforms to current norms. For laypersons, a world parliament might 
seem hardly probable as it has never existed before. For many in the field of world poli-
tics, feasible elements point to the possibility of a global body, both in the philosophi-
cal, legal and political sense. The continuity of history is applied to make assumptions 
about the future, and this is precisely what binds the future considerations of a world 
parliament to its probable origins in the past and the present.  
Science fiction novels may make harsh discoveries and invent the most improbable 
solutions the human mind can come up with, but nevertheless, the future is bound by its 
origins, its history. Within the next thirty years, everything is not possible, and poten-
tially the form of a future world parliament is one of small steps, making some people 
disappointed and others pleased. For an optimist and open-minded person, however, 
small steps are nevertheless steps, no matter their size. The possibility of any steps of-
fers  fruitful  content  to  believers  in  the  gateway theory:  small  steps  can  lead  to  bigger  
steps and after a certain amount of steps having been taken, a bigger picture is discov-
ered, making the steps in the beginning look small in comparison but important consi-
dering their impact. For positivists, this kind of research might pose a severe problem, 
since the methods, hypotheses and theories adopted by futures researchers might not be 
testable and deductively applied afterwards. This being said, futures studies implies a 
personal aspect. The scenario in chapter 5 would probably not be reproduced by some-
one else. Using the same attributes one might derive different conclusions.  
In the modern world of today, where be dragons?4 They are conspicuous by their absence from the 
practice of managing risks and uncertainty. It is becoming increasingly clear that they lie all around 
us: on the fringes of institutional boundaries, outside the silos of academic disciplines, beyond the 
risk metrics so carefully calculated… In each instance they are the unacknowledged blind spots, 
spanning scientific, geographical, temporal and institutional boundaries but unrecognised due to the 
challenges they represent to our human desire for order and control. (Elahi 2010, 2) 
 
According to Elahi (ibid.), a Black Swan portrays an unpredictable and improbable 
event that bears a massive impact on the status quo. In this sense, establishing a world 
parliament might at the first glimpse seem unrealistic but considering its necessity in the 
longer term, the very idea of it becomes more acceptable. In the current world, it is ne-
                                               
4 The phrase here be dragons (HIC SVNT DRACONES) signified dangerous and unexplored territories 
in maps. See more on here be dragons in Elahi 2010. The social science equivalent of here be dragons is 
turned into here lurk dragons by Tetlock 2005, 3.  
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cessary to think about the concept ‘world’. Obviously, with the knowledge provided by 
current science there is only one planet Earth but on the macro level there are several 
worlds. So it is vital to picture the world that is referred to in this thesis. This theoretical 
chapter will not consider the essence and nature of a world parliament. However, a con-
ceptualization has to be reached in order to get a grasp of the world one refers to. For 
which ‘world’ is a world parliament intended and to whom? A liberal cosmopolitan per-
son naturally inhabits a different world than a fundamentalist Christian or Islamist. In a 
multi-polar world society normative ideals conflict with each other, since everyone ea-
gerly pursues an image of the ideal world according to one’s own standards. This 
thought is meant for the reader to ponder upon, not to be distracted altogether, although 
the reality is such that in the end, everything is political and one often reads between the 
lines as one wishes. Elahi continues (ibid., 6) that human psychology, institutional 
frameworks and scientific convention have all plotted in order to remove here be dra-
gons from the human collective consciousness. She states that  
[w]hile the medieval world recognised both the concept and the value of ‘Here be Dragons’, science, 
based on the principles of observation and experiment, approaches the issue of indeterminate uncer-
tainty from a different standpoint. The very essence of science is the notion of conjecture and test. 
Science cannot provide certainty – at its core is the current best working hypothesis. At any time new 
data can emerge to refute current theories and require them to be modified. In principle, science is 
therefore a dynamic process, accepting and encompassing fallibility, evolving as more accurate theo-
ries replace earlier ones. However, the success of scientific thinking in driving rapid and radical 
technological innovation and the accompanying economic growth has meant that in practice it has 
become almost impossible to challenge the trajectory of scientific endeavour and the inherent risks 
the new technologies it spawns might pose. (Ibid.) 
 
Future can be seen in the light of here be dragons due to its uncertain nature. It is an 
imaginary “final frontier” in the sense space is, although space is spatially and geo-
graphically more reachable than what the future will ever be. The fact that it only stays 
in the realm of unreachable elements makes it more fascinating, because future is al-
ways one step ahead and can only be approached on a day-by-day basis, making the 
former future part of the present day, thus leaving space for new futures. In this thesis, 
the present day is pictured as an arena where the future is laid out in an open-minded 
room where presumably the unthinkable may become factual, in some circumstances. 
Since the question of the nature of the world parliament concerns the nature of the state 
system, a few thoughts will be given to this consideration. The debate on state sove-
reignty, a possible world parliament or a reformed UNGA is largely comprised of the 
cosmopolitan  view point  on  the  world  and  what  ought  to  be,  rather  than  what  is.  The  
federalist movement as a special area of cosmopolitanism has a long tradition when 
considering institutional forms above the traditional state system. Taking these condi-
tions into consideration, cosmopolitan thinking is both theoretical and political, since in 
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the case of the latter it strives for the institutionalization of global citizens and the estab-
lishment of a world parliament. Before deepening into the methodological background 
of futures studies, I briefly examine normative international relations theory, which can 
be divided into cosmopolitan and communitarian thinking. To examine cosmopolitan-
ism before tools of futures studies is reasoned by the issue that the methodology is bet-
ter understood when the upper layer of the topic – i.e.  the cosmopolitan theory on the 
global sphere – is already revealed. In order to answer why cosmopolitanism matters in 
the first place, one has to go back in history. For many that share the cosmopolitan 
world view, a world parliament represents the ultimate culmination point, the future 
goal that has been envisioned since ancient times. Therefore, cosmopolitan considera-
tion receives the first theoretical space it deserves here.  
 
2.1 Cosmopolitanism in world politics 
The cosmopolitan vision, (…), is more about the future than the past. It is predominantly not about 
what the world of nation-states was like but what the world is becoming and how our consciousness 
is changing with it. (Fine 2007, 17) 
 
Traditionally, inter-state relations are the core element of international relations theory. 
According to Chris Brown (1992, 3-4), normative international relations theory ac-
knowledges moral and ethical dimensions in international relations and between states 
and communities. The problem arising from a theory that is labeled normative is the fact 
that it also implies an existence of non-normative theories. However, as this is a discip-
linary matter, the purpose of this thesis is not to take a stand on this. In order to simplify 
the understanding future scenarios on the world parliament, the concepts ‘cosmopolitan’ 
and ‘communitarian’ must be clarified. Cosmopolitan theory5 should be separated from 
communitarian normative theory. Cosmopolitan theory can be called normative philos-
ophy: it considers questions of political existence from a normative perspective. Brown 
argues that state centricity emerged “from the collapse of medieval feudalism.” (Ibid., 
5) Later in history, the concept of ‘state’ was replaced by the sovereign state. Normative 
theories acknowledge the importance of the scope of justice, which can be applied to 
both international and domestic politics. (Ibid., 6-7)  
The cosmopolitan/communitarian divide relates directly to the most central question of any norma-
tive international relations theory, namely the moral value to be credited to particularistic political 
collectivities as against humanity as a whole or the claims of individual human beings. Communita-
rian thought either denies that there is an opposition here, or is prepared explicitly to assign central 
value to the community; cosmopolitan thought refuses this central status to the community, placing 
the ultimate source of moral value elsewhere. Some cosmopolitan thinkers believe that there ought to 
be one political community coextensive with mankind, but the cosmopolitan position is perfectly 
                                               
5 For the cosmopolitan model of democracy, see David Held’s account in Appendix 1.  
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compatible with the pragmatic acceptance of a world of divided jurisdictions, and (…) the term 
‘cosmopolitan’ is [here] never used to refer exclusively to adherents of a world-government position. 
(Ibid., 12-13) 
 
This is a more general representation of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. 
Cosmopolitanism can also be defined as a counterbalance for nationalism. As Fine 
(2007, IX.) puts it, it is remarkably important to understand that the idea of cosmopoli-
tanism existed centuries and even millennia before nationalism. The ancient Greeks 
were the first to start the conversation about cosmopolitan thought, but also later think-
ers, such as Immanuel Kant, have continued the dialogue on the potential forms of 
global governance. Fine defines cosmopolitan social theory as 
[a theory that] reconstructs the history and traditions of social theory in terms of its universalistic 
concept of society, the recognition of differences within a universalistic frame, and the critique of 
methodological and political nationalism. (Ibid., X) 
 
Fine uses the term ‘cosmopolitan social theory’  because  he  sees  that  it  combines  cos-
mopolitanism and social theory in social sciences. Cosmopolitanism implies a degree of 
a social form of right, a sense of consciousness which signals the capacity to the con-
cept both imaginatively and reflectively. (Ibid., XI-XIII) Within international relations, 
cosmopolitanism emerged after the fall of the Berlin wall. The so-called new cosmopo-
litanism criticizes realism for rationalizing the system of state sovereignty, which is in 
fact historically specified and normatively conditioned. New cosmopolitanism regards 
the modern state system as being surpassed. “Its basic intuition is that many of the as-
sumptions of the Westphalian model are still operative in international relations today 
but that the conditions for the reconstruction of international relations along cosmopoli-
tan  lines  are  now  ripe.”  (Ibid.,  4)  Here  Fine’s  account  is  close  to  Sørensen’s  on  the  
transformative nature of the current state system.  
On the one hand, the modern state represents both the public interest and the inter-
ests of individuals within the state. It could be characterized as a status quo system in 
the sense that it does not wish the society to alter too radically as a system. On the other 
hand, the cosmopolitan vision, as Ulrich Beck advances it, emphasizes the future in-
stead of the past. It is about the form of the world and the possibilities for changes. (Ib-
id., 17) Fine has underlined the theory as having the ‘ism’ taken out of cosmopolitan-
ism. By this he emphasizes the need to address cosmopolitanism as a research agenda 
rather than an idea or wishes for the future. (Ibid., 133-134) He accentuates cosmopoli-
tanism as a theoretical discipline rather than a mechanism for change or political dog-
matism. Fine combines cosmopolitanism with political philosophy which is common for 
cosmopolitanism when regarded through normative lenses. Fine’s version of cosmopoli-
tanism and his critique of the powerlessness of new cosmopolitanism differ from David 
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Held’s cosmopolitan model. This is not highly surprising since the approaches are dif-
ferent: Fine examines cosmopolitanism as a form of social action, while Held connects 
cosmopolitanism with the improvement of democracy.  
A third account of cosmopolitan tells the story of the individual perspective in cos-
mopolitan philosophy. Christopher Bertram (2007, 75) refers to John Rawls’ theory of 
justice, and the individual access to an important set of goods and morally significant 
capabilities all rely on favorable political arrangements. “The goods in question are 
those associated with being a functioning citizen of a democratic community and the 
capacities are the Rawlsian ones of being able to form, pursue, and revise one’s concep-
tion of the good and of a sense of justice. (…) A complete theory of justice should con-
tain an account of how people come to acquire and retain a commitment to its prin-
ciples. Arguably, a theory that simply postulates universal principles without showing 
how they might be realized and maintained is otiose.” (Ibid., 75-76)6  
Cosmopolitan projects can be viewed in a liberal7 light, pursuing a worldwide un-
derstanding between various peoples. There are, nonetheless, other factors that influ-
ence the current discussion on a world parliament or parliamentary assemblies. Georg 
Sørensen (2003, 14-15) separates three differing views: realistic, liberal and critical 
ones. According to him, the debate is concentrated on the output between liberals favor-
ing the retreat of the state and realists who are state-centric. The critical theory is mainly 
interested in international political economy and historical sociology. Sørensen (ibid., 
161-162) illustrates that the modern state, born in the peace accord of Westphalia in 
1648, has undergone transformation. He states that the world is now postmodern and 
still under correction. The liberal trend, here of most relevance, considers that inter-state 
relations have become more complex than what they were and arenas of interaction 
have multiplied, relations taking place on different levels. “International relations in-
creasingly look like domestic politics with a composite array of issues and coalitions. 
(…) The transition (…) is driven much more by groups, individuals and organizations 
in society than it is driven by states. (…) Another strand of liberal thinking focuses 
more on the role of international regimes and institutions as drivers of the transition 
from modern to postmodern statehood.” (Ibid., 167-168) Sørensen notes that liberals 
still assume a role for the state but that other actors, such as individuals, groups and or-
ganizations stemming from the societies as well as international organizations, are now 
primary. (Ibid., 168)         
                                               
6 Bertram’s account is more in depth than what can be here referred to. 
7 E.g. the Liberal International (LI), founded in 1947, has been a keen proponent of international solidari-
ty. See more in the LI’s internet pages http://www.liberal-international.org/default.asp?ia_id=1108.  
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One issue that has to be borne in mind is the fact that there exists an heterogeneity 
of the governed on the intra-state level. Bienen et al. (1996) discuss this and note that 
international governance comprises all political, social and cultural groups which leads 
to minimally shared values. However, the requirements for a collective identity are low-
er than at the national level since the national control covers a large part of authority 
issues. Thus, this does not apply to the legitimacy problem that arises when the interna-
tional governance has to solve identity challenges. Bienen et al. suggest that states and 
individuals can be subjects to the supranational systems. Rights and duties apply to both 
of the groups and their preferences should be determinate when decisions are made at 
the global level. Accountability will only be achieved if the individuals’ voice is heard. 
Nowadays, as only states are members in the UN, individuals could – while the border 
between national and international politics is not clear anymore – contribute to the de-
mocratization of the UN in a new way, because in the present conditions it still is the 
legitimate global arena.   
When considering yet never experienced global institutions, the structure of the cur-
rent form of states and international governance must be acknowledged. Thus, I now 
turn to examine the liberal model presented by Sørensen (2003, 59-62). How do liberals 
view the transition from national government to multi-level governance? What will 
happen to democracy in the multiform policy phase? In compliance with the liberals the 
international dimension demands more than inter-state cooperation. There have been 
serious changes at the political level following globalization. Territorial borders have 
become dispensable, allowing border-crossing infrequently in comparison to the mod-
ern period. According to Sørensen, liberal observers accentuate three major develop-
ments in cross-border collaboration. First, they highlight the accumulation of inter-state 
relations, meaning cooperation in intergovernmental organizations. Sørensen refers to 
UN institutions that have significantly influenced the development of international law 
in areas of human rights and minority issues. Second, trans-governmental relations have 
expanded, for example in the form of environmental regulations and standard-setting. 
External relations have thus been widely replaced by other intervening mechanisms. 
Third, transnational relations have also expanded in the form of non-state actors: indi-
viduals and the civil society at large, including international non-governmental organi-
zations now cooperating with and alongside states.8  
                                               
8 For further reading on the peoples versus states, see Rawls, John (1999): The Law of Peoples; with “The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. Cambridge & London. Especially see chapter Why Peoples and Not 
States, pp. 23-30.   
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Sørensen (ibid., 62) notes that global public policy networks increasingly influence 
governance. He distinguishes three separate aspects of governance: governance by gov-
ernment, a traditional hierarchy model, governance with government, where govern-
ments engage in negotiations with other actors, and finally governance without govern-
ment, where state interference has been excluded from the decision-making process. 
Radical scholars supporting the retreat of the state assert that when globalization gains 
strength, the two last-mentioned forms will gradually replace the first one. Another ap-
proach can be summed up as the global polity view. Here, governments become entan-
gled with complex networks of international organizations and many non-state forces 
gain ground in the process. (Ibid., 63-64) Sørensen draws the conclusion that since the 
liberals, the realists and the critical theorists all focus on different areas of the transfor-
mation process, in the end their input is relevant. However, at the same time, they are all 
exclusive. When considering a world parliament in the future, the feasibility is con-
nected to non-political aspects as well, such as technology and innovations. Sørensen 
states that without the significance of technological innovations and communications 
technology, the transformation would be irrelevant, but they cannot in themselves ex-
plain the developments in international fields. Technology is always used by humans 
and in this sense it enables the flow of transformation. “Without innovations in transport 
technology, communications technology and the ability to split up complicated produc-
tion processes into segments which are then scattered worldwide, the transformation to 
postmodern statehood could not take place. (…) Technology has to be put to use by ac-
tors; left alone it plays no role, present or not. (…) Once states have established the ap-
propriate conditions, [other] groups, individuals and organizations from society step in.” 
(Ibid., 170) This applies for the drivers of market forces as well. States possess the role 
of supervisors, and take an active role in times of crisis. This does enhance the power of 
the realists, since realists have not taken the fact into account that societal actors and 
market forces also affect states. They are not immune to the influence from internal and 
external forces. The dependence of states on other actors and vice versa explains the 
transition from modern to postmodern states. (Ibid., 170-171) Interdependence is one of 
the key issues when analyzing the best forms possible to establish a world parliament. 
The impact of still existing nation-states must be acknowledged. But neither can the role 
of non-state actors be neglected, since the permanence of the traditional state-centric 
appearance is not self-evident.  
Held (1995) proposes a cosmopolitan democratic model. In reference to his vision 
of an authoritative assembly, he argues that the creation of this assembly is unavoidable. 
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It would be an institution of democratic nations, little by little getting other nations in-
volved as well. Although the implementation of supranational law is difficult, the crea-
tion of this kind of an assembly would have significant normative implications. Accord-
ing to Held, democracy will in the future be likely to concentrate on the international or 
global domain. In his terms globalization is a dialectical process where local transfor-
mation matters as much as any other local transformation. (Ibid., 273-279) Held’s 
theory offers good hints on what issues the world parliament should work on. 
The cosmopolitan democratic model needs a political space. Forces, such as transna-
tional movements, agencies and institutional initiatives are pursuing the establishment 
of that space. The movement under the umbrella of cosmopolitan democratic model 
strives for greater coordination and accountability of those forces that govern global re-
sources and rule transnational public life. Held’s model encompasses liberal virtues and 
other peacefully oriented views, such as the peaceful settlement of disputes, demilitari-
zation, human rights, fundamental freedoms and rights, sustainable development and 
cultural reciprocity etc. The resources and capabilities that Held’s model pursues are not 
at hand, it would be misleading to expect to gain them in a short period of time. Never-
theless, the commitment to a change is already a step forward, towards these benevolent 
goals. Held asks whether the cosmopolitan model is able to seize “the organizational 
resources  –  procedural,  legal,  institutional  and  military  –  to  alter  the  dynamics  of  re-
source production and distribution, and of rule creation and enforcement, in the contem-
porary era[.]”(Ibid., 283) It does not possess these capabilities, but it does possess the 
mechanisms of democratic accountability which can help it access these capabilities. 
The strengthening of democratic rights and the commitment to develop regional and in-
ternational court systems symbolize the effort towards an improved democratic field. 
Individuals could sue their governments for rights violations, giving power to the global 
level.  Held  argues  that  regional  and  global  rules  and  procedures  would  aid  to  accom-
plish legitimacy not governed by states. Held notes that general grass root activism can-
not alone solve the problems associated with global governance, since the grass root 
level is not organized in itself and there are multiple organizations opposing each oth-
er’s views. (Ibid., 281-283) 
Held’s ‘embedded utopianism’ signifies that both – what is currently available and 
what  might  be  –  must  be  taken  into  account.  One  must  begin  with  the  existing  para-
digms and proceed to the ones that one desires from political institutions, forms, prin-
ciples and processes. “[C]osmopolitan democracy (…) places at its centre the principle 
of autonomy. To argue for this theory is to locate the political theorist as advocate, seek-
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ing to advance an interpretation of politics against countervailing positions. While ad-
vocacy is without guarantees, the very indeterminacy of this state of affairs creates the 
possibility of a new political understanding.” (Ibid., 283-286) By settling down to ap-
preciate the prevailing, one caves in on the possibility for change and new forms of go-
vernance. In that case, current problems – conflicts, catastrophes and warfare – are con-
tinuing and the realist view on security will not be replaced by comprehensive security, 
emphasizing environmental, social and political issues as security challenges and reject-
ing security issues as solely ones between states.   
 
2.2 Methodology of futures studies 
Futures research is a broad field and there are multiple interpretations on what its inner 
core is. In this chapter the aim is to make general remarks about futures research and 
select the elements that best fit to describe scenario writing. To give a good start kick, 
consider Philip E. Tetlock’s (2005, 199) account of expert political judgment. The me-
thod of scenario writing will be handled in depth in the end of this chapter. Tetlock ex-
amines scenario experiment and the limits of open mindedness from a skeptic point of 
view. He notes that “scenario exercises are not cure-alls. (…) One might despair over 
the utility of the scenario method for improving probability judgments about possible 
futures but still hope the method will check biases in how people judge possible pasts. 
[S]cenario exercises can check hindsight bias and occasionally improve forecasting ac-
curacy by stretching our conceptions of the possible. (…), it is easy to overdo it when 
we start imagining ‘possible worlds’. Taking too many scenarios too seriously ties us 
into self-contradictory knots. (…) Good judgment, then, is a precarious balancing act. 
We often learn we have gone too far in one direction only after it is too late to pull back. 
Executing this balancing act requires cognitive skills of a high order: the capacity to 
monitor our own thought processes for telltale signs of excessive closed- or open-
mindedness and to strike a reflective equilibrium faithful to our conceptions of the 
norms of fair intellectual play.” (Ibid., 199-202 and 214-215) The importance to be 
aware of biases is important, also when proposing alternatives for the future.9 
In their account on foresight methodology, Fuller & Loogma (2008, 71-72) adopt a 
social constructivist perspective to make conclusions about knowledge-creating activi-
ties. This is the basis for my thesis as well, to interpret futures research as a methodolo-
                                               
9 For an answer on the criticism posed for futurists, see Tony Stevenson (2008): Imagining the future: 
Ideas for change. In: Futures, Vol. 40, No. 10, pp. 915-918. For an insightful account of the ethics of fu-
tures thinking, see Turnbull, David (2010): Rethinking moral futures. In: Futures,  Vol.  42,  No.  2,  pp.  
149-153. 
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gy by implementing social constructivist tools. According to Fuller & Loogma, symbols 
are remarkable communication mechanisms when knowledge about futures is created. 
Symbols can be meaning, decisions, texts, images, objects and symbolic actions, but 
also trend lines, images, models, and the ubiquitous scenarios are the stock-in-trade of 
foresight activities. “Any foresight methodology, i.e. any attempt to validate the design 
of knowledge creation, should reflect the way that meaning emerges as thoughts and 
ideas, discourses and texts, anticipations and decisions, about the future.” (Ibid., 72) 
The main interest is to perceive how meaning is understood and how one acts on it. 
Whenever symbols are employed in reference to objects in the social world, symbols are 
constructed. Instead of the ontological reality, constructivism focuses on the constructed 
reality. Fuller & Loogma bind constructivism as part of the framework of symbolic inte-
raction theory, which emphasizes the explanatory power of order and change in obser-
vations of everyday life and the interactions between persons. Processes of communica-
tion and interaction enable persons to make sense of their social world and to construct 
structures. The premise of symbolic interaction theory is that “the world is never expe-
rienced directly, but through the ideas that we hold about it, and that these are commu-
nicated through symbols. Such symbols are not representative of reality in the sense of 
direct correspondence; their meaning constitutes interpreted reality.” (Ibid.) This brings 
us back to statements discussed earlier on the power of interpretation.  
As a conclusion, Fuller & Loogma (ibid., 78) state core elements of foresight me-
thodology. To them, foresight is both the mechanism for social construction and social 
construction itself. The perspective adopted by foresight methodology should make 
claims to knowledge by explicitly taking account of the following ten features: 
1) Construction of time within the context of the study at hand; 
2) power manifest in representational choice; 
3) performative power of symbolic representations; 
4) mode by which domain knowledge is produced; 
5) meaning generated by the community that engages, and what performative power such engage-
ment has; 
6) degree to which the production of meaning must be embedded in its constituency, in relation to 
the responsibility taken for subsequent actions; 
7) performative power of social discourse and challenges to self and community identity; 
8) dominant discourses and languages through which participation in the generation of knowledge 
actually occurs; 
9) interaction between knowledge and action; 
10) values that accompany the interpretation of meaning. (Ibid.) 
 
Foresight and prediction are not parts of the same coin: foresight bases its core elements 
into observing the social life and making it into both a concept and a practice. It is 
something that the everyday practice calls a “hunch”, whereas prediction is envisaging 
the path the future will take. There is a big difference between a possibility and an ulti-
mate option, like there is a difference between “might” and “will be”.  
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Futures research implies a variety of odd termini, like Black Swan, here be dragons 
or weak signs from which the last concept will be dealt with later in this chapter. Elahi 
(2010,  2)  draws  the  attention  to  yet  another  concept,  i.e.  Post  Normal  Science  (PNS).  
She characterizes the fiercely debated nature of PNS by high stakes, uncertain facts, 
disputed values and urgent decisions. With PNS the peer acceptance is low or non-
existent.  For  the  analysis  of  a  world  parliament,  this  is  important  since  it  clearly  does  
not represent the goal of the majority of people,  so with the establishment of a parlia-
ment  on  a  global  scale  would  pose  changes  of  major  multitude  to  the  global  citizens.  
Merryl Wyn Davies (2010, 9) continues on the same line by asking whether postnormal 
times are there already in the global age. She takes up the criticism of ‘postnormal’ be-
ing a West-centric concept as stated by others. Whether postnormalists outnumber oth-
ers now or whether postnormal times are at hand is a matter of debate. What she empha-
sizes as being crucial is the agreement on the need for an ethical framework of values 
and virtues that can be employed to overcome human problems and construct alternative 
futures. Alternative futures imagination and creativity help to reach this high goal.  
Hiltunen (2007, 256-257) distinguishes between two types of weak signs (or weak 
signals) in her article, namely early information and first symptoms. Early information 
means that the frequency of signals or the visibility of signals is small, while the num-
ber of events or issues is also small. There is a low correspondence level between the 
previous facts, so it is difficult to interpret the sign, therefore making the sign weak. 
This category includes new innovations or inventions. The second category is called 
first symptoms. The signals of the event are numerous and visible, but it is more diffi-
cult to interpret the sign. This could be an unaccustomed change in somebody’s beha-
vior.  The  change  itself  is  recognizable,  but  for  us  it  is  not  necessarily  clear  what  it  
means for the future. Figure 1 shows the two different types of weak signs. 
 
Figure 1. Two kinds of weak signs: first symptoms and early information. 
 
Source: Hiltunen (2007, 257)  
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Then, what about the relationship between cause and effect in the context of scena-
rio analysis? There has to be a connection between the conclusions made based on uto-
pian proposals on how to form an institution that has not seen a day light in the human 
history. Wendell Bell (2004, 84) emphasizes causal knowledge and empirical fact. Al-
though there is a factual context available here – the matter under which circumstances 
and in which form a world parliament can be established – the empirical side of the deal 
is more challenging. Later Bell (ibid., 86) suggests that means also have consequences. 
He criticizes ethical theory for consequentialism where the focus is on the consequences 
or  end  states  and  the  means  simply  function  as  instruments.  Bell  offers  the  advice  for  
futures researchers on how to realize that means can embody many consequences. Such 
consequences can be weighted and ethically evaluated before any decision or action on 
them. “Deliberation can include whether or not we ought to use a particular means to 
achieve  a  specified  end  given  the  way  in  which  it  will  affect  our  other  desires  or  the  
well-being of other people. (…) The means-ends relationship, of course, may not be a 
simple one. For example, something may be pursued both as a means and as an end (…) 
There is, additionally, always the danger that a means may come to be regarded as 
‘good-in-itself’ rather than simply as a means, (…). The causal relationship on which 
[the evaluation of ‘ought’ assertions] rests are subject to test and possible refutation 
against current scientific theory and data.” (Ibid.) Although this view is of importance 
for the methodology of futures studies, Bell comes to the conclusion that eventually the 
means-ends model fails to examine norms of society, desires and ends. Therefore, it is 
not an adequate method of moral reasoning. (Ibid., 86-87) 
To shed more light on what is happening in futures research in this context, let us 
consider ethical value judgments. In utopian thought, one begins with an hypothesis 
based on an ideal future and concludes with measures to be adopted in order for the fu-
ture  to  be  of  the  “X”  sort,  be  it  a  world  where  only  heavy  metal  music  is  allowed  or  
where the human encounter happens through sign language, to name a few examples. 
The relationship between ethics and the future is self-analogous: in some form they al-
ways imply each other’s presence. The part of the ethical consideration of greatest re-
levance for scenario analysis that Bell mentions is ethical utilitarianism. He (ibid., 96) 
depicts ethical theory seen with utilitarian glasses as a means of reaching the greatest 
happiness or good for the greatest number of people. Alternatives are measures against 
their future results is the basic idea behind “ethical utilitarianism”. Future is thus formed 
of the consequences adopted in the past.  
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The problem with this kind of ethical theory and normative value judgments is that 
interpretations are given great significance. Any consideration based on so-called 
“truths”, as in political or religious fundamentalism, is dangerous because the world 
within the future is interpreted for the whole human kind. It is important to remember 
WHO makes value judgments on the future and for WHAT purposes. WHY questions 
are usually the tricky ones, so it is necessary for the scenario writer to include passages 
in the scenario on why the utopian values depicted in it should be adopted. One should 
not be shocked by interpretations, since no matter individual conduct, humans always 
engage in interpreting events, also the future, and this is inescapable and should there-
fore not be doomed completely. In this sense future scenarios are in no traditional sense 
revolutionary. This is less important if the scenario is not based on a political program 
or party platform but considers broader lines, e.g. in the case of global democracy and 
challenges of globalization and the lack of current democratic institutions. Scientific 
scenarios answer to different questions than political propaganda, since the science-
based scenario does not try to convince the reader of the desirability and good options 
of the scenario but of the feasible aspects. The future is not portrayed as the mystical 
unknown but as a realizable world with certain new and old elements. And, unlike the 
opportunities in science fiction, the future scenario must be feasible without the inclu-
sion of supernatural, magical or secret powers of people. This goes without saying that 
the boundaries posed by reality make scientific scenarios less imaginative but the more 
interesting, since they could be feasible.  
According to Bell (1997, 5-6 and 41), futures studies demystify the future and adopt 
systematic and rational methods by observing the real world. Futurists use creative and 
intuitive measures to make logical conclusions of the reality. These are the ideal values 
for conducting futures research. The counterpart of futuristic methods is divination, i.e. 
predicting. Bell also notices limits and conditions essential to some future scenarios. 
According to the “standard” model where a simulation is presented on the future, often 
no major changes are assumed. However, the same models might contingently over-
shoot and “predict” the collapse of the world system. Usually this concerns food pro-
duction, industrial output and population growth. Bell (ibid., 73-75) then goes on to ana-
lyze purposes of futures studies. In his account, futurists are interested in knowledge: 
what can or could be (the possible), what is likely to be (the probable), and what ought 
to be (the preferable) – thus futurists concentrate on exploring alternative futures. When 
assessing  scenarios,  all  of  these  three  elements  should  in  the  best  possible  way  be  
present. As in the case of Wagar (1999) and other scenarios where major changes to ei-
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ther for the better or worse take place, alternatives can also serve as warnings. Bell sees 
the purposes of futures studies in discovering or inventing, examining and evaluating, 
and proposing possible, probable and preferable futures. Bell binds the task of a futurist 
in a right, if not an obligation, to engage in the political and social order where futures 
research is enabled, within the limits of respecting human dignity and protecting the 
human rights of the subjects in question. That way the futurist  becomes an element in 
the cycle of political processes by supporting freedom of speech, inquiry, and informa-
tion. These are all elements of free societies, and Bell notes that in an Orwellian world 
governed by the Big Brother, ideology and lies, futures research would not be at all 
possible, probable or preferable. Bell lists nine major tasks of futures studies, and gives 
later key assumptions (underlying beliefs) and general assumptions (foundational be-
liefs) for studying futures. The major tasks as well as the key and general assumptions 
are found in Appendix 2 as a compiled summary on the core elements. Bell’s account is 
lengthy, so attention is only paid to the main elements.  
Bell (ibid, 129-139) gives an elaborative account of the time frame. Time is a neces-
sary element when analyzing and writing scenarios and models. According to current 
standards, time is continuous (instead of being composed of discrete units), linear and 
unidirectional (instead of it being circular or cyclical). Although there may be cycles as 
part of nature, biology and human societies (refer to Kondratieff’s cycles in the global 
economy), cycles are not a type of time. “They are changes in events, activities or 
processes that occur in or with or during time. They are repetitive temporal sequences of 
phenomena. The identical time is never lived over again and the same identical event 
never occurs again.” (Ibid., 131) A third element of time is that it is irreversible, in the 
sense that it only has one direction and that is forward and not backward. Fourthly, Bell 
engages in considering two conceptions of time: the one being labeled as A-series (past-
presence-future), the other as B-series (before-after). A-series was long considered the 
individual experience and definition of time (subjective), whereas B-series was objec-
tive and scientific.  In the end, they are not two different kinds of time but simply two 
ways of viewing the same phenomenon. As the last concept of time, Bell mentions the 
“extended present”. In the astronomical sense, time moves relentlessly on.  
Clock time keeps ticking or pulsating away. Both invite a conception of the present that is only the 
briefest of moments, a knife-edge between the past and the future, between the last tick and the next 
tock. (…) Yet living beings – at least human beings – seldom actually experience the present as 
knife-edged. Rather, we tend to experience an ‘extended present’ that includes not only the knife-
edge of the present, but also the immediate future and immediate past, some duration of time on ei-
ther side of the passing moment as well. (Ibid., 139)  
 
On scenarios as methods of futures studies, Bell (ibid., 316-317) states that scena-
rios can be born to life by using any and all of the specific methods in futures studies. 
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Here the interest is in qualitative scenarios that provide alternative images of the future 
for whole societies both globally and nationally. In the end, scenarios tell stories about 
alternative  possibilities  for  the  future  and  allow people  to  reflect  on  them and explore  
reactions by others. Futurists apply their creativity and imagination and make use of 
their personal experiences, knowledge and capacities for speculation. The “data” can be 
drawn from futurists’ reflections or personal observations, beliefs, and values, and the 
realization of historical changes. There are few limits for scenarios, so they can basical-
ly be a mixture of creative writing, science fiction and fantasy. The alternative in the 
scenario includes a possible version of the future and a probability under various condi-
tions.  What  is  evident  is  the  account  of  desirability  of  the  alternative,  and  a  scenario  
may give implicit or explicit recommendations as far as present choices and actions are 
considered, or what ought to be done in order to anticipate certain outcomes. It may be a 
stunning image of a totally abominable vision of the future, a nightmare of such a 
dreadful magnitude that people will take actions to prevent it ever from happening.   
Mika Mannermaa (1986, 20-24) refers to the first person to use the term “futurolo-
gy”, Ossip K. Flechtheim, and the strong normative touch Flechtheim implied in futures 
studies. The purpose of futurology is to influence in the sense that a better future waits 
us in the end, a place where past problems have been solved. A good criterion to meas-
ure the goodness of futures research is to identify culmination points. Mannermaa (ibid., 
42-48) reminds that there is not a general theory of futures, so the correlation between 
events is hypothetical. For him, scenarios are hypothetical chains of events that are con-
structed in order to pay attention to causal processes and end points. Mannermaa refers 
to Herman Kahn’s and Anthony J. Wiener’s study The Year 2000 (1967). What is of 
interest is the categorization of scenarios. Scenarios can be divided into two groups, 
both including two sub groups. The two groups are projective and prospective scena-
rios, the former including tendency and frame scenarios, the latter normative and con-
trastic scenarios. Here attention is paid to prospective scenarios including the normative 
scenario. Prospective scenarios imply a desired state of future which is expressed 
through realizable goals. Most evident for normative scenarios is the aim to produce a 
picture of a possible and desired future, and the assumption is that from the very begin-
ning one can anticipate the group of defined goals. Although the perspective is turned 
upside down, since the picture is taken from the future towards the presents, in this the-
sis the perspective is from the present to the future. This view makes the description of a 
world parliament more feasible and the single steps and processes can be elaborated on 
an easier scale.  
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Based on these considerations on futures studies, the analysis and the new scenario 
are formed. Bell provides essential information on the nature and assumptions of futures 
studies, and both he and Mannermaa give valuable comments on the inner core of sce-
narios and what they try to influence. Other accounts offer information concerning the 
bigger picture behind futures studies, or detailed information on some specific issues of 
futures studies. In the next chapter, concepts and termini will be elaborated.  
 
2.3 Terminology 
Terminology  matters  and  it  is  essential  to  realize  that  concepts  such  as  globalization,  
federalism, realism or multi-level democracy should not be taken for granted. Their 
meaning is based on the interpretation of individuals, groups and academic circles, and 
they are objects of a continuous debate. Liberalism, realism, critical theory and others 
are politically loaded and their message might be used for political or ideological pur-
poses. The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the methodology and theory for the consid-
eration of the world parliament problematique and the over-encompassing debate in-
cluded in the consideration of world parliament, i.e. the future for states, the globaliza-
tion debate and the form democracy could take in the future. The discussion is linked 
with the renewal of traditional bilateral forums, the ones states are traditionally used to 
cooperate on. To open up this further, it means that sovereignty can, in the light of de-
velopments with a possible world parliament, become questionable.  
Constructivism was already referred to in the context of futures research. It can be 
regarded as structural idealism, as pictured by Alexander Wendt (1999). Since construc-
tivists are interested in units, levels, structures and different agents, the structures and 
agents in this thesis are both individuals and nation-states. The world parliament cannot 
be evaluated without the input by national actors, since a parliament requires the con-
sent given by actors with certain powers invested in the present day context. A scenario 
needs the discussion of the future for the state system. Wendt presents the “states sys-
temic project”, where states form the units in opposition to non-state actors, such as in-
dividuals, citizens’ movements or multinational corporations. This is closely related to 
the systems theory, which generally regards that states do not exist in complete isolation 
from each other. However, the states systemic project regards that its objects can be stu-
died autonomously from other units in world politics. Although the approaches are 
close, they imply contrasting information. (Wendt 1999, 7-14)  
According to Wendt, constructivism assumes “that the structures of human associa-
tion are primarily cultural rather than material phenomena, and against rationalism that 
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these structures not only regulate behavior but construct identities and interests. [In this 
approach] culture is a condition of possibility for power and interest explanations.” (Ib-
id.,  193)  The  state  system  has  been  under  the  domination  of  realism,  but  one  has  to  
borne in mind that the states systemic theory is by definition not realist in the way world 
politics is being viewed. Wendt argues that states embody actors and can be represented 
as so-called people and that they possess anthropomorphic qualities, such as desires, 
beliefs and intentions. The states can be portrayed through four specific objectives. 
Firstly, states can be seen as bodies, reducible to its parts. Wendt regards this as prob-
lematic, since states imply a relationship to societies. Secondly, the objective gives 
states life, since it identifies motivations and national interest. Thirdly, states have iden-
tities (corporate, type, role and collective) and interests (objective and subjective). 
Fourthly, states have four needs, such as physical survival, autonomy, economic well-
being and collective self-esteem. (Ibid., 194-198) Nonetheless, no matter how proble-
matic the states systemic theory is, it still implies a realist vision of the relationship be-
tween states. This could be portrayed as an invented tradition in the realist vision, since 
the Westphalian statehood is not historically old and the nation-states are even younger. 
Nationalism can be categorized in a similar way, since it embodies invented parts that 
begin to develop with time when the traditions are passed to other generations. Valerie 
M. Hudson (2007, 31) offers a different view by stating that “(…) it is impossible to ex-
plain or predict system change on the basis of system-level variables alone”. Foreign 
policy analysis (FPA) complements traditional international relations theory by intro-
ducing an actor-specific perspective. The objective is to look below the nation-state lev-
el  of  analysis  and  pursue  multi-causal  explanations.  The  core  lies  in  the  decision-
making process of leaders, individuals, attitudes, and contexts influence change in so-
ciety. (Ibid., 30-32) Although Hudson looks at the nation-states and their inner events, 
her theory can on a larger scale be applied to the state system. There is always someone 
or some persons who influence decision-making, so the state itself is barely a social 
construction formed by individuals. During the previous centuries, the state has become 
an invented tradition and it has received personified characteristics.  
In order to understand the nature of cosmopolitanism, one must examine the nature 
of the state system and especially sovereignty. Sovereignty is usually divided into inter-
nal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty aims to regard the state as the su-
preme concentration of political authority in a society. States can make final binding 
political decisions, which individuals, corporations or associations cannot make. This is 
seen as a right to act so, since other states recognize the state and give it the authority to 
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act  on behalf  of its  citizens.  The rights are based on a legal assumption rather than on 
political issues. Although popular sovereignty could eventually undermine state sove-
reignty, since the people have the right to revolt if the state acts are illegitimate. How-
ever, a democratic state still holds a de facto sovereignty because it is designed to en-
force laws and decisions for the society. One important discussion around sovereignty 
involves the question whether sovereignty can be divided. The contemporary version 
holds that it can be disaggregated by functions, levels or issue areas. The Weberian tra-
dition conceptualizes sovereignty as a property of a structure, even if it was property of 
state actors. Here the individuals and the bureaucracy make up the state, i.e. they form 
an organizational structure that is unified as a group. This makes the modern version of 
sovereignty difficult to locate, since it is not apparently structured in one location. 
(Wendt 1999, 206-208) 
The external concept of sovereignty signifies the lack of any external authority 
above the state, such as other states or international law. As a summary, this is constitu-
tional independence. However, international interdependence affects states as they be-
come subjects of external constraints through their actions. “This creates a gap between 
their right to do what they want and their ability to exercise that  right,  but it  does not 
mean that outsiders have ‘authority’ over states. Authority requires legitimacy, not mere 
influence or power.” (Ibid., 208) States that recognize each other do not tend to conquer 
each other, because the recognition implies a willingness to let other states enjoy their 
freedom of right. According to Wendt, sovereignty does not necessarily presume a so-
ciety or system of states. Empirical statehood does not need de jure existence. “Recog-
nition confers upon states certain powers in a society of states, but freedom from exter-
nal authority per se does not presuppose it.” (Ibid., 209) The concept of sovereignty has 
changed during recent decades. Although globalization is not a fixed term, global is-
sues, actions and transformations have affected the nature of state autonomy and sove-
reignty. The recognition of the sovereignty of another state does not guarantee good in-
ter-state relations, neither can the role of individuals, the civil society nor multinational 
corporations be interpreted traditionally, as merely subjects to states.  
The current concept of nation-state is rather weak, since it implies a national unity in 
a state. The states are more or less ethnically and nationally mixed, so nation-states are 
not relevant as terms. However, nation-states imply a level of thought that must be in-
cluded here, because in a historical perspective the concept ‘nation-state’ is interesting 
and gives insight into the elaboration of sovereignty. In this thesis the concept of ‘state’ 
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is referred to as an equal to the concept of ‘nation-state’; state is considered a general 
concept and no actual state is exemplified.  
 ‘Reform’ refers to the enhancement of democratic processes by reducing heavy 
administration and increasing direct democracy in reference to the individuals. Reform 
is usually linked with a positive change. There is not one single definition of reform, 
since scenarios elaborate the term in differing ways. International democracy, on the 
other hand, is often regarded through negative lenses. This implies that sovereignty is 
viewed as an absolute and attempts to challenge it are seen as endangering a well pre-
served entity of states. It should nevertheless be borne in mind that it implies several 
positive features. The fact that I am examining the possible positive aspects of supra-
national institutions and questioning the role of states at the same time does not imply 
that there would not have been successes in the national democracies of states. But the 
approach here is not directed towards the states as members of the international com-
munity. National democracies work well in the present conditions, but there are parts of 
the process that deserve criticism. When individual freedom has been delimited, the ac-
tions have been mainly orchestrated by state governments. My perspective is between 
the need for individual justice and the state-centered interests, thus this thesis studies the 
difference of emphasis, importance and priority.    
 
2.4 Conceptual changes in international and multi-level governance 
How should the difference between international and multi-level governance be unders-
tood? International includes the reference in itself: it simply means between nations i.e. 
states. However, as Sørensen argues (2004, 59-60), international economy and technol-
ogy increasingly influence states across national borders. States are traditionally re-
garded as possessors of sovereignty, their own freedom and the concept of non-
interference in the internal matters of other individual states. Here, the term ‘interna-
tional’ bears the significance of states as sovereign if also in close connection to other 
states. In contrast, multi-level governance is used in a broad sense: it signifies political, 
economic, non-governmental as well as governmental cooperation or connection be-
tween different individuals. Multi-level governance also encompasses cultural and so-
cietal actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) and citizens’ movements. 
The  EU serves  as  an  excellent  example  of  multi-level  governance.  Debate  concerning  
the strengthening of multi-level governance is often connected to the debate on the 
weakening of states, and this is intertwined with the goal of establishing a parliamentary 
assembly or a world parliament. The idea of a retreat of the state is of great relevance, 
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since  it  directly  questions  the  role  of  states  and  concerns  the  possibility  whether  there  
should or could be a new global institution.  
In reference to the theory of the shift from modern to postmodern statehood, Søren-
sen (2003, 11-14) examines the development of the people into citizens. The develop-
ment had an impact on the transformation of regional entities into a modern state. Be-
fore the modern state, persons were subjects of various authorities, subjected to the 
feudal order or to the church. However, as the power and the authority began to concen-
trate on the King and his government, the persons became direct subjects. The transfor-
mation from subjects into citizens occurred gradually. The modern, also called the 
Westphalian state, came to its conclusion around 1950 in Western Europe and in North-
ern America. Predominant for the modern state were a centralized government, defined 
territory with a community of citizens and a national economy (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. The modern state 
 
Government 
A centralized system of democratic rule, based on a set of administrative, policing and 
military organizations, sanctioned by a legal order, claiming a monopoly of the legitimate 
use of force, all within a defined territory. 
 
Nationhood 
A people within a territory making up a community of citizens (with political, social and 
economic rights) and a community of sentiment based on linguistic, cultural and historical 
bonds. Nationhood involves a high level of cohesion, binding nation and state together.  
 
Economy 
A segregated national economy, self-sustained in the sense that it comprises the main sec-
tors needed for its reproduction. The major part of economic activity takes place at home. 
Source: Sørensen (2003, 14) 
 
According to Sørensen, realists emphasize the great hegemony that could control the 
flow of events. Once the appropriate conditions are established, societal groups, indi-
viduals, organizations and corporations could join the effort. States would function as 
supervisors of the progress. For liberals, this view might show a strong inclination to-
wards realism. However, what realists have not considered is that societies and markets 
also affect states. Economic globalization and the intensified interdependence between 
societal actors compel states to change. Deepened international cooperation signifies an 
increased role for international institutions, as anticipated by liberals. (Ibid., 170-171) 
We are not in a final phase of the state transformation. The transformative process is not 
finished and therefore we cannot be sure about the change and the form that the post-
modern state will eventually take. The nature of state transformation and the eagerness 
of state actors to yield power is an important asset for a world parliament because a par-
liament with strong powers is still interdependent on the state system. 
The postmodern state, on the other hand, is in progress, since it is not entirely clear 
what has replaced the modern state in the transformation period. The postmodern state 
is a summary of the changes that have been apparent during the decades following the 
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Second World War (see Table 2). The postmodern state portrays the government af-
fected by multi-level governance on several levels – the supra-national, international, 
trans-governmental and transnational – while supra-national elements influence the na-
tionhood and the economy is integrated into cross-border networks. (Ibid., 161-163) 
 
Table 2. The postmodern state 
 
Government 
Multilevel governance in several interlocked arenas overlapping each other. Gover-
nance in context of supranational, international, transgovernmental and transnational 
relations.  
 
Nationhood 
Supranational elements in nationhood, both with respect to the ‘community of citizens’ 
and the ‘community of sentiment’. Collective loyalties increasingly projected away 
from the state. 
 
Economy 
‘Deep integration’: major part of economic activity is embedded in cross-border net-
works. The ‘national’ economy is much less self-sustained than it used to be.   
Source: Sørensen (2003, 162) 
 
2.4.1 Globalization and democracy 
 
The semantic arbitrariness, as Holton (1998, 11-12) pictures it, can be bypassed by the 
way the concepts are constructed in reference to that with which they are contrasted. 
Sørensen’s (2003) definition of globalization is broad, including “the expansion and in-
tensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations across borders. (…) The 
process of globalization is pushed by several factors, including economic, technological, 
political and social ones. Globalization is both a cause and a consequence.” (Ibid., 23) 
Sørensen sees a division into globalization believers and skeptics. The former believe 
that globalization already has changed the current world in economic and social aspects. 
Scholars who believe in the retreat of the state theory fall into this category. The latter 
regard globalization as nothing new, since it has progressed for decades. The state-
centric scholars mainly belong to this group. (Ibid., 25)  
Holton (1998, 80-84) asks whether economic globalization might make states out-
dated. This could be happening but the main interest is directed towards influence from 
non-market forces. Therefore, globalization should not only be seen in economic terms. 
Holton also poses the question whether the nation-state is finished. If national sove-
reignty has never been absolute and unconditional, then the influence of contemporary 
global processes on the undermining of national sovereignty must be dealt with care. “If 
absolute sovereignty never existed, what exactly about sovereignty is being under-
mined?” (Ibid., 84) Holton does agree, however, that this question does not eliminate 
the argument that globalization in fact has challenged national sovereignty. According 
to him (ibid., 85-107), globalization affects both state sovereignty and the nation inside 
state borders. The absolute sovereignty might have become a myth but globalization 
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might undermine the sovereignty of the state. Holton draws the conclusion that nation-
states have not come to an end and that they still hold the strings of power monopoly 
within the politics of globalization. Therefore, globalism cannot be viewed only as an 
inter-state matter but as a game of multiple actors.  
According to Held (1995, 16-17), traditional national democracy has been chal-
lenged by regional and global interconnectedness. The role of national political systems 
weakens as governments cannot exclusively determine their citizens’ needs. Held ar-
gues that “quasi-regional or quasi-supranational organizations, such as the EU, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
diminish the range of decisions open to given national ‘majorities’.” (Ibid., 17) The dis-
tribution of power is shared by several centers that each aim at determining the role of 
democracy and politics. Held accentuates that one has to look at the terms of power, au-
thority and accountability in a new light – terms that are traditionally connected with the 
nation-state. States are a myth in a sense. Established states date back only to the 17th 
century when the Thirty Years’ War came to an end and the Peace of Westphalia was 
signed in 1648. National constitutions that legitimized the power of the governments 
were not introduced until roughly the 18th century.  
Held (1995, 272) asks how cosmopolitan democratic law is to be maintained. Those 
who participate in democratic processes should be the guardians of democratic law and 
several institutions could determine the outcome and processes of politics. Cosmopoli-
tan democratic law should be enshrined by constitutions of national and international 
parliaments or assemblies. International courts play a great role in securing the rights of 
individuals, as they can influence governments when individual liberty is violated. This 
system could be summed up as a checks-and-balances rotation. The international courts 
would supervise the conduct and actions of separate governments and thus increase de-
mocracy. Held takes up the idea of establishing transnational legislative and executive 
powers in both regional and global spheres. He aims at creating regional parliaments 
and the enhancing the already existing ones, such as the European Parliament. He poses 
the possibility of having transnational referenda on contested issues in politics. (Ibid., 
272-273) Held leaves the individual with a large degree of influence. To increase the 
supervision of national governments, he proposes the call for an authoritative assembly 
where all democratic states and agencies participate.  
It is important how we conceive globalization. This thesis focuses on the non-
economic aspects of globalization, the political and ideological globalization, if it exists 
at all. Despite this, economy and globalization cannot be completely separated. Scholte 
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(2003, 84-85) defines globalization through four concepts. It can be understood as in-
ternationalization, which refers to the growing interdependence between various people. 
Globalization can also be seen as liberalization, forwarded by the neoliberals. This is, 
however, redundant, since liberalized trade was typical for times before the globaliza-
tion debate. The third concept is of globalization as universalization, referring mainly to 
cultural  exchange.  The  fourth  one  is  the  picture  of  globalization  as  westernization  in  
reference to post-colonial imperialism and homogenization. Hirst & Thompson (2003, 
98-105) challenge economic globalization as a possible myth which has been put for-
ward by the discussion on globalization itself. The internationalized economy currently 
at hand is not unprecedented. They argue that the economic system is less open and in-
tegrated than the system that existed from 1870 to 1914.     
Hardt & Negri (2003, 116-117) state that along the economic aspects of globaliza-
tion a global order has emerged, which they call a new structure of rule. This is a politi-
cal-juridical matter that directly involves sovereignty. Empire, on the other hand, is a 
political  subject  that  regulates  global  exchange  and  governs  the  world  as  a  sovereign.  
Hardt & Negri do not share the argument that sovereignty would have become con-
trolled by economic factors and would have declined. Some observers regard the politi-
cal and economic elements of globalization as competing forces, the economy finally 
freeing itself from political control. They argue that sovereignty has reformed itself and 
formed a new global logic of rule, called the Empire. They specify that empire and im-
perialism are not synonyms. Imperialism is most often understood as European colo-
nialism, whereas an Empire emerged at the end of modern sovereignty, in contrast to 
imperialism. “Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on 
fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule 
that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding fron-
tiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges 
through modulating networks of command.” (Ibid., 117)  
The dilemma still remains: who commands and who supervises the commands? 
Hardt & Negri participate in the discussion of the USA becoming an empire. Although 
in reality, the empire is often blood-stained, its purpose should be dedicated to perpetual 
and universal peace outside of history. Globalization is not a single object but a bundle 
of possibilities, multiple processes in need of reorganization. The forces responsible for 
sustaining the Empire are also capable of establishing a counter-Empire, an alternative 
with own political organizations and global exchanges. Hardt & Negri state that strug-
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gles have been already present to construct a real alternative for Empire and the alterna-
tive might not be territorially limited either. (Ibid., 117-119)  
Johan Galtung (2000, 143-145) calls the ongoing global projects with the term 
‘world-building’. This resembles the concepts of ‘state-building’ or ‘nation-building’ 
which global citizens are more familiar with. In the last few centuries, humankind has 
been involved in building democracy and human rights. The latter have bypassed the 
former state- or nation-building phases. “The introduction of democracy was also a 
clever effort to solidify coherence by adding consent – protecting the state construction 
with the argument that ‘the majority is always right’.” (Ibid., 144.) However, there are 
several problems with democracy in general and with global democracy. The democra-
cy that single states make up does not sum up in global democracy. According to Gal-
tung, the world system can still be described as feudal or hierarchic-anarchic because 
great powers posit excess military and political power. He argues that people should 
have invested in the nation-building project 200 or more years ago, before projects on 
human rights and democracy. If they had completed the former, the number of demo-
cracies would have been smaller compared to the current system. Galtung is pleased that 
this did not happen, but democracy and nation-building occurred in parallel, and that we 
now have a reality within clearly defined tasks. However, since the Second World War, 
both of the projects have been secondary compared to economic growth. (Ibid., 145) 
Galtung is mainly concerned with the development of the UN apparatus, but what is es-
pecially important, is the question of how to institutionalize global democracy.  
Galtung’s guidelines for the improvement of global democracy include proposals 
for the different levels of authority, the local, national and the international. He proposes 
a Second Assembly for people (UNPA) close to the General Assembly, a Third Assem-
bly for corporations (a UNCA) and a Fourth Assembly for local authorities (a UNLAA). 
Galtung’s UNPA would possess rights to enact laws, budgets and appointments. Only 
the UNPA would have decision-making power, whereas the Third and the Fourth As-
semblies were mainly of consultative nature. Galtung also introduces a Fifth Assembly 
for  NGO’s  (CONGO).  He  has  provided  a  list  with  some answers  for  a  potential  non-
territorial world citizen who would like to be admitted to a UN Assembly. (Ibid., 153-
156) The list offers a practical solution for democratic deficit and the improvement of 
these deficits. It also draws the attention to issues that are important when thinking 
about democratic reforms and future scenarios.10 
                                               
10 More on Galtung’s reasoning in Kuper, Andrew (2004): Democracy Beyond Borders. Justice and Re-
presentation in Global Institutions. New York.  
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1) Is the organization internationally representative? Does it have members in sufficiently many 
countries distributed over a sufficient number of continents, preferably also across cultural 
and political as well as geographical, divides? 
2) Is the organization sufficiently democratic? Is the leadership of the organization accountable 
to its members, and can it be changed through a process of election? 
3) Is the organization concerned with basic human needs and rights? Or is the focus on the ra-
ther narrow interests of rather special groups? 
4) Is the organization capable of reflecting world perspectives, rather than having a perspective 
which is only regional, or even national? And if so, is this reflected in the power distribution 
inside the organization (…)? 
5) Does the organization have a certain permanence? Or is it rather ephemeral, something that 
easily withers away? (Ibid., 156-157) 
 
Examining the points separately, they each favor certain target groups, be it multi-
national states (point 1), democracies (point 2), addressing general human solidarity 
(point 3), focusing on world interests (point 4) and favoring permanence (point 5). Cor-
porations should also join the effort of institutions to undergo a democratic process. As 
a word of warning, Galtung argues that if the states fail to notice the link between glo-
balization and democracy, state sovereignty may be overtaken and passed by other sys-
tems. (Ibid., 157-159) The space of sovereign states has become avoidable while new 
spaces adopt their place. As an example, international economy is in some degree at 
odds with the modern state system. According to Murphy (1996, 107-108), social and 
environmental developments confront the economic system as incompetent to face the 
reality. He catches the attention to the challenges for the existing order that are mani-
fested at different scales and in overlapping spaces. State nationalism has proliferated, 
making global challenges even more difficult. (Ibid., 110-111)  
 
2.4.2 Sovereignty in a changing environment  
 
As elaborated above, the definition of sovereignty implies a strong legal reference: in-
disputably, sovereignty is a major issue of international public law. According to Hensel 
(2004, 37-38), sovereignty has been seen as deriving from a god in the historical dis-
course. It has also been connected to the authority of the ruler exercising power over the 
subjects.  The  contemporary  concept  of  sovereignty  is  referred  to  de facto and de jure 
elements of sovereignty. The main social scientific interest is the concept of sovereignty 
as a social construction.  
Sovereignty, (…), is an inherently social concept. States’ claims to sovereignty construct a social en-
vironment in which they can interact as an international society of states, while at the same time the 
mutual recognition of claims to sovereignty is an important element in the construction of states 
themselves. (Biersteker & Weber 1996, 1-2) 
 
The social construction of sovereignty is important, since the theoretical background is 
based on social constructivism. As nationalism, also state and sovereignty are products 
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of a discourse, constantly subordinate to change and transformation. This concerns the 
role of state as identity and institution. (Ibid., 11)  
Sørensen (2003, 112-116) examines the problem of sovereignty from multiple pers-
pectives. Sovereignty is portrayed as a social construction on legal principles. It con-
tains  the  rules  that  define  political  authority  and  set  the  context  for  relations  between  
states. However, what happens to sovereignty as a consequence of the substantial 
changes in statehood? It is argued that constitutional independence will remain in place. 
However, at the level of regulative rules, meaning the rules by which actors actually 
play the sovereignty ‘game’, sovereignty has developed in new ways. It is misleading to 
talk about the end of sovereignty, but some change has occurred, especially in the EU. 
The regulative rules of the modern sovereignty game, non-intervention and reciprocity, 
have been reformed. This is evidenced in the context of supranational governance where 
systematic interference in the domestic affairs has taken place. The state appears to be 
challenged by many quarters, including global market forces, international institutions 
and popular movements. Sørensen argues that the institution of sovereignty has changed 
in postmodern statehood. Multi-level governance is quite the opposite of non-
intervention – the traditional ‘golden rule’ of sovereignty – but a rather systematic in-
tervention in national affairs by international or supranational institutions. States accept 
this because they get something in return, a measure of influence on the domestic affairs 
of other states. (Ibid., 114-121) 
Susan Strange (1996, 197-199) binds the question of sovereignty together with the 
problems of global governance. She argues that global governance is lacking an opposi-
tion. Not a single non-state authority that has authority status is democratically go-
verned. The corporate world consists of a hierarchy, not of a democracy. The cartels, 
insurance businesses and the mafias are not interested in democratizing effects. Strange 
calls for a force to check the “arbitrary or self-serving use of power” (Ibid., 198). Only 
world elections could initially take the role of a force of the alternative opposition. Al-
though Strange’s theory of the lacking opposition is of economic nature, its key ideas 
are relevant for the study of sovereignty.  Besides being interested in the dispersion of 
power in the global economy, she also pays attention to the society in the need for an 
authority. The individuals, for whom the dispersion of authority might be unclear, have 
to bear the burden of what Strange calls Pinocchio’s problem. It refers to the relation-
ship between the individual and the state. “The strings that held each of us to the nation-
state [are] like the strings that were attached to Pinocchio, making him the puppet of 
forces he could neither control nor influence. [When he magically turned into a real boy 
 33
 
at the end of the story], he had no strings to guide him. He had to make up his own mind 
what  to  do  and  whose  authority  to  respect  and  whose  to  challenge  and  resist.”  (Ibid.,  
198-199)  
What Strange suggests is that we have to pose ourselves questions about global go-
vernance. Since the current world system consists of conflicting forces of authority, we 
are indeed facing Pinocchio’s problem. Where are the strings that are holding us togeth-
er? Where do we place or locate allegiance, loyalty and identity? The allegiance is 
sometimes  directed  towards  a  government  of  a  state  and  sometimes  towards  a  social  
movement operating across territorial frontiers. Since the end of the Cold War, we are 
facing  a  system where  a  new absence  of  absolutes  reigns.  Our  conscience  is  the  only  
guide that can lead us. (Ibid.) Perhaps neo-medievalism can be a solution. This can be 
evident if cosmopolitanism proceeds on a concrete level and in what extent the cam-
paign on the world parliament is executable. According to Strange (ibid.), typical for 
neo-medievalism is shared sovereignty, supranational or trans-local governance that 
gain ground as well as diversified regulatory organizations. 
Global democracy, globalization, the formation and transformation of sovereignty, 
potentially arising Empires or counter-Empires, and legal paradigms are all part of the 
aggregate or the niche where a possible world parliament is to be fitted within. These 
abstract issues are all part of the same cake: by removing one slice the completeness of 
the whole cake is changed. For this reason, all of the above mentioned issues of world 
politics have been mentioned, although some are more relevant than others when consi-
dering a world parliament.   
In the next chapter, the focus is turned towards case scenarios and models on a 
global institution. The models are various in their content, but they all acknowledge 
some forms of global representation, considering legal, institutional, political, democrat-
ic and sovereignty-related issues. After they are analyzed with methods from futures 
studies, a compiled scenario of my own will be established, based on the story line of 
the coming thirty years, the nature of a world parliament and its powers as a global ac-
tor. As a further supplement, Appendix 3 offers solutions on how to interpret and eva-
luate world parliament proposals. The purpose of Troy Davis’ solutions is to clarify the 
understanding of the proposals for the reader, and not to act as a guideline for the ex-
amination of the proposals as such.  
 34
 
3. Case analysis: models of a new global platform 
3.1 General observations on the models 
In this chapter, altogether 17 individual scenarios11 from the time period 2003-2010 will 
be elaborated. Andreas Bummel and Joseph E. Schwartzberg have two individual mod-
els, and Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss have their individual scenarios and a com-
bined one. The proposals of Bummel and Schwartzberg are included under one model 
for each, whereas Falk and Strauss employ 3 scenarios altogether. In the end of chapter 
4.2, Table 4 presents a summary of the 17 proposals elaborated in chapter 4.1. The sce-
nario in chapter 5, however, follows standards set by the theory and methodology of fu-
tures studies. In the analysis, attention is given to the following remarks: 
1) The article’s content and the feasibility aspect of the proposal.  
2) The general need for a world parliament in the global arena. 
3) The main initiators of change in the global arena and the world parliament. 
4) Technical and realistic considerations on how to establish a world parliament. 
5) The approach of the article and the methodology adopted by it.  
 
In chapter 4.2, the feasibility of the content in reference to a potential or non-potential 
world parliament is evaluated. Overall attention is given to the political aspects of a 
world parliament instead of the global economic system.  
The idea of cosmopolitanism existed before nationalism, dating back to ancient 
Greece, and cosmopolitanism found room in Kant’s writings in the late 18th century 
(Fine 2007, IX).  With the closure of the Cold War, the debate on the UN reform gained 
renewed ground, and when the UN celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1995, proposals 
were published. At the time of the anniversary, few theoretical debates had been started, 
as Bienen, Rittberger et al. (1996) state. Most of the proposals were detailed suggestions 
on the form of democracy in the UN. The latter half of the 1990’s was interested in two 
versions of reform, the one emphasizing states and the other promoting individuals as 
the subjects of democracy. The 21st century has witnessed proposals made for a world 
parliament outside the UN context.  
A few remarks on the sovereignty are also in order. Andreas Hasenclever et al. 
(1996) note that “[s]overeignty as an institutional concept is inextricably related to the 
                                               
11 The fact that precisely these 17 models were selected is based on the assumption of relevance and fram-
ing. Other models could have been included, but since the time and space of a Master’s thesis is limited, 
only a certain number of scenarios could be included in the analysis. Originally, the material consisted of 
over 20 proposals. In the end, some of the excluded ones did not take any stand on global institutional 
considerations, or they were more generally discussing international organizations without including an 
analysis of a world parliament (WPA/WP), GPA, UNPA or other institutions. Some of the proposals were 
political pamphlets instead of academic articles, so they were excluded. The 17 models consider issues of 
global assembly and parliamentary proposals, or envision new forms of global democracy and the role of 
international law. The length of the models was not decisive but the content played a crucial role.     
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territorial and hierarchical organization of rule [‘Herrschaft’  in Max Weber’s sense] in 
the modern state system. (…) Outside a state’s territory, and in its relations to other 
states, anarchy reigns.” Hasenclever et al. also contribute to the discussion on sove-
reignty by introducing the term ‘new medievalism’. By this they implicate that  
[i]n such a system, units are so fragmented and so penetrated or dependent, the borders between the 
domestic and the international are so blurred, and authority-relations are so dehierarchized, that it is 
impossible to speak of ‘sovereignty’ in any empirically tangible sense. [This is] based, (…), on the 
observation that sovereign state authority is increasingly transferred to international organizations as 
well as to nongovernmental organizations and transnational corporations, (…). [I]t is viewed as the 
result of ‘globalization’, i.e. the fact that transnational, above all economic, actors are increasingly 
able to allocate significant values beyond the reach and control of state actors. (Ibid.)     
 
The theory of new medievalism assumes that the liberal model looses significance 
in relation to globalization with the emancipation of the transnational civil society. Ha-
senclever et al. ask what model of international organization is best suited for the post-
modern international system. In the medieval system, two so-called “world organiza-
tions” existed, the Holy Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic Church. Hasenclever et 
al. take a stand on the UN reform rather than on a world parliament. For them the UN 
projects are similar to the models of “Global Manager” and “Global Counsel”. The Em-
pire was devoted to possess the highest secular power in the Western hemisphere and 
the Church declared to be the highest spiritual authority, both holding important politi-
cal  powers  in  their  own  time.  The  writers  criticize  the  establishment  of  the  UN  as  a  
Global Counsel; they envisage that this role presupposes a unitary world citizenship, 
which is hard to realize. (Ibid.) On the other hand, the current cosmopolitan debate re-
volves  either  around the  UN context  or  the  world  parliament  and  often  the  discussion  
neglects each other. The KDUN distributed a proposal paper on the UNPA to hundreds 
of decision-makers in September 2004 with the aim of restarting the political discussion 
on the UNPA. During the spring and summer 2005, the Liberal International (LI) and 
the European Parliament showed their support for the UNPA. The LI strives for a con-
sultative status with secondary semi-autonomous body according to the Article 22 of the 
UN Charter. The EP favors a UNPA with genuine rights and control mechanisms. 
 
Table 3. List of models 
 
No. Author/s Title Book/Journal/Publisher 
1 Falk, Richard & Strauss, 
Andrew (2003) 
Toward Global Parliament A Reader on Second Assembly & 
Parliamentary Proposals 
2 Heinrich, Dieter (2003) Extension of Democracy to the Global 
Level 
A Reader on Second Assembly & 
Parliamentary Proposals 
3 Laurenti, Jeffrey (2003) An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come A Reader on Second Assembly & 
Parliamentary Proposals 
4 Levi, Lucio (2003) Globalization, International Democracy 
and a World Parliament 
A Reader on Second Assembly & 
Parliamentary Proposals 
5 Roche, Douglas (2003) The Case for a United Nations Parlia-
mentary Assembly 
A Reader on Second Assembly & 
Parliamentary Proposals 
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6 Schwartzberg, Joseph E. 
(2003 and 2004) 
Overcoming Practical Difficulties in 
Creating a World Parliamentary Assem-
bly (WPA) and Revitalizing the United 
Nations 
A Reader on Second Assembly & 
Parliamentary Proposals and other 
material 
7 Bummel, Andreas (2010a 
and 2010b) 
The composition of a Parliamentary As-
sembly at the United Nations and Devel-
oping International Democracy – For a 
Parliamentary Assembly at the United 
Nations 
KDUN  
 
8 Onesta, Gérard (2010) From a European to a World Parliament KDUN 
9 Archibugi, Daniele 
(2007) 
Can Democracy Be Exported?  
 
Widener Law Review 
10 Baxi, Upendra (2007) Towards a General Assembly of Peoples: 
Notes for Conversation 
Widener Law Review  
11 Falk, Richard (2007) What Comes After Westphalia: The 
Democratic Challenge 
Widener Law Review  
12 Franck, Thomas (2007) Speech: One Man One Vote Or One Man 
One Goat: Reflections on Democracy in 
the Global Arena 
Widener Law Review  
13 Johansen, Robert C. 
(2007) 
The E-Parliament: Global Governance to 
Serve the Human Interest 
Widener Law Review 
14 Kennedy, David (2007) Speech: Assessing the Proposal for a 
Global Parliament: A Skeptics View 
Widener Law Review 
15 Patomäki, Heikki (2007) Rethinking Global Parliament: Beyond 
the Indeterminacy of International Law 
Widener Law Review  
16 Strauss, Andrew (2007) On the First Branch of Global Gover-
nance 
Widener Law Review 
17 Marchetti, Raffaele 
(2006) 
Global Governance or World Federal-
ism? A Cosmopolitan Dispute on Institu-
tional Models 
Global Society 
 
As was suggested earlier, the concept of model and scenario are contextually differ-
ent. Less than half of the original 17 models can be labeled scenarios, whereas the rest 
are either mathematical or thematic models. Only scenarios can be referred to as feasi-
ble, although chapter 4.2 also considers the impact of the models as well.  
 
3.2 Models for a new world order 
3.2.1 Global democracy and governance  
 
This chapter examines the models by Bummel, Falk & Strauss, and Archibugi. They 
illustrate both UNPA and WP related proposals. The perspective is directed from above, 
considering large scale issues rather than details. Therefore, global democracy and as-
pects of governance receive considerable attention.  
According to Andreas Bummel, the world parliament is not realistic and could not 
be established in the present conditions. He is concerned that neither the UN nor any 
other global organization possess formal parliamentary bodies, not even with advisory 
capacity. Against this democratic deficiency, Bummel suggests the establishment of the 
UNPA. He is head of the German-based KDUN and an active member of the UNPA 
online campaign. (Bummel 2010a, 9-10) He calls for the inclusion of the world citizens 
into the UN activities. The UNPA would serve as a new quality with the stronger repre-
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sentation of individuals in an international environment. As the first step, the UNPA 
could be established as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly or as a specialized 
agency. In this initial phase the UNPA would consist of national parliamentarians. “In 
later steps, the UNPA’s sphere of influence should be extended to the institutions of the 
UN system and the economic and financial institutions through a similar gradual affilia-
tion. (…) the UNPA could finally be incorporated into the UN with the status as main 
body.” (Bummel 2010b, 16-17) The work of the UNPA would be formed through ple-
nary, commission and party sessions and they would be held in open sessions, in close 
collaboration with the civil society and government representatives.  
[T]he UNPA formally could be established underneath the threshold of Charter reform in two ways. 
The first option would be to establish it through a decision of the UN General Assembly under Ar-
ticle 22 of the UN Charter as semi-autonomous subsidiary body. (…) Option two would be to estab-
lish it as an independent specialized agency on the basis of an international treaty and a subsequent 
co-operation agreement on the mutual relations with the United Nations. (…) Article 57 of the Char-
ter [is] not applicable since this rule affects a relation with the Economic and Social Council and 
therefore would imply undesirable thematic limitations. (Ibid., 23)  
         
The establishment through an independent international treaty would demand a diplo-
matic conviction of the majority of countries. However, the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) has been established through an independent international treaty, so this 
could also theoretically apply to the UNPA. The second option could also be achieved 
through the first option, resulting in a specialized agency, which would be easier than to 
directly form a new international institution. (Ibid.; see also Appendix 4) 
In the second account, Bummel (2010a, 7-8) reconsiders his models on the UNPA. 
According to him, the way the international community responded to the global finan-
cial crisis and the failure of the UN Conference on Climate Change in December 2009 
in Copenhagen showed that “the UN suffers from a sharp contrast between its large and 
small member states and that its current design is unable to offer a working solution to 
bridge this divide”. (Ibid., 9) He offers models A to D as solutions to the improvement 
of the UN system and the introduction of the UNPA as a representative intergovernmen-
tal body of autonomous delegates, not government diplomats. The delegates should be 
chosen from within and by political groups existing in national legislatures. An example 
is provided from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Bummel does 
not discard the possibility of direct elections, but rather sees them as the result of a later 
stage, when a transition has taken place. The delegates in a UNPA would be organized 
according to multifaceted political, national and regional groupings. If a country has no 
political groups, the UNPA delegates could be chosen by parliament directly. However, 
the independence of delegates should arise from their personal judgment and con-
science. Governments should not be able to influence their decision-making and voting 
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powers. Problems arise from states without multi-party systems or weak legislatures. 
Some proponents have suggested even-sized electoral districts to a world parliament but 
Bummel considers this as not viable from a pragmatic point of view. (Ibid., 12-16) 
It  is recommended that the determination of the number of seats per country in a UNPA should be 
based on the principle of “degressive proportionality”, corresponding to the example of regional par-
liaments and parliamentary assemblies. [It] allows to achieve a reasonable balance between the prin-
ciples of democratic representation on the one hand and of the equality of states on the other. (…) 
The models are all designed in a way that they do not exceed an upper limit of around 800 seats. One 
of the basic purposes of a UNPA is to reflect the political plurality of the population of the UN mem-
ber states. In consideration of this, a minimum of two seats is allocated to every country, one to be 
selected by the majority, the other by the minority in parliament. (Ibid., 7) 
 
In  models  (A)  to  (D),  Bummel  considers  potential  ways  to  allocate  seats  to  coun-
tries. Model (A) illustrates proportional distribution, model (B) the square root formula, 
model  (C)  considers  population,  UN dues  and  sovereignty  as  developed  by  Joseph  E.  
Schwartzberg (see chapter 3.2.3), and model (D) adopts the view by the Commission to 
Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP) according to population, UN dues and sove-
reignty (1970). An important asset of the models concerning the distribution of seats is 
that an upper limit of the total number of seats must be considered, and that population 
size is an indispensable criterion. An interesting part of Bummel’s account is the inter-
national poll conducted in 15 countries on behalf of the BBC in 2007. The poll included 
the question “How likely would you be to support a Global Parliament, where votes are 
based on country population sizes and the global parliament is able to make binding 
policies?”  According  to  the  poll,  only  three  states  –  Dubai,  India  and  South  Africa  –  
showed high interest in the majority of responses. The overall picture however showed 
insufficient popular support. Important for all the four models is that a majority of dele-
gates would come from countries classified by Freedom House foundation as “electoral 
democracy”. Interesting is here the difference to Falk and Strauss, as evidenced later in 
this chapter, in giving weighing measures also to non-democratic states. Bummel sug-
gests that in the case of autocratic regimes with one-party systems, the delegates would 
act with the instructions gotten from their home governments. (Ibid., 21-24) 
To give a closer idea of the four models Bummel (2010a, 25-31) analyzes, here a 
more indebt presentation of them. Model (A) calls for proportional distribution. It as-
sumes that all UN member states participate and the number of delegates is fixed at 800, 
from which 384 seats are distributed on the principle of equality, meaning two for each 
country, while the remaining 416 seats are allocated according to the share in the world 
population. This model gives China, India, USA, Indonesia and Brazil 26.39 percent of 
the total amount of seats. In model (B), the Square Root Formula as devised from Lio-
nel Penrose’s method (1946), the total number of seats is 732. The model is based on 
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the calculation that “it is possible to measure the probability that an individual vote or a 
bloc of votes changes the outcome of a decision that is made by majority rule” (ibid., 
27). Model (B) adopts the same five countries with the largest shares of seats, but the 
total share of seats is lower than in model (A), 14.7 percent.  Model (C) considers popu-
lation, UN dues and sovereignty and it is based on Schwartzberg’s development. This 
model results in 800 seats in total, and the USA, and the members of the G8, G20 and 
the EU would receive the highest combined of seats compared to the other formulas. 
The five countries with the largest share of seats would be the USA, China, Japan, India 
and Germany, giving a more Western touch in comparison to models (A) and (B). The 
last model (D) considers same issues as model (C) but according to the CSOP. Here, the 
total number of seats would reach 675 seats, and the original ceiling of 25 members in 
the CSOP model would thus be abolished. Asian countries, China and India as well 
members of ASEAN would share the lowest number of seats compared with the other 
three models. The five largest share holders of the seats would account for 14.64 percent 
of seats (USA, China, Japan, India and Germany).  
Next, Bummel (ibid., 32-40) considers the democratic character of the Assembly. 
When examining a UNPA, a fear arises that pseudo-parliamentarians would be selected 
to the assembly and take instructions by their democratically illegitimate governments. 
The question thus arises in what extent authoritarian governments could get a foothold 
of the UNPA, and whether they would be able to form a majority in the assembly. The 
problem is that there is no consensus on the measurement and definition of democracy. 
Bummel refers to the rating by Freedom House, the only source to include all UN 
members in its assessment. The criteria Freedom House employs include the following:  
1) A competitive, multiparty political system; 
2) Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (…); 
3) Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot securi-
ty, and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and that yield results that are representative of the 
public will; 
4) Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and 
through generally open political campaigning. (Ibid., 32-33) 
 
Also, electoral democracy requires that the last presidential elections and/or last legisla-
tive elections must have been free and fair. According to the analysis by the Freedom 
House, 88 of the 192 UN member states are “free”, 57 “partly free” and 47 “not free”. 
As a further aspect, political groups within a state must come to a conclusion on how to 
distribute the country seats. After the initial first step of determining the number of seats 
for each country, a country must be broken down to the political level in the respective 
parliament. As an example, as of 2010, the US Democrats would according to model 
(A) receive 12 seats and the Republicans 9 seats of the total of 21 seats. According to 
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this reasoning, also regional parliaments and parliamentary assemblies at the national 
level could dispatch delegates. (Ibid., 33-37) 
Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss (2003, 12) assume that there is a serious lack of 
direct democracy in a globalizing world. As Bummel is more interested in the form and 
the way the UNPA could eventually be established, Falk and Strauss are in the 2003 ac-
count of the opinion that only the cooperation between the civil society and the business 
world leads to a legitimate representative body. Because the authority of the assembly 
would be rooted in the global citizenry, “it could refute the claim that states are bound 
only  by  laws  to  which  they  give  their  consent”.  (Ibid.,  15)  The  assembly  is  seen  as  a  
protector of international norms and standards, since there is nowadays a lack in regard 
to reliable implementation mechanisms.  
Because elected delegates would represent individuals and society instead of states, they would not 
have to vote along national lines. Coalitions would likely form on other bases, such as world-view, 
political orientation, and interests. (…) Some business leaders would certainly oppose a global par-
liament because it would broaden popular decision-making and likely press for transnational regula-
tions. But others are coming to believe that the democratic deficit must be closed by some sort of 
stakeholder accommodation. (…) Many business leaders today (…) agree that democratization is ne-
cessary to make globalization politically acceptable throughout the world. (Ibid., 16-17)  
 
But are the large corporations willing to approach the politically more acceptable world 
through civil  society  or  rather  with  states,  is  another  question.  New diplomacy is  also  
needed which means innovative collaboration between civil society and states. The 
Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court were positive successes in the 
1990’s and were results from a similar cooperation. (Ibid., 17-18) 
Falk  and  Strauss  assume that  there  is  no  need  to  establish  the  assembly  through a  
formal treaty process. Governments might undermine the power of the establishment 
without any formal treaty. They trust on the power of the media which would question 
the opposition by the states. Another option is to base the assembly on a treaty. But also 
using the second option, the civil society would organize the negotiations around the 
establishment of an assembly and through a public relations campaign try to get the 
states to sign the treaty. The business sector would be included in the consultations in 
the organizing committee. Falk and Strauss place great confidence in the strength of in-
dividuals, since they are the forces persuading their governments to sign the treaty. As 
more states would sign the treaty, international pressure would help others to sign. The 
assembly would over time be incorporated into a constitutional framework. As the as-
sembly gains more support, its formal powers would have to undergo a redefinition. The 
assembly could eventually be merged with the UNGA and therefore lead to a bicameral 
legislation system in the UN. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the signing process would gradually 
become customary law.  
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Because leaders can’t lead if followers won’t follow, the political character of societies are deter-
mined by how citizens collectively choose to condition their willingness to follow. (…) In order to 
function effectively, societies need to institutionalize the coordination of actions and no society has 
yet figured out how do so without delegating at least limited decision-making powers. At the level of 
organizing global society, citizens on matters of common global interest have almost exclusively 
come to accept the obligation to follow the legal commands of national authorities as opposed to 
global authorities. (Strauss 2007, 347) 
 
In his later account, Strauss (ibid., 347-348) gives a more detailed account on how 
to establish a Global Parliamentary Assembly (GPA). The world society would be dif-
ferent if citizens had equal voting powers to decide on the selection of global authori-
ties. Therefore, Strauss introduces the first branch of global governance, and by that he 
refers to a world parliament. He approaches the GPA with four models that all include 
one common denominator: that the GPA should be initially a largely advisory rather 
than a fully legislative body with binding powers. He reasons that “postponing the day 
in which the GPA will have significant legislative powers enhances its political viability 
because it encourages those who are presently powerful to focus more on the organiza-
tion’s abstract neutral benefits than on how it might negatively impact their short-term 
political interests”. (Ibid., 348) With time the GPA could evolve from its initial role as 
an advisory body into a “real” parliament. In the future, it could hold hearings and issue 
reports in cases of malfeasance by other international organizations, carry a moral 
weight and provide a political forum, be an intermediator between the representatives to 
work out legislative compromises. The parliament could eventually become a global 
authority, and gradually its powers could be increased by its elected representatives. 
Under the present conditions, there is no global institution having the world’s citizenry 
as its constituency. The UN is an organization for the society of states. The present in-
ternational system misses a large component of effective governance. One idea is for the 
GPA to take a central role between the citizens and the various international organiza-
tions. The biggest challenge, however, is the fact that even a body with an advisory role 
is difficult to establish under current conditions. (Ibid., 349-350)     
Strauss (ibid., 350-354) presents four models on how to approach the GPA. The first 
model (A) concerns the amendment of the UN Charter articles 108 and 109. This is the 
classical  road  to  form  a  GPA.  The  process  at  the  UN  level  to  reform  its  bodies  has  
shown that the road is rocky. The 2005 reform attempts were not successful, and none 
of them included the requirement to amend the UN Charter. To convince two-thirds of 
the UN membership of the need to amend the Charter is not easy, and ratification of the 
amendment is even more challenging, not to mention the securing of affirmative votes 
by the reluctant veto-holding powers in the Security Council. Still, as Strauss concludes, 
this model can be seen as the most legitimate. The second model (B) would create the 
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GPA as a subsidiary organ by the UNGA according to article 22 of the UN Charter. The 
article empowers the UNGA to establish a subsidiary organ when deemed necessary to 
perform its vital functions. This approach is supported by the KDUN. Although this ap-
proach might provide a roundabout way around the UN Charter amendment process, 
political difficulties still remain. A parliament could exceed the wording of a subsidiary 
organ and also the legal questionability of calling a parliament necessary to perform 
functions of the UNGA.  
The International Court of Justice has announced that the UNGA cannot “delegate 
powers to a subsidiary organ that it does not itself possess or are not implied as consis-
tent with the overall structure of the Charter. Since the General Assembly does not have 
the power to represent directly the citizens of the world, and the United Nations is struc-
tured under the Charter as an interstate organization, opponents of the project could 
challenge the General Assembly’s powers to create a parliament.” (Ibid., 352) The 
KDUN suggests that the parliamentary assembly would be composed of representatives 
of national parliaments with direct popular elections in the future, and that all UN mem-
bers could send their representatives to the parliament no matter their democratic or un-
democratic origins. According to Strauss, the idea by the example of the EP bears dan-
gers: if national parliamentarians begin as the actors in the initial parliament, eventually 
they could feel as owners of the parliament and be reluctant to shift the parliament to-
wards directly and independently elected representatives. Without the popular elections 
and thereby given legitimate powers to the parliament, the body would be hardly taken 
seriously or noted at all. If each UN member state was able to send their representatives 
to the parliament, it would undermine the credibility of a well-functioning democratic 
organization as an alternative to authoritarianism. (Ibid., 350-354)  
Model (C) composes of the civil society organizing elections, meaning that actors 
from international civil society establish a provisional structure for the parliament and 
organize as well as carry out elections. In the beginning, the parliament would claim an 
unofficial body and the popular mandate would empower it. To initiate the establish-
ment process, a panel of prominent political and moral figures, former heads of state, 
Nobel Peace Prize winners and other figures could be formed. In their final conference, 
the panel could adopt a more political role needed for the establishment of the parlia-
ment. The civil society would organize elections in all countries where free campaign-
ing is allowed and where elections are not banned and political conditions are favorable. 
This model implies serious political, logistical and financial (esp. funding issues) im-
plementing challenging. It is the model that Strauss and Falk originally favored. There 
 43
 
are no pre-existing structures for a collective decision-making infrastructure concerning 
civil society. The project would be politically more manageable if existing political par-
ties participated along the civil society actors. (Ibid., 354-358) 
The fourth model (D) implies an interstate stand-alone treaty process between will-
ing pioneers, i.e. internationally progressive states. Strauss states that even twenty to 
thirty economically and geographically different countries could establish a world par-
liament. These countries would agree on the voting system and the electoral districts, 
and most of all form a legal structure for the parliament. The parliament could later be 
expended by countries willing to meet the standards and obligations set by the then par-
liament. The most important aspect would be that citizens are allowed to vote represent-
atives to the parliament in free and fair elections. Strauss claims that a parliament estab-
lished along a stand-alone treaty where the membership base is not the one of the UN 
might not be the most novel one. The parliament could cooperate with the UN by enter-
ing into a relationship agreement with the world organization. In this sense, Strauss sees 
the GPA as a parliament strengthening and not replacing the UN. Given time and space, 
the GPA could in cooperation with the UNGA evolve into a truly bicameral legislative 
system capable of producing binding legislation. Model (D) is the most promising of the 
four models Strauss presents. He sees that those countries that truly support a GPA 
would form a democratically best suitable parliament. Later, the GPA could put pres-
sure on countries that could no longer withhold the right of their citizens to vote in the 
globally elected parliament. At that point, these countries could not be in a position to 
compromise the integrity of the GPA, and would join the body according to its own 
democratic standards.12 (Ibid.) 
Falk (2007, 243-244) complements Strauss with a more theoretical and background-
defining method. He gives the face to the ongoing global problems and the difficulty of 
establishing a true global governance structure, namely a global people’s assembly. Ac-
cording to him, the concept of “world government” is associated with the movement 
striving  for  “world  federalism”,  often  interpreted  as  utopian  or  a  way  to  reach  global  
tyranny. Global governance is seen softer, at the interface between realism and liberal-
ism, and tightly based on the Westphalian world order emphasizing sovereign states. 
There is need for a normative framework because practical issues demand to be solved – 
climate change, polar melting, deforestation, transnational crime, international business 
cooperation, and economic globalization. As the actual models of GPA are covered by 
Strauss in the same issue of Widener Law Review, Falk concludes his article by recom-
                                               
12 Refer to the EU enlargement procedure.  
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mending thorough education of citizens. This implies educating the youth to learn about 
an engaged citizenship in the 21st century, and including pedagogy of peace and human 
security as part of the school systems. “The essence of global democracy involves a 
shift in expectations from a geopolitics of force to a geopolitics of dialogue and persua-
sion. (…) Hope begins when we have the moral courage to transcend what seems possi-
ble by what seems necessary and desirable. [T]he changing parameters of debate on 
climate change, facing that ‘inconvenient truth,’ [sic!] is an encouraging sign of an 
emerging receptivity to an acceptance of constraints on behavior for the sake of a hu-
mane future.” (Ibid., 253)     
Daniele Archibugi (2007, 283 and 289-294) approaches the world parliament debate 
from a unique perspective. His article does not offer a scenario, but poses questions for 
consideration. Many powerful political systems, be it Catholic, Protestant, Monarchic, 
Republican, Communist  or Fascist  regimes have tried to impose their  system upon the 
one of others and this has caused problems. He compares exporting democracy with the 
establishment of a world parliament. Exporting democracy was an American dream, he 
summarizes,  and  the  situation  is  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  serve  as  good  examples  of  de-
mocracy exportation. “The error embedded in the crazed desire to export democracy 
concerns only the means, not the ends. If the ends are legitimate, what then are the in-
struments that democratic states should utilize?” (Ibid., 289) Both the export of democ-
racy and the idea of a world parliament imply the increasing of the level of democracy 
on Earth. Democracy export assumes that the ends compose of cooperation, peace, and 
ultimately  democratic  values,  however,  the  system lacks  the  commitment  to  apply  the  
norms and values of democracy at the global level. Those deciding on what is democrat-
ic are prepared to resort to apply means in conflict with the very democratic values and 
procedures in question. Governments use power and have the means to resort to military 
powers. “The proposal of a world parliament (…) assumes that a new institution direct-
ly representing the citizens of the world will also act as an instrument to achieve demo-
cratization inside those countries that are not yet democratic. The main factor here at 
stake is persuasion. [T]he life of a World Parliament will not be dependent on the 
founding governments, but rather on their own people.” (Ibid., 293) However, the estab-
lishment of a world parliament may best  serve in the aftermath of the Iraqi war when 
democracy is defended and renovated through persuasion and dialogue.  
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3.2.2 Federalist perspectives  
 
This chapter examines the models by Levi, Onesta and Marchetti. Lucio Levi (2003, 54-
55), a member of the Executive Committee of the World Federalist Movement (WFM) 
and the Federal Committee of the Union of European Federalists, states that globaliza-
tion has been mainly viewed in its economic aspects but the political dimension of glo-
balization has been neglected. According to Levi, the border between civil society and 
state has shifted.  
Here lies [with the gaining in power of NGO’s, multinational corporations, criminal or terrorist or-
ganizations] the root of decline of the sovereign state that will be overcome only through the estab-
lishment of new forms of statehood at the world level. (…) The response of governments to globali-
zation has been to pursue international cooperation, not because it is their inclination, but because 
they have no other choice. (…) It is a formula that hides the illusion that a solution to the main inter-
national issues can be based on mutual consent among sovereign states. Federalism is the antithesis 
of the international approach. Its strength lies in the alternative goals of world government and inter-
national democracy. However distant and though they can be pursued gradually, these goals are the 
answer to the need to control globalization and to start the process of establishing peace among na-
tions through law. (Ibid., 55-56) 
 
Levi states that the reform of the UN can only be achieved gradually as a long-term 
goal. However, the goal to reform the UN is not a goal in the far distance but an appli-
cable  one.  Of  all  the  states  in  the  world,  over  half  have  adopted  a  democratic  system.  
But democracy alone is not strong enough to prevent the authoritarian regimes to retard 
the process of democratization. Levi uses the EP as an elaborate testing field of interna-
tional democracy. Nonetheless, not only authoritarian governments can hinder the de-
velopment of subjugating globalization under democratic control, but also the USA will 
not have its power being undermined by international organizations and civil society. 
The fact that a government is democratic is not necessary sufficient as the example of 
the USA illustrates. Levi calls for a center of power to oppose the American resistance 
for a worldwide change. The European unification and integration serves as a center of 
power. The Europeans have overcome the nation-state and can take over some of world 
responsibilities that the USA has thus far wielded. As Europe itself has to speak with 
one voice, it has to form a federalist form of governance inside Europe. After the adop-
tion of federalism in its own continent, Europe could widen the process over to other 
regions and at world level, including global organizations. Levi’s footing is in the UN 
representing the world citizens, not the states. (Ibid., 56-61) He asks whether the UNPA 
is still an adequate form of governance in the globalizing world. He exemplifies the di-
rect elections of parliamentarians to the EP as a campaign headed by the European fede-
ralists. Since globalization removes the borders between national and international poli-
tics, the UNPA could be insufficient in responding to the demands of international de-
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mocracy. The UNPA has centered on the parliamentarians which does not count to mo-
bilizing the world citizens and is in conflict with the current actions of civil society.  
Green MEP and federalist Gérard Onesta (2010, 33-35) gives the example of the Eu-
ropean Parliament in overcoming challenges during intergovernmental systems. He re-
fers  to  the  UNPA project  as  the  solution  to  the  diplomatic  stalemate  at  the  UN level.  
The  UNPA  could  follow  the  example  of  the  EP  in  a  proportional  representation:  this  
would balance the political and demographic weight of each country and the amount of 
seats in the assembly. Initially, the UNPA would be established according to the same 
chronological order as the EP was formed, by giving it first indirect powers. The UNPA 
would be formed by national delegates (parliamentarians) and eventually lead to direct 
universal suffrage, which changed the course of the EP in 1979 when it was granted EC 
wide suffrage.  
Our political and social conceptions are Ptolemaic. The world in which we live is Copernican. (Mar-
chetti 2006, 287; originally quoted in Reves, Emery [1947]: Anatomy of Peace. Harmondsworth, p. 
37) 
 
Raffaele Marchetti begins with a quote from the federalist Reves that gives a good 
overview of the idea to consider large-scale changes in the still somewhat Westphalian 
world order. Marchetti participates in the debate by defending cosmo-federalism based 
on the freedom of choice, the principle of justice for individuals and he is devastated by 
the lack of effective citizen participation at the global level. According to him, the most 
optimal choice is decentralization to increase opportunity and centralization to avoid 
exclusion. He presents two models of democracy, cosmopolitan democracy and cosmo-
federalism. There is a deep gap between the rulers and the ruled: the ruled citizens can-
not exercise their freedom of democratic rights and freedom of choice in global institu-
tions. The first model, cosmopolitan governance, is a temporary project that lacks long-
term plans. It implies a multi-level, decentralized and complicated governance structure 
with manifold centers where states possess relatively high powers. Marchetti takes up 
the example of the UN reform. An additional chamber of the UNGA would only have 
consultative status and restricted representation. The chamber would be formed by a 
regional voting system. What is striking is that any kind of UN reform would inevitably 
fail in terms of political inclusion. Only those actors that are relevant for a problem at 
hand are allowed to vote, and this does not decrease exclusion. Many states would be 
automatically excluded from the center of attention, and the individual participation is 
almost absent. Since many states are not democratic in the first place, large shares of the 
population would feel excluded. (Ibid., 287-299) 
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The second model of cosmo-federalist principles has a background in the UN 
reform aiming at a federal system. “While a major concern for many federalists was 
peace, the primary concern for the present version of cosmopolitanism is the maximisa-
tion of social well-being. As this is determined to be attainable only through the en-
hancement of individual choice possibilities, it is necessary to obtain the political em-
powerment to enable political agents to self-legislate on all aspects of their lives.” (Ibid., 
299) This model assumes a central power and federative communities based on the 
double loyalty and the principle of subsidiarity. Marchetti considers both the feasibility 
and desirability aspects of cosmo-federalism. Feasibility is linked to global threats that 
threaten common interests. This considers mainly technical issues and practical difficul-
ties. In aspiring justice one has to bargain with efficiency. Considering the desirability 
aspect, there is a fear that a global government would lead to homogeneity or even ty-
ranny. In this model, the principle of universal suffrage would apply, and a federalist 
global institution would tackle global issues, without the states withering away. Interna-
tional law would be overriding, so in this sense the states would give part of their juris-
diction to a global institution. However, states would only have to accept those deci-
sions made according to majority voting. Individuals would gain double citizenship – 
the national and the cosmopolitan. Human rights would become legally binding, and 
those committed of global crime would be held responsible for their acts. In order for 
this model to function, a global charter would be needed so that the global body would 
have jurisdiction. Eventually, the model aims at establishing a world government. The 
voting share would be based on “a universal democratic voting system, according to 
which the national representatives’ quotas are measured according to a function made 
up of diverse elements including population, state recognition (in order to safeguard 
small countries), and proportionate and actual financial contribution to the UN system”. 
(Ibid., 303) Also this model sees the non-democratic states put under pressure to adopt 
more democratic measures. At the point when states have adopted democratic voting 
procedures at the domestic level, can democratic elections be called for an assembly 
with the task of reforming the UN Charter. Marchetti does not exclude the fact that the 
initial actors in the assembly would only be democratic states. (Ibid., 299-305) 
 
3.2.3 Pragmatic reform proposals 
 
This chapter examines the scenarios by Heinrich, Schwartzberg, Patomäki and Johan-
sen. According to Dieter Heinrich (2003, 71-73), the UNPA serves as a symbol of a 
new world  order  in  the  future.  The  citizens  of  the  world  cannot  be  excluded  from the  
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reform of the UN. The UNPA would be representing the world community of individu-
als sharing similar expectations and interests. This is foremost a moral duty to cover the 
problems of the present day. Individuals free from governmental control would issue 
questions from a global perspective, free from raison d’état.  The  UNPA  could  be  
formed by former parliamentarians, able to cope among other things with political and 
social issues. An important element is the economic point of view: the UN parliamenta-
rians would receive their salaries directly from the UN. Heinrich is the first to mention 
this kind of an asset, since financial issues are relevant, also in the case of the UNPA. 
The selection of representatives would most equally happen through secret ballot, thus 
preventing the domination of a single party. Another question concerns the participation 
of representatives from non-democratic states. These could either be excluded or in-
cluded in the participation of the UNPA work. If the UNPA was of consultative nature, 
a large number of representatives would not serve further purposes. But non-democratic 
states could be under collegian persuasion and this way the democratic states could con-
tribute to the democratic development in other countries.  
Heinrich states that the UNPA with consultative status would not possess formal 
powers but its existence would have a moral influence on states similar to today’s Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions. Heinrich also discusses the composition of UNPA members. 
It would be, at least in the beginning, unwise to divide the amount of representatives by 
the share of population because then the population-wise largest non-democratic states 
would gain disproportionate power (20% of the total representative forces). “Alterna-
tively members could be apportioned on a sliding scale with ever larger increments of 
population needed for each additional representative from a state. The smallest countries 
might have one, the largest 10 to 20.” (Ibid., 73) Heinrich concludes that the creation of 
the UNPA would eventually save governments’ financial resources seen as a moral 
global investment and help to solve problems in advance. (Ibid.)  
Joseph E. Schwartzberg (2003, 81-84) continues with similar interest points as Hei-
nrich. Schwartzberg uses the term World Parliamentary Assembly (WPA) instead of the 
UNPA. He examines several assumptions on how to proceed towards a UNPA. These 
include areas to be represented, number of chambers (including a list of states given 
specific shares of representation), population size and territorial extent of constituencies 
as well as the size of assembly and population per representative. Schwartzberg empha-
sizes the importance of creating a professional Election Commission (EC) in the UN to 
supervise the election of representatives impartially and to establish rules of fairness for 
the candidates. The EC would possess the authority to determine how fair the election 
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of candidates is and it could nullify or reschedule dishonest elections. In order to estab-
lish a truly global assembly, certain requirements are needed:  
a) At least 20 nations must agree to the conditions established for the WPA and provide credible evi-
dence of their ability to fulfill those conditions.  
b) Nations from at least four (or, arguably, five) continents must be included. 
c) The participating nations must account for at least 15% of the world’s population.  
d) The participating nations must account for at least 15% of the UN’s budget. (Ibid., 88) 
 
The pressure arising from the WPA could account for the spread of interest in its ac-
tivities. Schwartzberg raises the question in what extent the WPA should be granted 
powers. Opinions vary from ones emphasizing the influence of the WPA as a forum for 
expressing popular sentiments to ones discussing possible legislative powers and advi-
sory status holder. (Ibid., 88-89) When looking at the representative suggestions pre-
sented under (a) to (d), the WPA might lose its significance if the numbers and percen-
tages are to be taken by the minimum. Schwartzberg acknowledges that the goal to 
achieve the WPA is not easy but worth striving for. However, he does not account for 
the fact how the WPA is eventually achieved and how the endorsement is maintained. 
He is examining the facts after the approval of the WPA has been announced and study-
ing the reasons for the measures and questions concerning representative issues. Al-
though he states (ibid., 89) that many other proposals ignore practical issues concerning 
the ways and forms of a WPA, he does not present any solutions either. Perhaps he 
thinks that it is not even the purpose, since the proposals’ main task is to vitalize the 
discussion on the WPA/UNPA and thereby strive for popular support.  
In his mathematical model, Schwartzberg offers (2004, VII-VIII) the following for-
mula to calculate the seats each country gets allocated in the UNGA: WV = (P + C + 
M)/313. According to him, an empowered UNGA would have several benefits. It would 
function as an incentive for countries to pay their assessed dues, result in a rough bal-
ance between the power of the world’s major economic blocs, the OECD and the so-
called “Group of 77”, necessitating creative bargaining and compromise between the 
two groups, and substantially increase the voting strength of the relatively free nations. 
[I]f you start from the premise of possessive individualism, you end up arguing from a supranational 
basis; and if you start with supranationalism, you end up recognizing the implications of possessive 
individualism; i.e. actual state practices. (Patomäki 2007, 384) 
 
Heikki Patomäki (ibid., 375-380) conceptualizes his thoughts about the world parlia-
ment with as much enthusiasm as Falk & Strauss and Bummel and, in comparison to the 
                                               
13 WV here represents a nation’s weighted vote, the average of; P, its percentage share of the total popu-
lation of all UN members; C, its financial contribution as a percentage of the total UN budget; and M, its 
share of the total UN membership (i.e., 1/191, or 0.524%). This formula embodies three fundamental 
principles: democratic/demographic, economic, and legal (the sovereign equality of nations). 
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most proposals, with sufficient amount of detailed information. Patomäki underlines the 
importance to establish a global system of realistic and feasible strategies for the further 
democratization  of  the  globe.  This  means  offering  realistic  accounts  both  in  the  short  
and long run, and one has to find a balance between a gradual process and the process as 
an end itself. What is lacking at the moment on the global level are the social conditions 
that would enable large scale reforms. According to Patomäki, this specifically applies 
to those considerations that in the end desire global federalism or a centralized world 
state,  and  proposals  that  grant  a  world  parliament  real  powers.  He  stresses  that  in  the  
present conditions, the most important task is to enable those conditions “for a pluralist 
and global security community. (…) The building of a security community is a long and 
complicated process of institutionalization of mutual acceptance, and trust, procedures 
and  practices  of  peaceful  change.  [A]n  effectively  functional  world  parliament  would  
also  enable  peaceful  conflict  transformations  and  changes.”  (Ibid.,  377)  A  solution  to  
test the lack of social conditions is to organize a global proto-referendum. In his ac-
count, Patomäki sees a world parliament as a solution to the deep problem of interna-
tional law in its indeterminacy. The UN system and in particular the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions are almost impossible to democratize. WTO on the other hand offers a more 
fruitful organization for reform, since the body is based on the one country/one vote 
principle. But, as the WTO deals with a limited scope of global affairs, i.e. with trade 
issues, it will not be given further attention here.  
Patomäki (ibid., 381-387) introduces a third way to deal with the world parliament 
discourse. In the longer run, the world parliament could function as a coordinating body 
with globally elected representatives in an assembly, with limited and relational powers. 
It would be relative in the sense that the assembly could offer selective opportunities for 
its members, meaning that not every rule or principle should be followed by each and 
everyone.  The  most  realistic  way to  reach  a  world  parliament  is  to  make  use  of  spill-
over effects: gradually the boundaries of sovereign territorial states could be overcome. 
“Logically, what would emerge is a non-centralized, non-territorial and non-exclusive 
system of complex global governance with manifold treaties, rules of law, and sets of 
regulations.  To  an  extent,  this  is  the  situation  already.  The  problem is  that  these  laws  
and regulations may be not only overlapping but also mutually (or in themselves) con-
tradictory and thus indeterminate in various ways.” (Ibid., 383) After considering global 
democracy in A Possible World: Democratic Transformation of Global Institutions 
(2004) together with Teivo Teivainen, Patomäki comes to the conclusion that a strategy 
of global democratization must be put on the agenda for very essential matters.  
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On the practical essence of a world parliament, Patomäki (ibid., 387-393) argues 
that direct global elections would give the legitimization to the body, but the parliament 
should not be conceived as a world’s Supreme Court because its essential role would be 
to  act  according  to  the  will-formation  of  citizens  and  not  as  the  highest  possible  legal  
expert.  However,  the parliament would not be able to function as part  of a centralized 
world state, and it could not have the powers or the machinery to enforce issues on its 
agenda. Instead, a world parliament would establish itself as a public opinion of the 
world community.  
Something, or somebody, should ensure that the first set of interpretative constraints – legal materials 
– remains essential to the formation of democratic and legitimate public opinion in the world parlia-
ment. One possibility is a world parliament of two chambers, with the second chamber given limited 
veto powers, following well-specified procedures. Whereas the first chamber would be a directly 
elected body of citizens’ representatives, the small second chamber could consist of legal experts 
who would determine whether the decisions of the first chamber are reasonably based on the existing 
body of law (…). The second chamber may by nominated by (i) states, (ii) existing international 
courts and (iii) law schools of various universities representing different parts of the world. (Ibid., 
387-388) 
 
By being established in this manner, the parliament would avoid clinging to the prob-
lems and risks of world federalism. The lawmaking infrastructure would remain in the 
hands of sovereign states, but gradually other actors, such as national parliamentarians 
and civil society organizations, could be included in the machinery of the parliament. 
With time, the new organization could merge with the UN and evolve into a world or-
ganization replacing the UN system. Another version of the world parliament is  to es-
tablish it by like-minded states, like the International Criminal Court (ICC) was formed 
in  the  1990’s.  Still,  a  truly  global  parliament  is  the  ultimate  goal  of  the  project.  Al-
though the parliament would not be a sovereign legislative body, it would still possess 
real powers through the principle of majority voting. The second chamber would check 
if the decisions made by the first chamber fit into the frame of legal reasonability. One 
important challenge remains, however, namely the definition of the procedure of taking 
cases to the world parliament. “Some kind of principle of subsidiary is probably needed: 
whenever law can be reasonably determined elsewhere, the world parliament should not 
be involved. [T]he world parliament should also have the right to initiate a process of 
scrutinizing legal rules, principles, priorities and applications. [To avoid too often 
changing legal interpretations and uncertainty], [o]ne possibility is to develop rules and 
principles to limit how often a case can be opened. The terms of office of the world par-
liament could also be made relatively long, from six to eight years.” (Ibid., 389) Anoth-
er essential element of the world parliament is to not confine its duties or powers only to 
legal disputes. The parliament could coordinate global economic policies and different 
functional organizations. Funding and revenue resources must be given appropriate 
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space,  since  it  is  not  inexpensive  to  establish  large  scale  global  bodies.  Patomäki  re-
commends among other things following mechanisms for collecting revenue for the par-
liament: global taxes (such as the currency transactions tax, CTT) including pollution 
taxes, arms sales tax, travel tax, proceeds from mining the seabed, and a fractional tax 
on the day’s telecommunications. On the other hand, other sources of revenue could be 
formed from world lottery, a percentage of proceeds earned through national lotteries, a 
credit card under the control of the world parliament, and a dedication to a special fund 
of the proceeds from one day’s sale of stamps by the world’s post  offices every year.  
The funding should remain independent. (Ibid., 388-393) 
Patomäki is worried about the role the parliament may adopt in the eyes of the glob-
al public. It should overcome the challenge faced by the EP that is not exciting enough 
as a political body to keep the Europeans on track of its whereabouts. Another tough 
challenge is to decide on the global voting districts. He does not recommend strictly 
proportional districts, since individuals are drawn to different identity groups and boun-
daries, therefore the districts may need to imply compromises. Thus, identity could be a 
better common denominator than territorial location. Patomäki suggests that the process 
towards a world parliament should remain most of all experimental and evolutionary. A 
world state is not desirable. A gradual process brings the best outcome, so the workings 
and potential reform ideas can be better understood and implemented with a reformed 
version of the parliament. (Ibid., 390-393) 
According to Robert C. Johansen (2007, 320-325), democracy at the national level 
is inadequate, but the global level suffers from democracy deficit. The UN reaches the 
closest  point  of  organizing  an  arena  for  the  global  interest  but  it  often  faces  dogmatic  
resistance by governments. Next to the democratic deficit lies the action deficit. “Major 
decisions are urgently needed to address global problems, such as reliable rules to go-
vern weapons of mass destruction, to deter terrorism and crimes against humanity, and 
to protect the atmosphere against greenhouse gases before more time and opportunities 
slip away.“ (Ibid., 322-323) The action deficit is eminent for the international system 
built to sustain the Westphalian system. These deficits are only a few, Johansen also 
names a chronic resource deficit, due to which emergency response e.g. to end hunger, 
reduce poverty, provide education for children, environmental protection, UN financing 
and challenges with the peace-keeping system are not met. The global arena seldom 
meets the promises given in the rhetoric, so the globe also suffers from a vision deficit, 
a poverty of moral imagination. Johansen states that self-governance in nation-states no 
longer helps to solve matters of life and death. Therefore, individuals must press for a 
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more complex global manifestation of democracy, or they will face the degeneration of 
global democracy. What Johansen suggests is for citizens to grasp the leading role in the 
development of democracy, as of according to the conclusion of the Commission on 
Global Governance in 1995. The Commission recommended an assembly of the peoples 
to complement the UNGA. Although this has not yet occurred, the Internet has provided 
useful tools of global communication, commerce and governance. This possibility even-
tually led to the creation of the e-Parliament14 in 2001.  
The long-term mission of the e-Parliament is to encourage representative self-government so that 
every person on Earth may exercise an equal opportunity to be represented in decisions that affect 
their lives. (…) The immediate purpose of the e-Parliament is to enable all those legislators through-
out the world who have been democratically elected to national (or regional) legislatures to deliberate 
with one another, primarily over the Internet, and to engage with citizens in a joint search for effec-
tive solutions to global problems. (…) In its first phase, the e-Parliament provides an opportunity for 
members of parliaments (MPs) and congresses to communicate ideas and best practices (…) and then 
to develop common ground for model legislation that subsequently could be introduced in many na-
tional legislatures. (…) As the e-Parliament gains experience and the numbers of MPs participating 
increases, it could, over the years, evolve into a global body with more authority. (Ibid., 325-326) 
 
Johansen (ibid., 327-343) notes that NGO’s provide expertise to the MP’s interested 
in the workings of the e-Parliament. He also takes up the issue of persons living in non-
democratic societies. The e-Parliament Council has come to the conclusion that legisla-
tors from non-democratically elected parliaments should not be allowed to participate in 
the voting activities of the e-Parliament. What is interesting is that the e-Parliament was 
established as a not-for-profit organization without the need to resort to any formal trea-
ty process. In various consultations, the e-Parliament has been positively approached 
throughout the world, and the e-Parliament is, according to Johansen, feasible in the 
sense that it was started as a small organization by persons familiar with national par-
liamentary systems and able to give the e-Parliament sustainable growth opportunities. 
Since the e-Parliament is already there, critics have been able to pose challenging ques-
tions  on  the  nature  of  the  Parliament.  “On  the  left,  some  argue  that  the  e-Parliament  
could be elitist and confer an undesirable global legitimacy on national legislators who 
already are negatively bound by inertia and vested interests. On the right, people fear 
that its democratic emphasis might alter perceptions of legitimacy, giving too much 
weight to representation that is proportional to population.” (Ibid., 334) The e-
Parliament has created an Idea Bank for legislators to resort to when seeking informa-
tion. In the long run, proponents of the e-Parliament hope to see their Parliament evolve 
according to the example of the EP into a body with more actual powers.  
 
                                               
14 The e-Parliament opened its website in 2006. More recently, the e-Parliament has established a Climate 
Parliament to combat climate change. See Johansen 2007 on the structure and governance of the current 
e-Parliament. Johansen is a member of the current e-Parliament Council.  
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3.2.4 Critical, skeptical and realist arguments 
 
This chapter examines the scenarios by Laurenti, Roche, Franck, Kennedy and Baxi. 
Jeffrey Laurenti (2003, 119-120) regards the world federalists as a small but determined 
group aiming at establishing a world parliament. He does not clearly oppose the UNPA 
as such but the proposals or imaginings made on it. They have not been able to satisfac-
torily answer questions on how a UNPA could possibly be established. Until the ques-
tions remain unanswered, the global assembly must remain a theoretical probability. 
Laurenti considers three features in the proposals, “the proposed parliament’s inclusivi-
ty, its authority and its efficiency”. (Ibid., 120) He begins with the inclusivity and ques-
tions the accountability of a UNPA in consideration of a large proportion of people liv-
ing under non-democratic governments. He asks whether the proposals are eager to ac-
cept a tradeoff between a democratic legitimacy and inclusiveness. The Community of 
Democracies, constituted in 2000, is used as an example of exclusivity. The aim was to 
include non-Western governments as members but many countries, for instance a num-
ber of Arab countries and two-thirds of Africa were left outside, which Laurenti finds 
peculiar, since such a body could not have a consultative oversight role. (Ibid., 121-122)         
The second point Laurenti emphasizes is the authority issue. “The central conun-
drum facing an imagined international parliamentary assembly is the apparent impossi-
bility of reconciling its mandate and its appeal to prospective parliamentarians. What 
powers would such an institution have? If it has no authority over the activities of even 
the scarecrow agencies of the United Nations, why should serious politicians invest se-
rious time in it?” (Ibid., 122) He refers to the proposals that have suggested a legislative 
status for the assembly, including the power to make law on a global scale. Laurenti 
doubts that the proposals could hardly attract the attention of the press, public and poli-
ticians with such an ambitious program. Global decision-making and resources would 
find strong resistance among the public. Although the resistance has been mostly Amer-
ican, Laurenti mentions that federal ideas have for the most part not found enough pro-
ponents in other countries either to fulfill their goals. As a reference tool, he only uses 
dissolutions of federal states which are not equivalent to regional federalisms. The in-
ternational community is in its birth stage and not yet able to work globally. Laurenti 
acknowledges that the EU works as a counter-example where progress towards federal-
ism has positively proceeded in its common identity. However, the immigration issues 
prohibit the Europe to become a fully existing forum. He encourages the people to real-
ize that a world parliamentary assembly with law-making functions does not cohere 
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with the reality. Even the smallest steps towards a UNPA-like body demand the accep-
tance of politicians. Laurenti (ibid., 122-124) is partly right in stating that the UNPA 
project is not eased as long as the decision-making process of the UN remains non-
transparent. The problems he illustrates deserve to be presented because they contain 
noteworthy criticism towards the functioning mechanism of the UN.  
The last point Laurenti examines is the efficiency of persuasion. The proponents of 
an assembly must convince the people of the desirability of a new system compared to 
the currently existing one. Diplomats sent abroad on missions by their governments tend 
to be internationally oriented and eager to understand foreign cultures. The diplomats at 
the UN level, whether they are from developing or developed countries, have adopted a 
common language and global thinking, sharing liberal internationalist values. Laurenti 
is of the opinion that this mechanism of international cooperation has proved function-
ing. Why should it thus be altered? In reference to the democracy deficit, he states that 
the audience for international affairs is rather small. (Ibid., 125-129) 
Douglas Roche states that the idea for the UNPA has a long history, dating back to 
the origins of the UN, but only recently has the movement made progress. However, 
one can at this moment draw outlines for the future, since the achievement of the goal 
lies far away. The achievement can be fastened, since there is need for a reformed UN. 
According to Roche, “a parliamentary assembly implies democracy. The first [possibili-
ty] is to provide transparency, added legitimacy and – presumably – more effectiveness 
to UN operations themselves. The second would be to address more general issues of 
global governance that stem from perceptions and conclusions about globalisation. A 
third reason is linked closely to the desire by some to address a central question of in-
ternational security: the role that sovereignty and sovereign states may play in prevent-
ing universal solutions to questions of basic human rights, peace and security.” (Roche 
2003, 31-32) Thereby, Roche rejects the idea of the UNPA becoming a world parlia-
ment. According to his definition, the term ‘governance’ is aimed at picturing the regu-
lation of complex and interconnected relations between states, societies, the business 
world, individuals and the academic communities. The discussion on the UNPA be-
comes interconnected not only with the UN but at the same time with the entire world 
and its communities. There are several levels that the UNPA project touches. (Ibid., 32-
33) 
Since the project is a creation of the UN, it is simultaneously for the UN, as Roche 
puts it. “It would therefore reflect those structural biases of the United Nations that rein-
force national sovereignty and the power of states.” (Ibid., 38) States would be members 
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in the assembly; Roche thus emphasizes the parliamentary assembly. According to him, 
the UN strengthens the role of the states in international relations. This in an interesting 
thought, which he clarifies by the assumption that the UN heavily relies on the power of 
large states, mostly on the United States. The UN was originally planned to reassure the 
American public, so the UN must fit this frame of reference. (Ibid.)  
Roche attracts the attention to collective security of states and great power issues in 
UN circumstances. War and peace constitute the initial framework for the UN main 
field. (Ibid., 39) He considers that there are in reality only two possible ways to consti-
tute the future UNPA, “a parliamentary assembly comprising national parliamentarians 
or a parliamentary assembly that is selected independently. Which type is chosen will 
affect what a UNPA might potentially become.” (Ibid., 40) For the first proposition, us-
ing existing national parliamentarians, he mentions among others the Parliamentary As-
sembly of the European Council (PACE), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the parliamentary assembly of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) as examples. These are referred to as IPI’s, Inter-
Parliamentary Institutions. This is a pragmatic solution, since national parliamentarians 
already exist. The way the members are chosen must have the democratic credibility to 
last  in  the  long  run.  The  importance  of  the  UNPA  must  rise  from  the  moral  weight,  
since  it  will  otherwise  have  restricted  powers.  A  positive  feature  for  already  existing  
parliamentarians is the fact that they embrace the approval in themselves. They are also 
experts on their own field which can an advantage on the international arena as well. 
The second option illustrated shortly above indicates an independently selected UNPA. 
The criteria and methods for selection must be carefully reflected. Roche states that de-
tailed questions on the membership issues must be answered, otherwise the UNPA 
could fail in its credibility. If having direct representatives, this would add to a more 
democratically governed UN, since national parliamentarians are nonetheless more na-
tionally inclined. These independent ones would devote more time to the UNPA than 
national ones, clearly a positive sign. (Ibid., 40-47)      
Roche is interested in the technical aspects of the solution to the UNPA challenge. 
All  the  questions  ‘how?’,  ‘what?’,  ‘when?’,  ‘where?’  and  also  ‘who?’  need  to  find  an  
answer. He illustrates that the result of the UNPA might be unintentionally different and 
affected by political power as was initially planned. Roche suggests a non-permanent 
UNPA and sees it in the light of a consultative rather than legislative body. The UNGA 
would remain the initial legislator and the UNPA would report of actions directly to the 
UNGA, giving credibility to the UNPA as well. The suggestion is to establish UNPA 
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committees in the fashion of current committees in other international parliamentary 
assemblies. There would be the usual committees, such as Political and Social, Econom-
ic, Human Rights, Technology and Science, but also others, such as Refugee and Envi-
ronmental committees. Another approach would be to credit the UNPA with program-
matic committees having oversight obligations. There could be a UN budget committee 
and one on the Security Council. Roche’s view on the UNPA remains on the schematic 
structure. He states that “[t]here is currently a disjuncture in traditional, liberal-
democratic political decision-making between the international and the domestic level. 
Inter-parliamentary institutions of various types offer a good solution to [global gover-
nance] and perhaps the most prominent international organization lacking an IPI is the 
United Nations. (…) If there is to be a UNPA, there needs to be a recognition that 
choices on how it becomes institutionalized may have subtle, but important long-term 
affects on how much a UNPA comes to represent a UN legislature.” (Ibid., 47-50)  
Thomas Franck (2007, 371-374) sees the project of establishing a global democratic 
political space as important, but it faces enormous difficulties. What Franck calls tribal 
nationalism is on the rise, the ethos to close oneself off from others. According to him, 
in a “globally elected parliament, national interest groups would tend to disaggregate 
and reform in new, transnational configurations. (…) In an elected global assembly, 
people who are elected from the various member countries will find that in order to ad-
vance their agenda (…) [they] would need to combine forces, not solely with other 
people form [sic!] their own states, but also with like minded persons from other nations 
who are pursuing the same ends.” (Ibid., 372) Franck views the proposal for the estab-
lishment  of  a  world  parliament  from a  safe  distance.  He  states  that  a  powerful  global  
parliament is not going to be formed and he sees it too easily dismissed, since it sacri-
fices national sovereignty in too large a share. The institution on the other hand deserves 
more thought: Once the institution is there, it will function as a pressure mechanism “to 
attract power in accordance with its perceived legitimacy”. (Ibid.) The framework of 
democratic governance will gradually expand. The power should remain in the hands of 
governments, and the steps towards a global institution should proceed slowly. Franck 
suggests to form a directly elected second body of the UNGA. The impression that this 
body would harm the legitimacy of the UNSC should be avoided.    
David Kennedy (2007, 395-399) is a skeptic from the very beginning of his speech. 
According to him, the proposals on the WP do not meet with the underlying problem. 
Kennedy is mainly skeptical of the parliamentary idea not “at all because it’s unrealistic 
– to remake the political order, we must sometimes think unrealistically. [His] worry is 
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that the image of politics embedded in the proposal for a global parliament seems out-
moded, even part of the problem.” (Ibid., 395) Kennedy is concerned of the national 
public capacity to fulfill the needs of the national challenges (e.g. the US government’s 
response to hurricane Katrina in 2005), not to mention the global level. Institutional ar-
rangements outside the realm of states are not up to date, and because the international 
arena has no center, it is suffering from the erosion of capacity. By this he means that 
focused decisions are not done, and that instead of building a global parliament, the at-
tention should be directed towards encroaching semi-autonomous systems embracing 
economic, cultural and other kinds of systems. He draws his view on the legislative 
purpose of a parliament which he sees as outmoded. He thinks that legislation no longer 
serves the purpose, since the background institutions make the actual decisions, and 
therefore a global parliament simply does not meet up with the demands of the current 
times. Universal decisions are outdated, and the world needs heterogeneity, interaction 
and ethical pluralism to deal with the challenges of the plurality of life choices. Accord-
ing to Kennedy, a modest reform that the proponents of the world parliament promote is 
not the solution. The whole idea behind a world parliament is too sincere and practical 
for him. So, the demands and needs for the near future do not face up to the different 
“truths” out there.    
Upendra Baxi (2007, 408-418) poses critical questions for the GPA debate. He tries 
to overcome the Western perspective (in his words the nightmare of the universalization 
of the Western model of democracy) and embrace a more inclusive approach. Inclusion 
always implies exclusion as the counter pole, Baxi notes. He does not offer a compre-
hensive infrastructure on how the GPA should be accomplished, but according to him, 
“the GPA discourse needs to more specifically address the construction of a new global 
‘level playing field’ for the voices of the world’s dispossessed, deprived, and the disad-
vantaged peoples.” (Ibid., 416) Therefore, the concept of democratic inclusion should 
be ripped off of any romanticized versions of global representation. Instead of empha-
sizing the ahistorical construction of global citizens, direct and effective representation 
should be granted to various wounded communities, vulnerable and suffering peoples 
and persons living in exploiting circumstances. The project on the GPA should embrace 
just freedom for all instead of only covering practices of freedom.  
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4. Feasibility and desirability of the models 
 
Now that all the models have been presented in detail, I will consider their feasibility 
and desirability. However, I shall begin by making summarizing comments about the 
proposals and move on to analyze the feasibility aspects in the latter part of the chapter. 
There is a clear division of models into two main groups, the first group viewing a glob-
al  assembly  or  world  parliament  as  the  solution  to  the  crisis  of  global  democracy,  the  
second group being portrayed by persons that are rather skeptical or even critical of any 
global bodies. Another division concerns the concept of scenario and model. Until now, 
the proposals have been mainly referred to as models, in the sense of using an overall 
category. As mentioned shortly in the introduction, not all models or proposals are sce-
narios but all scenarios include models as the models offer a general perspective but 
they might not include a causal reasoning eminent in futures scenarios. Scenarios imply 
procedural points in the accounts, and therefore they are, at least in this context, leng-
thier and more detailed than general remarks on the nature of international democracy 
or on the need for a global parliament. Their feasibility is easier to assess than the one of 
general  models.  Some  of  the  proposals  are  either  even  more  optimistic  than  the  ones  
that were examined in the group of global governance, or are realistic and potentially 
lacking a certain level of imagination when considering new forms of governance at the 
global scene. The models are all unique and their extent varies from proposal to propos-
al.  Unfortunately  some of  the  shorter  models  covered  here  do  not  take  a  stand  on  the  
practicalities and the infrastructure of a world parliament, but state a critical or skeptical 
view without envisioning a better model themselves. International democracy deficit 
and the lack of a citizen’s voice is one common denominator for the proposals being 
optimistic about a world parliament or a UNPA. Another dominant feature is the allo-
cated power given to sovereign states or parliamentary representatives arising from the 
state system. Only critical models take a stand on the retreat of the state paradox.  
Almost  all  of  the  proposals  take  a  stand  on  the  relationships  of  different  levels  of  
governance – the international, national and local – and between actors who are in-
volved in the transformative process. A relevant question is the degree in which the in-
dividuals are becoming more internationally oriented. Freedom and independence of 
national  constraints  are  often  understood  in  the  context  of  freedom  of  speech  and  as-
sembly. How can freedom be achieved, since many individuals are either not familiar or 
are not used to democracy in the first place? If the individual level is ignorant of trans-
formations occurring in the current world, the upper levels – politicians and other lead-
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ers – might use this as a tool to decide for the local and individual level. Common for 
the most scenarios is that a gradual change is the best solution to the problems democra-
cy faces: changes do not occur over night, they need time and patience. Human beings 
are usually regionally or locally adjusted and the majority of issues they are concerned 
with consist of regional matters, not global challenges or problems. Why would the 
people desire a project such as the WP? What would they gain from it and what could 
they loose? These are important questions because the WP is unrealizable if it does not 
have the support of citizens. In this regard, the scenarios may seem far reaching and un-
realistic. Some do give detailed information about the way the WP or the UNPA is best 
accomplished, some proposals are mainly concerned with the reasons or the need for the 
assembly.  In  this  thesis  the  emphasis  of  the  scenarios  is  thus,  at  least  considering  the  
majority of them, on why rather than on how – how implying the why but the why does 
not  necessarily  include  the  how.  This  is  an  unfortunate  fact  but  luckily  the  most  tho-
rough scenarios imply both the how and the why.    
Another  interesting  feature  is  the  difference  between  the  WP  and  the  UNPA.  The  
latter could be seen as the forerunner of the former. The UNPA proponents have orga-
nized themselves effectively in the social media – on an actively updated webpage and 
on Twitter and Facebook – and several parliaments, such as the EP including pan-
European political groups, and other parliaments such as the Pan-African and the Latin 
American Parliament, have adopted supportive resolutions in favor of the UNPA. As of 
early February 2011, the UNPA campaign is supported by 3855 individuals from 145 
countries, 280 NGO’s from 66 countries (among them 21 international organizations), 
770 MP’s from 98 countries and 196 former parliamentarians from 46 countries.15 The 
figures concerning the parliamentarians’ interest in the project is remarkable. The sup-
port is channeled for a UNPA within the UN system, an already existing global institu-
tion; therefore its support is more eminent than the one of the world parliament. We can 
think of feasible elements in terms of what is easy versus what should be striven for. It 
is hard to get the EP support the WP instead of the UNPA, now that the support is al-
ready there. But as the UNPA could be a pioneer for a new tryout for global citizen re-
presentation, this impact should not be neglected. Therefore, both institutions do not 
exclude each other but can be regarded as different sides of the same coin. As the EP 
has often been referred to as the most successful regional parliamentary assembly in the 
world, it is valuable to pay attention to its historical elements.   
                                               
15 The Steering Committee of the UNPA is a group of NGO’s and networks (KDUN, Democracia Global, 
Society for Threatened Peoples International, World Federalist Movement and 2020*Vision Ltd.). More 
information on the International Campaign for the Establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary As-
sembly at www.unpacampaign.org.  
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Besides the influence of the European Parliament based on its legal rights, the EP has also signifi-
cantly shaped the European agenda in a political way. In some instances, it was even a catalyst for 
significant change. Thus, in the middle of the so-called ‘eurosclerosis’ in 1984, the EP courageously 
presented a draft constitution for a federal EU with a genuine parliament, which brought the EU out 
of its paralysis, revived the reform process, and concurrently also led to an increase in its own pow-
ers. (…) In one of the first cases under the new arrangement, the EP refused in February 2010 to rub-
ber-stamp the interim SWIFT agreement between the EU and the US on the transfer of citizens’ fi-
nancial data to prevent terrorist attacks, dealing a blow to both EU governments and US authorities. 
The EP has thus acquired a considerably strengthened position with regard to some international 
questions in which the EU is involved, for example in world trade or climate policy. (Claudia Kis-
sling 2011, 46-47)  
 
With the introduction of direct elections in 1979, the European national parliaments lost 
their direct link to the structure of the EU and gradually the EP has managed to expand 
its original remit. Although the EP has a great legislative competence in comparison to 
IPI’s and other regional parliaments, it still only has co-decision rights with the Council 
of Ministers. “Since the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has the right to co-
decide on the EU budget as submitted by the EU Commission in its entirety together 
with the EU Council.” (Ibid., 43) According to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU will need the 
consent of the EP to conclude international agreements, so in this instance the EP holds 
important strings in its possession. Kissling also favors the formation of a UNPA first 
with limited competence and eventually the scope of the assembly could be further ex-
tended. (Ibid., 10 and 41-53)  
In the long-run, the campaign to establish a people’s assembly or a UNPA envisages 
the evolvement into a real world parliament, the concept ‘real’ including the definition 
of a body with legislative decision-based powers. This suggests that the transformation 
is having a final goal, a radical one in the sense that it concretely abolishes the tradition-
al  state  system  by  creating  a  mechanism  emphasizing  the  power  of  the  citizens.  This  
does not imply that the Westphalian system would wither away after the establishment 
of a true WP, but it puts the traditional state system under a gradual change. It is highly 
consequential to review the case of the WP from a broad perspective with long-term 
goals and desires, and to carefully examine the transformative feature its establishment 
would suggest. The creation of a WP can only be achieved through small steps, each of 
them contributing a small share to the larger picture. It is surreal to imagine the world 
parliament being created over a couple of years, even thirty years seems short. The es-
tablishment must be in relation with the adjustment of individuals, groups and states. 
The network on the UNPA and the e-Parliament website show that appearance and me-
dia coverage are important. However, both of the websites have so far remained invisi-
ble  for  the  majority  of  citizens.  This  puts  them  under  serious  criticism,  and  someone  
might argue that they are intended for the parliamentarians and other prominent figures 
rather than individual citizens, making the project seem elitist. The individuals and par-
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liamentarians worldwide must be involved, otherwise the democracy deficit remains 
intact. Several proposals saw parliamentarians as initiators of a democratic change, 
since they already have adopted the parliamentary dialogue, procedural matters and the 
cooperation on the national level. A theoretical analysis is relevant but in itself not 
enough, since the practice advances the concrete project. However, if the individuals are 
aware of the theoretical debates between differing ontological questions of the shape of 
the world, their adjustment to the contextual discussion is easier. Future considerations 
of inventions and scientific breakthrough in the area of the natural sciences reach the 
individuals more directly than abstract scenarios on political and societal changes. Ab-
stract WP proposals must be made accessible to the wider public and their content must 
be understandable at grassroots level.   
Another assumption about feasibility is that it only concerns part of the models be-
cause in order to offer feasible aspects, they would have to consist of enough considera-
ble material in the first place. Of the 17 original and colorful models only approximately 
the half can be included in the section of potentially feasible proposals. The aspect of 
feasibility will only be applied to the 17 models under surveillance here, and not to oth-
er articles or publications the authors of the scenarios might have given out. The critical 
and skeptical scenarios are not considered based on their feasibility but on their account 
and critical focal points that help to examine the feasibility of the more WP-positive 
models. As a summarizing comment, it goes without saying that most of the scenarios 
advocating a gradual move towards a WP are feasible. The next step is to consider 
whether the gradual element will affect short or long-term causalities. A normative ap-
proach defines in which degree something is viewed as feasible. It is important to re-
mind oneself of the concept of feasibility itself: for whom is something plausible and 
why, i.e. for what ends should a WP be established? Since I have adopted a normative 
approach in futures studies, the concept of feasibility is closely linked with the term de-
sirability. The question ‘for whom’ implies a degree of desirability, since normativity is 
linked to the matters that should be rather than what currently is available. A world par-
liament is at least feasible for those who see that the crisis of democracy needs lasting 
solutions and avoids the inefficiency of the UN stalemate born in the post World War II 
circumstances. In the 21st century, we are free of the burden of any world war stigma, 
we can forget both the war winners and losers. In this chapter, feasibility will be consi-
dered in terms of solutions to the global political crisis; the impact of the economic or 
financial crisis will be neglected.  
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The next challenge concerns the issue of institutional relevance. Not all of the pro-
posals consider a world parliament, but an institution with a different name, be it a 
people’s assembly or an e-Parliament.  Some of them directly examine the UN reform, 
and their input only concerns ways of renewing the UN system, not of building a new 
global organization. My initial hypothesis is that the UN cannot be considered as a good 
solution of establishing a world parliament because the system has proved itself as very 
hard  to  reform,  and  the  system works  still  in  the  aftermath  constellation  of  the  World  
War II happenings. As became evident in several models, amendments to the UN Char-
ter are hard to make, and so far they have not gained much support among the UN 
member states. The question what is feasible is more uniquely understood in the sense 
of a new organization because that way old dilemmas, stalemate circumstances and in-
efficiency, as experienced throughout the UN system when real decision-making pow-
ers are concerned, can be avoided and history can be made by turning a new page. 
Another issue is the difficult relationship between state-based organizations, such as the 
UN, and citizen activities. The UN has a steady establishment and it relies heavily on 
the sovereignty of states. Therefore, involving NGO’s, prominent individuals and direct 
suffrage hardly seems feasible in connection to the world organization. Matters concern-
ing non-democratic states also face challenges in the UN system which is a club for all, 
no matter the degree of democracy and human rights for the citizens in authoritarian or 
totalitarian states. Taking these issues into consideration, I will examine the models as 
objectively as possible, i.e. considering proposals on a UNPA and a world parliament 
with equal footing, but the previous examination is intended for chapter 5 where a new 
scenario  is  built.  Sometimes  the  reader  has  to  resort  to  interpretation  when examining  
scenarios; the meaning and purpose of the content might not be self-evident, therefore at 
times, measures of “reading between the lines” must be adopted. I will now consider the 
feasibility of the 17 models from a more general perspective in comparison to the level 
of analysis in the coming chapter.     
 
4.1 Assessment of the individual models and scenarios 
Bummel (2010), a prominent proponent of the UNPA campaign, emphasizes the prag-
matic and realistic start in the process towards a UNPA. As he states, the whole process 
needs a change in consciousness and a deep understanding of world politics. This is 
more theoretical than concrete. Several issues must be taken into account in transforma-
tion processes and in the enhancement of democracy at the supranational level. Bummel 
sees the relationship between global institutions as problematic since the global repre-
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sentatives are at the moment accountable to their national governments rather than na-
tional citizens. The emphasis is overtly on the allocation procedure of distributing seats 
to countries according to different models. Although his models offer viable sources for 
the mathematical consideration, the basic evaluation and core thought is missing. What 
purpose would the UNPA have according to his reasoning? Each country would be 
represented in the UNPA, also the autocratic and non-democratic ones, so his account 
does not offer anything we would not already have witnessed in the current UN institu-
tions. However, in that sense his model is feasible. My interest is normative, and the 
emphasis of democracy receives considerable attention. Bummel does not take into ac-
count the content of the UNPA workings. What powers would his institution bear, how 
would it benefit democracy and most of all, how could it complement the UN system 
with something new? If also non-democratic states were involved, what would the nor-
mative value of this instance be, if some? Bummel’s model has feasible elements for the 
UN reform but there are serious blank spots in the causal reasoning between the overall 
need of a UNPA and the link to its realization at the practical level. For this reason, his 
account remains a model, since he does not examine the comprehensive dimension of 
the UNPA after it would have been realized and the powers it would be granted.  
In their analysis on the UNPA, Falk and Strauss (2003) refer to a lack of direct de-
mocracy in a globalizing world. The role of the states is rejected, since the genuine fo-
rum consisting  of  civil  society  representatives  can  surmount  the  difficulties  the  UN is  
now experiencing. However, neglecting the role of the states in the working field of the 
assembly indicates a different purpose of the future UN. The dilemma rises from the 
actual bypassing of the states. How can it be technically and concretely possible to over-
rule the power of the states, now so powerfully represented in the UN decision-making 
process? For example, states still hold the power in the Security Council and in other 
UN bodies.  According  to  Falk  and  Strauss,  the  current  ad  hoc  system in  international  
relations will at some point, due to globalization, be called into question. This happen-
ing will intensify the need for democratization and gradual evolvement of an assembly. 
Although civil society has gained more ground, its domination is not comparable with 
the one of sovereign states. Falk and Strauss realize this problem by asking whether it is 
possible to create such an assembly without states and business interests. The EU is 
used as an example of how it is tenable to launch an inter-regional forum. The UN as-
sembly has potential in involving the civil society and thus, gradually, the entire society. 
In spite of this, the business representatives are unlikely getting excited about an assem-
bly with civil society stigma. Falk and Strauss are quite naïve on the cooperation be-
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tween civil society and corporations. They are inclined to think that the political poten-
tial will not suffice in order to attain the legitimacy for the assembly. They trust in the 
liberal system emphasizing the grassroots level and its impact on the new form of world 
practice. In reference to their theory, the hardest step is the first one. How do academic 
circles that first get in touch with reform initials convince the general public of the ne-
cessity and emergency of change? Few theories are concerned with the initial step of the 
transformation, partly due to the difficulty and the belief in the victory of the individu-
als.  One  general  deficiency  concerning  especially  the  proposals  for  the  UNPA  is  that  
they begin from the phase where the trust of the people has already been established. 
There is pressure for an evolutionary social process in the democracy initiatives but this 
must involve a scenario with a clear causal relationship between argumentations for the 
need of change at the global level, practical and plausible solutions on how to establish 
a functioning global body and also long-term aspects of the body once it has been estab-
lished and ways of improvement in the long run.  
In their 2007 accounts, Strauss and Falk give a more feasible analysis on a GPA. It 
is indeed true that the global arena lacks citizen representation, so any proposal giving 
appropriate space for global individuals is feasible if the proposal is also practical and 
examines all or most of the points previously mentioned. It seems plausible that a gra-
dual development from an initially advisory body to direct elections is the road to 
choose, but the advisory body must be invested with powers that it can later monopol-
ize. In the case of the UN Charter, when a body is established with general guidelines, 
the global body might fail in the long run if the Charter defends status quo mechanisms 
and is hard to amend. The original plan must therefore be included in the draft for the 
future global parliament. Otherwise it might suffer from stagnation and remain advisory 
for ever, until new bodies are established. The more feasible a world parliament is in the 
long run the more thorough the original plan and execution should be, implying both 
short and long-term expectations. The draft must be cleared of too radical elements 
since it might scare the majority of persons, but at the same time it must be semi-radical 
in the sense that within a certain time frame a real legislative body will be established, 
with direct suffrage and citizenship participation, and potentially the right to interfere if 
international law, human and social rights, environmental standards have been violated.  
The most difficult part of considering the world parliament is inclusion versus ex-
clusion. The EU serves as a relevant example: in the 1950’s,  when the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) was initiated it embraced only six states. Nonetheless, 
nowadays the former European Community (EC) is a European Union of 27 countries 
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that have each had the desire to be a member of the European project. Similarly, as the 
EC was an economic community but has shifted more towards a political union during 
the EU, the world parliament could equally evolve from its original element towards a 
body of legislative rights similar to the jurisdiction of national parliaments. Thus, as the 
case of inclusion in the case of the UN and of exclusion in the case of the EC shows, 
using existing examples of inclusion and exclusion one can conclude that exclusion 
pays off. This is measured against efficiency and practical success.  
In many models, the EU and especially the EP have been portrayed as a success sto-
ry, although some proposals criticize the actual significance of the EP in the eyes of the 
public. There is still a huge difference between the importance of national parliaments 
and supra-national ones. Citizens do not follow the discussions and reports submitted by 
the EP in the extent that would be expectable of an important parliament. Exclusion, 
then again, implies heavy machinery of advertisement and lobbying, otherwise the 
community, union or any other club remains limited in numbers. In this instance, the EP 
has  failed  to  keep  the  EU  citizens  on  track  and  excited  about  the  common  European  
identity manifested in the commonly shared parliamentary institution. The proposal of 
Strauss (and Falk) to eventually merge the advisory body with the UNGA and the the-
reby establishment of a bicameral legislative system implying powers is feasible. Falk 
and Strauss are the personification of the world parliament concept but they must avoid 
being overtly subtle and good-hearted. Their 2007 scenario has improved from the one 
made in 2003 as it offers detailed information and normative ideals. Their scenario is 
probably the most feasible of the 17 models, since it is not overtly normative but rather 
practical and humble. 
Archibugi16 (2007) – a congenial soul of Held – is a strong proponent of cosmopoli-
tanism and his model is a good exponent of a world parliament. His 2007 account is 
mysterious since it leaves too many practical details unattached, but the use of democra-
cy export can prove to be essential when bringing about a world parliament. Therefore 
its feasibility is difficult to measure. Archibugi names post-World War II nations, Ger-
many and Italy, as examples of progressive democratization. Details that were not cov-
ered earlier when his model was presented include the following list of learned lessons 
that may help when establishing a world parliament:  
1. The internal context. The level of support enjoyed by the existing regime is a crucial factor. Un-
fortunately, not all authoritarian regimes are equally opposed by their populations. (…) Wanting 
to impose democracy against the will of the same people is simply nonsense. 
                                               
16 Archibugi has enthusiastically published cosmopolitan and democracy-related articles and books. E.g.  
see Archibugi, Daniele (2008): The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democra-
cy. Princeton & Oxford.  
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2. Restoration is easier. It is much easier to reintroduce democracy than to introduce it for the first 
time.  
3.  Aggression is counterproductive. The efficacy of the regime change after the Second World 
War was a result of the fact that the war was begun by the fascist regimes.  
4. Acceptance of the transitional administration. (…) Due to concerns about being colonized, the 
local populations are generally hostile when they confront a transitional administration, which 
can become permanent and overbearing. (Archibugi 2007, 286-287) 
 
These suggestions are not be interpreted literally, since their original impact con-
cerns the war in Iraq and concrete examples of bringing in democracy in authoritarian 
states. For the consideration of world parliament scenarios, points 1, 2 and 3 are crucial. 
The gradual path of the world parliament must be advertised to the individuals around 
the globe in an honest fashion: the citizens must be kept on track, and they should be 
promised that the project does not impose heavy cosmopolitan federalism overnight, 
that it is directed towards developing global democracy and the efficiency of global go-
vernance. Concrete proposals with step-to-step advice on how to reach a common goal 
keep the individuals interested and do not scare them away. The 2007 model of Archi-
bugi unfortunately fails to offer this kind of a solution; his proposal is too vague in its 
format. The reader is left perplexed and cannot follow the practical road towards a 
world parliament in the fashion Archibugi might have intended. The same criticism ap-
plies to the model of Baxi (2007) as well: his account offers no practical suggestions. 
Baxi is a proponent of an assembly for peoples but his fear of the exploitation and abuse 
of the world’s vulnerable peoples leaves other relevant points untouched. As if he was 
there to offer his worries for others, not that he himself could offer a feasible solution on 
how to support inclusion and a pluralistic view of global democracy. His model is 
turned upside down: instead of recommending a practical solution to establish a GPA, 
he  assumes  that  it  will  be  established,  no  matter  under  which  regulations  and  charter  
amendments and other viable routes. It would seem plausible to proceed in a different 
order than Baxi suggests: first to create a GPA and then place the protection of dispos-
sessed persons and groups under the jurisdiction of the assembly.  
By avoiding too radical elements the scenarios receive positive attention by a large 
public which is very important in the early days of a world parliament. World federal-
ism might be plausible at some point in the distant future and it might be the ultimate 
solution to the problems nationalism, regional and ethnic wars, religions and ideologies 
have caused, by embracing the common denominator all humans share – namely hu-
manity and peaceful approach to earthly dilemmas. But, as of yet the current world sys-
tem  and  the  citizens  do  not  deserve  world  federalism.  The  project  to  wipe  territorial  
states is not an issue of the 21st century. Aiming at cosmopolitan federalism in the post-
Cold War era is like taking too many steps at the same time, or as the saying goes one 
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should not count one's chickens before they are hatched, endangering the ultimate goal 
of peaceful living on this planet.  
This detour takes us back to the federalists – mainly Levi, Onesta and Marchetti – 
and their models. Their accounts are heavily normative but also unpractical. They fail in 
adequately illustrating the actual structure or the gradual proceeding of a world parlia-
ment or a UNPA. They speak of the ends as if the means were already present. Other-
wise Levi’s (2003) model has many plausible elements: he is among the few to name 
political parties as the initiators of change and direct elections of parliament fit well 
with the other models. Marchetti (2006) on the other hand presents a multifaceted pro-
gram of idealistic cosmo-federalism and cosmopolitan governance which sounds prom-
ising, but his plan is too general and it looses the comprehensive perspective. Most of 
the states are not federations so the cooperation between federative communities could 
only reach a few states, no matter how crucial these states would be. Onesta’s (2010) 
model is too modest to add any new elements to the discussion that would not be there 
already (e.g. refer to Strauss and Falk). Giving the UNPA that Onesta examines indirect 
powers in the beginning according to the example of the EP might further deteriorate 
the stalemate at the UN, something the body was designed to solve. For the above men-
tioned reasons, these three models do not count as scenarios although they have feasible 
elements.  
Levi assumes that the problems of the nation-state have been solved by federalism. 
The theory in itself is not so far from the reality as it sounds. The EU, the closest model 
of regional federalism and motor in the background, entered a phase of stagnation in the 
early years of the 21st century. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, under 
debate in 2002-2003, did not yet exist. The Lisbon Treaty has been ratified by all the 
EU member states but the union is far from being a political community of like-minded 
states. The EU enlargement during the previous decade have dramatically changed the 
nature of the EU: before the 2004 enlargement the Union was a league of Western Eu-
ropean states as received according to Cold War standards. Due to the enlargement the 
common goals that were before more or less centered have diversified. However, the 
enlargement can also be seen in a positive light, since the unification is a process to-
wards a goal, not a step behind. Levi focuses on the democratic reform of the globaliza-
tion but he fails to recognize the relevant steps needed after the establishment of a world 
parliament. He states that it would gain legislative legitimacy but for what purposes 
would it be established. He is for the creation of world federalism but how is the fede-
ralist project to be proceeded from the level of the EU. The traces of transformation are 
 69
 
not presented and several questions are left unanswered. The role of the UNPA is nearly 
untouched and the one of the world parliament is inadequately elaborated. In Levi’s 
terms, a world parliament poses a contradiction between globalization and the lacking 
democratic international means. He calls for the World Federalist Movement to lead the 
coalition of NGO’s for a UN parliament. Thus, an assembly does not completely fulfill 
the desires set by civil society. A coalition emphasizing peace, protection for the envi-
ronment and human rights, and the importance of international justice must be estab-
lished. National governments are both the means and the hindering mechanism in reach-
ing for the European federation, as Levi quotes Altiero Spinelli. The political parties can 
enhance the world parliament becoming a true global actor.  
Heinrich (2003), Schwartzberg (2003-2004), Patomäki (2007), Franck (2007) and 
Johansen (2007) are interesting counterparts for the models of Bummel, Falk & Strauss, 
and Archibugi. One of the crucial points of Heinrich, although his input is rather li-
mited, is the fact that UN parliamentarians would receive their salaries directly from the 
UN, thereby diminishing the influence of national governments over representatives, 
and increasing the independence of a new global institution. This can be regarded as 
highly feasible for the long-term goals of a WP. Heinrich’s pragmatic model on the 
UNPA stands somewhere between idealism and realism: his effort to examine the role 
of non-democratic states is relevant because they must be included in changing the 
working mechanisms of the UN and for control over the stability of the democratic UN 
system. In that sense, considering the share of representatives from the countries in 
question, partly undemocratic means must be adopted, so that the system stays in a 
democratic balance. This thought should be kept separate of the analysis of a WP where 
exclusion could be a more feasible solution than the inclusion of non-democratic states.  
Schwartzberg, a keen sympathizer of the idea of a WPA, underlines the importance 
to reform other UN bodies even more urgently than the UNGA. The UNGA should 
adopt a more realistic and representative decision-making process and possess the right 
to binding decisions. Accordingly, the UNSC should be reformed to apply to the repre-
sentative nature of the world. He does not see an active participation of individuals and 
civil society, sovereign states being the main initiators of the highly mathematical 
change of the UN system. His model does not call  the sovereignty of states into ques-
tion. Therefore, the power balance of sovereignty must not be touched. His criticism is 
aimed at many activists who are proponents of the assembly but withdraw their support 
because they are convinced of the practical difficulties to establish an assembly. They 
thus believe that the project cannot be achieved during their lifetime. As appears in 
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Strauss (2007), the process to amend the UN Charter is a nearly impossible mission, 
thus Schwartzberg’s account, no matter how just it would be concerning the UN reform, 
is not feasible. His proposal does not improve the state of global democracy but makes 
alterations to existing institutions, thereby neglecting any considerations of global citi-
zenship and the enhancement of democracy. His model does not include a comprehen-
sive continuum as is here expected of a reasonable scenario but Schwartzberg rather 
aims at making the UN system more just in terms of the number of seats. Concerning a 
WP, Schwartzberg does not offer more than cosmetic changes.  
Franck mentions a global polis, fascinating as a concept, where the directly elected 
members in the global parliament come to find common ideals. In order to advance their 
agenda, the members of the parliament develop unique ways to reach their ends, empha-
sizing thus transnational elements. In a normative sense, this is positively feasible, since 
it predicts ways of governance that would be circular in a good way. By combining in-
dividuals, they will form a common identity, thus empowering them to further develop 
global democracy and participation. Franck’s model is hesitant and he is careful in stat-
ing that one should aim low, and one should not aim at establishing a powerful global 
parliament. Johansen’s model is one of the most challenging ones, since he speaks for 
the established e-Parliament that combines parliamentarians and individuals to solve 
global issues on various topics. The practice has shown that the loosely led e-Parliament 
has not succeeded in attractive measures: the e-Parliament is directed towards parlia-
mentarians, i.e. only a small number of global citizens and the project has not been visi-
ble although the e-Parliament is accessible in the virtual world. Presently, it seems, the 
e-Parliament is focusing on climate issues, which might be eminent for e-organizations: 
the initial idea aims high but the concrete results circulate around specific topics and 
excite experts in specific field of academics and NGO’s. 
Patomäki  offers  a  realistic  and  pragmatic  description  of  a  world  parliament  by  
touching the important topic of international law and its indeterminacy. Together with 
Strauss & Falk (2007), Patomäki’s detailed account is highly feasible. All three propose 
a gradual system towards a directly elected body by including different actors from par-
liamentarians to civil society organizations. Both scenarios assume a degree of exclu-
sion: Patomäki suggests in his second version a group of like-minded nations establish-
ing a body of two chambers, whereas Strauss emphasizes the importance of progressive 
states in the creation of a WP/GPA. Neither Falk and Strauss nor Patomäki give any at-
tention to the development of global or at least regional political parties. Europe has al-
ready, to some extent, seen the evolvement of supra-national political groups (e.g. the 
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earlier mentioned LI, or party groupings in the EP), although they still lack relevance 
when compared to national political parties. National parties have long cooperated with 
their sister parties in other countries, so the final evolvement into single global parties 
not consisting of national parties is not far-fetched. Patomäki’s recommendation of in-
cluding legal experts reminds of Plato’s philosopher kings. Their impact and necessity 
has not been utilized to the maximum at the national or global level. Many of the scena-
rios that propose a second chamber to the world parliament leave the purpose and func-
tions of this institution untouched. Patomäki makes his scenario feasible by giving his 
second chamber a plausible role to play, namely the upper control organization in a 
milder sense than what the connotation of ‘control’ usually implies. A single-chamber 
world parliament can fall into the trap of being its own supervisor and end up causing 
democratic problems it was initially aimed at solving. The idea behind a second cham-
ber is to organize an independent body to oversee the activities and decisions made in 
the first chamber. I return to the issue of chambers and global political parties in detail 
in chapter 5.  
What  remains  are  the  critical  and/or  skeptical  models.  Their  purpose  was  shortly  
mentioned earlier in this chapter. The fact that those proposals critically neglect any 
form of a world parliament or a UNPA are not feasible because the status quo is already 
there, one cannot hide from it. But the current conditions are inefficient in terms of the 
democracy deficit and the lack of citizen-based organization. But in a thesis where the 
feasibility of world parliament scenarios and models is examined, ideas that do not see 
any relevance in such a global institution cannot be labeled feasible. Therefore, their 
impact is considered in the latter half of this chapter. Kennedy (2007) is one of the big-
gest skeptics among the models. In his perspective, the sincere projects to alter institu-
tional arrangements do not meet with the needs of the present time. He criticizes legisla-
tive systems as such since the decisions are made in other institutions. The reader is left 
confused; it is not quite clear what Kennedy sees as relevant in all the criticism. It is 
true that legislation is not enough as such, even at the global level, but maybe it is pre-
cisely the fact that the global sphere lacks a center that many problems have arisen. His 
keen focus on the national level and the challenges to tackle national problems deserves 
attention but how long should those interested in reforming the global level wait until 
improvements at the national level are made successfully. Could the challenges not be 
handled at the same time, since global and national challenges are not exclusive. Ken-
nedy fails to acknowledge the comprehensive view that the national and global levels 
are inter-linked and that by reforming the one the other is enhanced as well.  
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Roche (2003) writes with a technical-realist perspective when examining the UNPA. 
He accentuates that world federalism and the end of the state apparatus are not part of 
the mainstream political agendas of the present day UN aims. The emphasis is on issues 
of international governance which are similar to current UN objectives. He evaluates the 
rumors on Kantian models of world federalism as not being relevant in the present 
world.  Interpreted  against  the  retreat  of  the  state  theory,  he  stresses  that  the  assembly  
does not try to replace the existing states, which is in discrepancy with the civil society 
model proposed by Falk and Strauss (2003). Roche argues that the fact that the civil so-
ciety could rise and beat the large states is based on wishful thinking rather than on 
facts. He brings the discussion around the UNPA to the current international field and 
the main players. The USA, Russia and China would presumably not be interested in 
extending the powers of non-state actors. The Europeans, on their part, share the expe-
rience by the European integration. According to Roche, the emphasis placed on the in-
fluence of civil society actors might be a European dream. Nonetheless, he acknowledg-
es that the UNPA would not only enhance democracy in the UN but also promote and 
increase democracy, civil society and good governance in the wider world. He does not 
present ideas but attainable goals that are probable in current world politics. In any 
event, he does not understand the idealism that is often behind transformation theories. 
The question is whether realistic views actually undermine the possible development 
paths that could take place in the future. Does skepticism delay positive development?  
The majority of the interest towards the WP project arises from liberalism or liberal 
values. However, other political, ideological or theoretical approaches exist which cri-
ticize the world parliament or a UNPA. Laurenti (2003) neglects the power of the indi-
vidual and civil society. Politicians undoubtedly possess relevant expertise on democra-
cy enhancement but Laurenti ignores the possibility of cooperation between government 
representatives, the corporate world and the public sector, including the citizens and 
NGO’s. His view of a parliamentary assembly is pessimistic. His account shows how 
realist policies still influence the current world, and he does see the state-centric view 
being questioned but regards it as absolute, unchanging and normal in the sense that all 
attempts are considered secondary to the prevailing conditions. Apart from some Amer-
icans, the majority of individuals in other countries as well might be uninterested in 
global news and discussions. It seems as if only the American public matters in consti-
tuting a parliamentary assembly when one reads Laurenti’s views. A clear lack of un-
derstanding is the attitude towards dissenters from his perspective He is so devoted to 
the status quo in the present institutional boundaries that he does not give other ideas 
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any chance. The global peace and justice movement requires a vision of the future. A 
global institution would enable direct participation of individuals and other actors in po-
litical processes encompassing the world. The state-centric world order can only be 
challenged when individuals are included in building international institutions. Once a 
world parliament is established, it would gradually gain in influence and reputation. Af-
ter the establishment, citizen groups should begin exercising pressure on the govern-
ments to join in the process. Eventually, authoritarian governments would not be able to 
afford staying outside the process. The evolutionary process of the global parliament 
and democracy would probably take decades. During this phase, the parliament should 
adopt a moral duty to continue the work of civil society.  
 
4.2 Beyond the models towards postmodern statehood 
A world state has been the ultimate goal of many globalist thinkers. Before reaching this 
high goal, diplomacy is regarded as the intermediate phase or means before the ultimate 
ends. Nuclear weapons are the tools of this phase because they balance out the current 
system, as many IR theorists would point out. Traditional forms of foreign policy and 
diplomacy have also been linked to the principle of self-determination, an important 
part of inter-state relations. Critics of global parliamentary scenarios spotlight the very 
self-determination when changes to current paradigms are proposed. Their criticism is 
not directed to the theory of the retreat of the state but to the very concept of self-
determination which is ultimately the point where a nation-state begins and ends. Sym-
bolic institutions do not question self-determination in the extent that draw the attention 
of WP critics but everything standing out the conceptualization of symbolic bodies rece-
ives their concern. A feasible WP scenario must acknowledge the principle of self-
determination and the hierarchies of power – from symbolic to radical – in the analysis 
because to state that the retreat of the state is a true fact would be misleading. Although 
many are willing to grant NGO’s and individuals more power, the actual global world is 
still based on international relations in a literal sense of the concept.  
With the establishment of a world parliament, the transformation towards a postmo-
dern statehood would be inescapable and there would be transformation of the state 
when  states  give  part  of  their  jurisdiction  to  a  global  organization.  This  does  neither  
suggest a retreat of the states but only diminished forms of state powers. In the instance 
of a WP, all three levels of the postmodern state – government, nationhood and econo-
my – would be accomplished and each of them would have transformed. There is no 
doubt that even in present conditions, the modern statehood no longer exists, at least in 
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the developed world (refer to Sørensen). Some of the preconditions of postmodern state 
and multi-level governance already exist in the EU and other regional systems. What is 
missing at the global level is cosmopolitanism: it is among the few political projects that 
were launched thousands of years ago without ever being actually constituted. The 
models and scenarios in the previous chapters demonstrate that modesty and gradual 
approach bear the most signifying results. If modesty is combined with goal-oriented 
planning, the idea of a world parliament could be realized in the future.  
In the theoretical framework, several peculiar termini – weak signs, here be dragons 
and the Black Swan – appeared that can now be interpreted in a new light. The first 
concept, weak signs (Hiltunen 2008), consists of the two elements, first symptoms and 
early information. First symptoms signify an unaccustomed change that makes the fu-
ture look uncertain, since it is not sure what the change means. Early information, on 
the other hand, shows a low correspondence level between previous information, so the 
sign is hard to interpret. Dragons also  lurk  in  the  corners  of  the  present  day  mental  
maps. Global governance still bears unrecognized spots due to challenges in the human 
desire to be in control and to find order in a chaotic world. The third concept, the Black 
Swan (Elahi 2010), signifies unpredictable events that massively affect the status quo. 
These summarizing comments on the three concepts can all be interpreted in the face of 
a world parliament. A WP can be any of those signs, although here be dragons and the 
Black Swan come closest to the nature of the world parliament as perceived in 2011. If 
the world parliament is constituted during this century, it diminishes the space left for 
the final frontier. A feasible world parliament would dramatically change the gover-
nance humans have ever invented and would bring global cooperation and peaceful 
measures to tackle common issues to a new level. Global democracy and international 
law would considerably gain added value. Without being too serious, this tremendous 
transformation would make something previously considered dystopian into utopian, 
without the utopia remaining unaccomplished. In the following chapter I examine 
whether this constellation is feasible within the next thirty years.  
Without being too harsh, all of the 17 models contained possible features but only a 
few complete scenarios were both feasible and probable according to the standards of 
futures studies. The most deciding elements are how power shifts from states to the 
global level and how the argumentation follows from this towards suggestions of a 
world parliament. Another point is the dimension of legislative powers: what does it 
mean if a WP has operative legislative rights? What is the practical value of desirability, 
feasibility and credibility? All three concepts are very abstract but their input must be 
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linked to the practical level, otherwise scenarios remain unrealized. Before examining 
the scenario in chapter 5, Table 4 shows the analysis results based on the 17 models. 
The accounts were examined with five questions that were shortly introduced in the be-
ginning of chapter 3.1. The table only acknowledges the main elements of each model.  
 
Table 4. Summary on the dimensions of the models 
Author/s Proponent of 
world par-
liament? 
Why need for global 
change? 
Main initiators of 
change/world par-
liament? 
How to establish a 
world parliament? 
Approach or 
methodology?  
Falk, Richard 
& Strauss, 
Andrew (2003) 
Yes for a 
UNPA 
More direct democ-
racy, global citizen-
ship as a goal 
Civil society, indi-
viduals, business 
representatives (neg-
lects the role of the 
states) 
Through a formal 
treaty or a public 
relations campaign, 
combination with the 
UNGA 
Gradual pers-
pective, idealis-
tic, liberal 
Heinrich, Die-
ter (2003) 
Yes for a 
UNPA 
A new world order; a 
moral duty; freedom 
from governmental 
control; discusses 
problems with non-
democratic states 
Citizens, individuals, 
former parliamenta-
rians 
Salaries from the 
UNPA directly (di-
minishes national 
influence); no consul-
tative status 
Pragmatic 
Laurenti, Jef-
frey (2003) 
No to world 
federalism, 
world parlia-
ment and a 
UNPA 
Current system better 
than the one pro-
posed by world par-
liament enthusiasts 
Diplomats and state 
representatives have 
the knowhow to deal 
with international 
issues 
By overcoming the 
problem of inclusivi-
ty and exclusivity 
Skeptical, anti-
idealistic 
Levi, Lucio 
(2003) 
Yes, but does 
not adequate-
ly illustrate 
the form and 
purpose of the 
UNPA 
New forms of state-
hood at the global 
level; need to control 
globalization through 
federalism; impor-
tance of law 
Political parties, fe-
deralist states, the 
EU, NGO’s 
Direct elections of 
parliamentarians in 
cooperation with 
NGO’s; world par-
liament 
Gradual pers-
pective, federal-
ist, long-term 
goals 
Roche, Douglas 
(2003) 
No, rejects 
the idea of a 
world parlia-
ment and 
objects world 
federalism 
Transparency, effec-
tiveness of the UN, 
building democracy 
States, parliamenta-
rians 
The UNPA as an 
Inter-Parliamentary 
Institution (IPI), con-
sultative status, the 
UNGA as legislator 
Technical-
realist, pragma-
tic, skeptical 
Schwartzberg, 
Joseph E. (2003 
and 2004) 
Yes for a 
UNPA; does 
not elaborate 
the share of 
individuals 
and civil so-
ciety 
World Parliamentary 
Assembly (WPA); 
reform of the UNSC 
and other organs 
important 
Sovereign states Professional Election 
Commission (EC); 
reform of the UN 
budget system; no 
deep solutions 
Pragmatic, care-
ful examination 
Bummel, An-
dreas (2010a 
and 2010b) 
Yes for a 
UNPA, no for 
world parlia-
ment 
Change through 
present conditions, 
change of conscious-
ness and understand-
ing of world politics; 
lack to tackle impor-
tant issues in the 
current UN system 
Individuals, parlia-
mentarians; parlia-
mentarians: auto-
nomous delegates 
according to “degres-
sive proportionality” 
Subsidiary body of 
the UN, later a main 
body; not a world 
parliament; gradual 
change, direct elec-
tions to be considered 
after the transition 
phase 
Pragmatic, rea-
listic, mathema-
tical 
Archibugi, 
Daniele (2007) 
Yes In order to defend 
and renovate the state 
of democracy in the 
aftermath of the war 
in Iraq 
Democratic states, 
governments and 
citizens 
By exporting democ-
racy as an ends 
Neutral, careful 
about the means 
to reach the end 
result 
Baxi, Upendra 
(2007) 
Yes for a 
GPA (in 
terms of an 
Assembly for 
Peoples) 
To form a more plu-
ralistic view of global 
democracy and to 
ensure a truly civil 
society rather than 
ahistorical global 
citizenry, emphasis 
on inclusion 
World’s dispos-
sessed, deprived, and 
the disadvantaged 
peoples 
No account of the 
practical steps to-
wards a WP 
Directed to-
wards a special 
share of the WP 
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Falk, Richard 
(2007) 
Yes for a 
GPA 
Normative changes 
for practical chal-
lenges 
See Strauss 2007 See Strauss 2007 Pedagogic, edu-
cating, feasible 
Franck, Tho-
mas (2007) 
A gradual and 
hesitant yes 
To pass tribal natio-
nalism and for en-
hancing developmen-
tal issues 
World’s governments A directly elected 
second body of the 
UNGA 
Gradual pers-
pective, careful, 
concerned about 
the potential 
harmed role of 
the UNSC 
Kennedy, Da-
vid (2007) 
No, skeptical 
of a world 
parliament 
Current challenges 
are best solved by 
heterogeneity, inte-
raction and ethical 
pluralism; erosion of 
capacity 
Background institu-
tions, not legislative 
bodies 
Instead of legislative 
global bodies, the 
globe needs semi-
autonomous systems 
Skeptical, ironic 
Patomäki, 
Heikki (2007) 
Yes, based on 
a gradual 
process 
As a strategy of glob-
al democratization, in 
order to overcome 
the indeterminacy of 
international law 
A gradual process, 
including legal ex-
perts and sovereign 
states 
Directly elected rep-
resentatives (incl. 
national parliamenta-
rians, civil society 
organizations); 2) a 
grouping of like-
minded states. / Two 
chambers: first 
chamber for the di-
rectly elected citi-
zen’s representatives, 
the second chamber 
for legal experts 
(states, international 
courts, law school 
representatives) 
Pragmatic, tho-
rough, realistic, 
feasible 
Strauss, And-
rew (2007) 
Yes for a 
GPA 
The global arena 
lacks an authority 
representing world’s 
citizens; moral need; 
to improve effective 
global governance 
Interstate stand-alone 
treaty process be-
tween willing pio-
neers, i.e. interna-
tionally progressive 
states 
Initially an advisory 
body, gradually di-
rect elections; coop-
eration with the UN-
GA, eventually to-
gether with the UN-
GA a truly bicameral 
legislative system 
(legislative powers) 
Thorough, sys-
tematic, gradual 
perspective, 
feasible 
Johansen, Ro-
bert C. (2007) 
Yes for an e-
Parliament 
Need for global de-
mocracy due to a 
democratic deficit, 
action deficit, re-
source deficit, vision 
deficit 
Parliamentarians By the participation 
of parliamentarians 
and individuals in the 
virtual decision-
making on global 
issues 
Gradual pers-
pective, technic-
al 
Marchetti, Raf-
faele (2006) 
Yes The international 
political system is 
based on exclusion 
(moral unaccounta-
bility); need for cos-
mopolitan federalism 
The rulers and the 
ruled; individuals 
(global citizenship); 
states would give part 
of their sovereignty 
to a global assembly 
Through cosmo-
federalism: UN 
reform, establishing a 
central power and 
federative communi-
ties (double loyalty 
and subsidiarity); 
eventually goaling 
for a world govern-
ment (global Charter)  
Idealistic, gra-
dual perspective, 
federalist, cos-
mopolitan, com-
plex 
Onesta, Gérard 
(2010) 
Yes for UN-
PA, but the 
account does 
not adequate-
ly illustrate 
practical con-
siderations 
To solve the diplo-
matic stalemate at the 
UN level and chal-
lenges in intergo-
vernmental systems 
National delegates 
(parliamentarians) 
EP chronology in the 
background; goaling 
for direct universal 
suffrage; initially 
indirect powers, 
gradually proportion-
al representation 
Optimistic, ge-
neral, federalist 
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5. New scenario on the world parliament 
 
A whole history remains to be written of spaces – which would at the same time be the history of 
powers (both of these terms in the plural) – from the great strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics 
of the habitat. (Michel Foucault, adopted from Murphy 1996, 81) 
 
The concept of time and space alter with history. With the conclusion of the Cold War, 
we are facing a new global chapter in need of rewriting. With mental ‘spaces’ or maps, 
we can orienteer in futures through sceneries never seen before. The current multi-polar 
world is full of opportunities, both feasible and non-feasible. The idea of changing men-
tal ‘spaces’ brings a new approach to the development of a new world order, either 
stressing retreat or state-centrism. The idea of a world parliament offers a new space, 
clearing room for global citizens. The space of sovereign states is narrowing down as it 
is not self-explanatory anymore. The opportunity of a transformation makes futures 
scenarios the more interesting and fascinating.  
This chapter considers a new scenario, based on the consideration of the proposals 
made in chapters 4.1 and 4.2. In the end of the chapter, Table 5 displays a listed sum-
mary of the gradual transformation to a world parliament. Most of the examination in 
this chapter is devoted to a thorough analysis and impact-consideration, but issues con-
cerning the building of cooperative circles of interested individuals, parliamentarians, 
NGO’s and business partners, and empowering international political parties as well as 
getting fundraising started are also considered. The scenario reaching the 2040’s cannot 
be detailed in the sense that each year is filled with tasks and objectives. The time frame 
of thirty years is relative and flexible. I will borrow feasible aspects from the other sce-
narios and models and try to build a world parliament that is plausible both in the short 
and long run. The aim is to write one normative scenario, because by avoiding several 
proposals I can avoid speculative what-if questions arising from the comparison be-
tween two or more scenarios. As scenario writing includes personal elements, the scena-
rio might not please some readers, and one has to bear in mind that a longer time frame 
would have accomplished a different scenario altogether. Thirty years is naturally not 
enough, but the shorter the time frame, the more realistic and feasible it can be. A sce-
nario reaching into the last decades of the 21st century  goes  too  far;  the  technological  
and mental development concerning how future humans conceive their surroundings 
might have altered in a high altitude, making current scenarios look ridiculous.  
The positioning of this thesis is that the present-day world is chaotic enough in order 
to need another catastrophe – be it nuclear or totalitarian – in the future. The aim is to 
offer a peaceful solution to the problems of global and parliamentarian democracy. The 
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ideal world parliament should possess the following characteristics: sustainable democ-
racy, cosmopolitan ideals, secularity, expertise in global events, goal-orientation, execu-
tive powers to act (when solving global problems) and actual conflict-solving mechan-
isms. Desirably, a world parliament should be invested with uncorrupted methods and a 
second instance should control its decision-making. This leads to further problematiza-
tion if control institutions need to be “invented” in order of the main ship being able to 
sail. All of the elements cannot be reached in the next thirty years. What I can alter at 
this point, before moving on to the actual scenario, is the issue of cosmopolitanism and 
executive powers of the parliament. Cosmopolitan ideals form the background philoso-
phy but they cannot be included in the short-term objectives, since they would change 
the nature of the world parliament by making drastic amendments to global governance. 
Therefore, cosmopolitanism can only be considered a long-term goal of peaceful gover-
nance. It provides the thin red line but it cannot be implemented on the practical agenda, 
i.e. all references to any form of cosmo-federalism are neglected at this point because 
global federalism is not feasible in 2011. On the note of executive powers, they should 
not be considered in connection to a world parliament, since they are a matter of a po-
tential world government.  
The future is formed of the consequences adopted in the past, thus future events al-
ways imply the significance they had in the past. When considering scenarios, ethical 
value judgments are made of the future, although the context of the judgments is based 
on the present resonance. Within time, ethical boundaries may shift, as does the degree 
of  normality.  During  the  late  medieval  times,  the  city  states  were  at  the  time  normal,  
and nation-states seemed unnatural for the solutions of organizing humans into social 
groups. This illustration has the purpose of shaking customary concepts. The scenario 
adopted here concerns a world parliament built outside the UN system. As the examples 
of the 17 models demonstrate, and especially the most feasible ones, a gradual change in 
the form of a new body is most desirable, not the least due to the difficulty of amending 
the UN Charter and finding approval among the UN members. The problem of examin-
ing  a  world  parliament  in  the  UN context  is  the  level  of  relevance  submitted  to  sove-
reign states. As the Westphalian state system is transforming, a flexible WP outside the 
UN has relatively more room for maneuver than what a reformed UNGA would have.  
There are signs already supporting the fact that state sovereignty is loosing its grip 
on the information society and especially in economic matters. The UN, and in some 
terms the EU as well, serves as a good example of what might be established and what 
should be avoided. The UN is both an encouraging and a warning mechanism. The aim 
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is to avoid inefficient bodies in the long run: the new world parliament must have the 
means in the short run to accomplish them in the long run. Otherwise it becomes yet 
another platform for inefficient resolutions and discussions that have no actual effect on 
the future of the global arena. If the WP turns out to be a magnificent global institution 
with effective means and result-oriented status, it might put the future of the UNGA if 
not the whole UN system at stake in the long run. This does not exclude the fact that the 
WP, the UNGA and other UN bodies could cooperate on certain issues, such as delegat-
ing and deciding on the peace-keeping forces. An effective WP could have the effect of 
accelerating the UN reforms and thereby improving the old global organization where 
the membership basis is more inclusive. If the WP and UNGA were to cooperate, the 
division of their reciprocal relations and functions is left for future consideration.  
This scenario is based on a step-by-step process. Each single step presupposes that 
the previous step has been taken, i.e. that the preconditions are already there for the next 
step. The order of the steps is not predetermined so the individual steps may occur with-
in  a  flexible  timeframe.  For  the  closer  consideration  of  a  scenario,  the  6-point  list  of  
Davis (2003) in the end of Appendix 3 helps to consider relevant issues for a world par-
liament  and  the  actual  process  of  setting  up  a  global  body.  Davis’  list  examines  what  
roadmaps and signposts one has to consider when creating a feasible pathway for a new 
institution. The third point on the list concerns a World Constitution. Such a framework 
or a world charter is needed. A Charter could be drafted by legal experts in international 
law from various instances. It would include detailed elements, in contrast to the general 
nature of the UN Charter, on how to act on the legislation of the parliament, how to re-
spond to international disputes and crises, how to solve economic issues, how to organ-
ize global elections (including the election districts and the activities of the WP Secreta-
riat), how to supervise the second chamber and how to react to violations of the Charter. 
These are exemplary issues so further content may be added to the list. The Charter or 
the Constitution could follow the example of national legal texts and national constitu-
tions. It is important to draft the charter as inclusive as possible, as in the case of nation-
al laws, so that the legal interpretation is not all-you-can-eat, but sets a strict framework 
with agreed boundaries. The Charter should, however, withhold the right for new inter-
pretation and set the conditions and rules for amending the Charter in the future.  
Inclusion versus exclusion and in this instance especially the problem of strictness 
versus acceptance (concerning membership selection) should be discussed. The world 
parliament would not be all-inclusive. As the UNGA evidence shows, a club for all is 
hardly efficient and risks of being exploited by corrupted and authoritarian means for 
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undemocratic ends. A gradual “universal” suffrage is one of the important ends but the 
means must be more exclusive. Organizing global elections for citizens residing in au-
thoritarian or totalitarian states is hardly feasible. The WP must stand firm on this: any 
forms of approaching undemocratic states in a forgiving manner proves counter-
productive. The elections must be fair and free. The fact that the initial WP only com-
prises of democratic states (e.g. based on the results of independent sources; the results 
submitted by institutions such as the Freedom House might not be the best solution) 
hopefully stirs pressure by citizens in non-democratic states. This is highly speculative 
but it is an element that many of the scenarios refer to, so it might bear some truth. The 
negative counterpart of this speculation is that the statement is not true and that a closed 
circle of so-called “suitable” states has the effect of a dead-end. The states left outside 
the WP, as might happen to the big majority of the G77 states, might establish an organ-
ization of their own to show a counter actor against “elitist, Western democracies”. In 
order to avoid a future stalemate of the WP, anticipatory measures could be taken. This 
applies to the significance of popular support. As with the online UNPA campaign 
launched in 2007, the proponents and WP activists could organize themselves with per-
sons from the IT and advertisement branch and set up a modern website presenting the 
future of the WP and its jurisdiction. As the UNPA project can be supported by anyone 
around the globe, polls and appeals could be organized to the extent citizens pursue the 
WP, in which format they would see the WP best fitted, and concerning the legislative 
powers of the parliament. The citizens could freely express their opinion, and these ad-
visory views could be used for the architecture of the WP. The online campaign could 
interest NGO’s, inter-governmental organizations, global networks, regional groupings 
etc. Social networks should not be neglected, since they reach millions of persons.  
On the question of networks, elections and jurisdiction, following remarks can be 
made. The first step to organize the establishment of a WP concerns the building of a 
network of WP enthusiasts around the globe. This group could include legal experts, 
parliamentarians, individuals from academic circles, the corporate world, NGO’s and 
governmental representatives with similar motives and desires for a WP. The group 
could then call a meeting for all interested in the project and draft a preliminary version 
of the WP Charter. The meeting could be organized for all interested, in the manner of 
the UNPA campaign, and not only for those from democratic countries. At this point, 
the discussion should remain general and the objective would be to build a larger net-
work, chart guidelines, find agreements and disagreements, and make preparations for 
further steps towards a WP. On the national level, political parties and individual volun-
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teers favoring deeper federalism could join the efforts. In the next thirty years, the aim 
is to constitute an advisory body for the coalition of the willing consisting of democrati-
cally elected states, individuals, NGO’s, experts from legal and IR scholars etc. Later 
aims concern a body with full legislative powers and competence to make binding deci-
sions. However, at the present moment, legal issues restrict the option of binding legis-
lative powers of a supra-national body that does not yet exist. Once the group of like-
minded persons is established, later steps are easier to take. Elections and competence 
are bound by the legal framework. Presently, only states can sign treaties with each oth-
er or existing international organizations. Therefore, the initial WP cannot possess com-
petence that it does not legally have in the first place. Feasibility is in this case balanc-
ing between normative ideals and legal boundaries.   
Fundraising cannot be considered an obvious mechanism, since the advertisement 
measures must bear real fruit. If the citizens do not support the WP due to failing adver-
tisement measures, inadequate online campaigns or the lack of clearness in the portrayal 
of the nature and purpose of the WP (e.g. on the website), then the WP will be an organ-
ization without means. The World Parliament Secretariat (WPS), to be established dur-
ing the first step (see Table 5) of the scenario, could organize advertisement activities 
intended for all layers of the population in the capitals of the potential member states, 
open a bank account for donations, employ face-to-face fundraising measures in big ci-
ties and employ other modern high-tech measures when making the WP campaign visi-
ble. The WPS does not need to be a large organization in the beginning but it cannot 
solely rely on volunteers. Employed staff should also be hired. Patomäki mentioned 
several options for collecting revenue and taxes to cover the expenses of the WP. These 
included the environmental taxes, proceeds from mining the seabed, travel taxes, global 
lottery, a global credit card, postal contributions etc. They could all be feasible, except 
for the arms sales tax. The relationship between the WP and taxes collected from moral-
ly questionable sources should be next to a minimum. Taxes from arms sales should be, 
if anything, directed to benevolent sources, but bringing in revenue from arms sale for 
the WP could harm the independent moral and ethical role of the WP. Legislative meas-
ures of the WP could in the long run include further measures to restrict and forbid arms 
sale,  but  at  the  same time the  parliament  would  be  dependent  on  its  revenue,  thus  the  
danger lies in its moral dimension and potential circular resources. Therefore, the WP 
should refrain from receiving taxes from arms sale in the first place.   
At this point, universal suffrage is excluded, since global membership is not in-
cluded either. The suffrage will be, when the WP is established, given to the democratic 
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member states and their citizens. In a later phase the parliament, as has been agreed in 
the Charter or the Constitution, decides on legislative matters just like a national par-
liament does. The legislative functions of the first chamber of the WP could include 
economic, welfare-related and environmental issues, decisions concerning other global 
bodies (at a later point institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, UNGA etc., although 
this is still highly premature at this point), and other legislative matters in the fashion of 
national parliaments. Cooperation with the World Bank (WB) and the IMF would indi-
cate that the WP has expertise in financial matters. The legislative powers would be 
binding on the members, and the WP could also issue sanctioning measures on those 
MP’s and states not obeying to the common rules set by the Charter of the WP.  
As to the structure of the world parliament, the WP would embrace two individual 
and independent chambers. In the beginning, both of the chambers would be advisory. 
In the future, the first chamber would extend its legislative rights and the second would 
be a legal institution with a more restricted number of members than the first one. The 
first chamber would be invested with minor oversight powers in regard to the second 
chamber and its righteous actions, so it could resort to the legal interpretation of the WP 
Charter. However, the second chamber is the actual body with oversight functions. The 
members of the chambers could be participants in one chamber only, so dual member-
ship is excluded, since it could harm the daily work of the chambers. The first chamber 
would be more political, whereas the members of the second chamber need not be ex-
perts in policy-making, but rather experts in e.g. international law, human rights, inter-
national political economy, environmental issues and global governance. The experts in 
international law would require knowledge of punitive structures as well, through their 
expertise on the ICC, ICJ or the European court systems. At this point, the number of 
members in the first chamber influence the number of the entire chamber in the first 
place, so any calculations on the total number of first chamber MP’s cannot be made at 
this point. However, as a mathematical exercise, we can speculate. If the first chamber 
comprised individual members of e.g. 40 member states, then the number of MP’s 
would amount to approximately 250 members in total, as the number of MP’s found in 
some  medium-sized  European  state.  The  number  of  MP’s  from  single  states  must  be  
accountable to proportionality in terms of population. But, since the WP empowers 
global democracy, the structure of the parliament could be calculated based on several 
features making up to the total number of MP’s. Population, the Human Development 
Index (HDI), level of corruption and transparency and the extent of the rule of law could 
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be used as indicators. As mentioned before, besides MP’s from different states, the WP 
would embrace individual MP’s from NGO’s and other groups.    
The issue of jurisdiction returns us to the problem of legitimacy. If the WP gained 
legislative powers and had its members elected through suffrage, then which instance 
would grant these large powers to the WP? Since sovereign states hold the strings of 
international  politics,  they  would  have  to  surrender  part  of  their  powers  to  the  supra-
national level. In order for something as radical as a WP to take considerable ground, 
power must shift from somewhere else, in this case presumably from both sovereign 
states and/or other global organizations. The new power structure cannot be created 
overnight from nothing. Therefore expert panel discussions, expert opinion-making, 
mathematical calculations and advertisement have to be made for the WP. The dilemma 
has its sides: the democratic sovereign states lose part of their powers, but they also gain 
new legislation by being members of a global institution. Here, the meaning of partial 
retreat of the state would be materialized, although the postmodern state would return in 
a new format. Although a world parliament is in the sense misleading that it would not 
be a WORLD parliament in its literal sense, at least in the beginning, the status of a real 
WP would be added in a later development phase. As the example of the EU suggests, 
regional forums can be created successfully and states can be willing to give part of 
their jurisdiction to the global level. More than anything, the WP is a process: to put the 
euro as a currency into practice took more than a decade after stage one of the Econom-
ic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe in the early 1990’s.    
What remains is the impact of other members than individual MP’s. Often regional 
federations or unions are compared when global institutional architecture is under scru-
tiny. As the UN has observer members (international organizations, entities, and non-
member states), the WP could employ indirect membership measures as well. This 
would then apply to regional organizations, such as the EU or the African Union (AU), 
entities such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 
the IPU and other organizations with non-member status, such as the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization in the UNGA. The permanent and non-permanent observers would 
not be allowed to vote in the WP, but the observer status would lend more global credi-
bility  to  a  world  parliament.  As  the  original  members  –  states  and  non-governmental  
organizations – could make binding decisions on the future criteria of membership se-
lection, new members would have to fulfill the required criteria, as in the case of the EU 
enlargement procedure. The issue of specific criteria is too detailed and dependent on 
multiple issues, so they will not be covered in this thesis.    
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Before the summary table, the final contextual examination concerns supra-national 
parties. Unique parties beyond the national level are a good goal when citizen involve-
ment is concerned. Individuals are political animals and the establishment of single-
handedly regional or global parties could excite the citizens to do follow-up at the su-
pra-national level. Currently, the European parties represented in the EP are extended 
national parties that only in theory have common denominators although the national 
MEP’s are divided according to party divisions and not according to countries in the EP. 
Still, as long as the suffrage methods are not changed, real European parties cannot be 
formed. Reaching political parties is not among the hardest tasks of the WP. Using the 
EP as an example, the European parliament could organize its elections in the manner of 
party politics. Politicians could have dual party membership and they could be members 
of national parties and of new regional parties that candidate in the EP elections. MEP’s 
could only get elected through supra-national parties; i.e. they could not be EP candi-
dates in national parties. Slowly a new identity would be created, clearing room for the 
further development of global parties.  
 
Table 5. Summary of the time frame of the scenario 
 
1. step: 2011-2020 
 
a) Open-minded advertisement campaigns and global polls for the support of the WP: 
use of social networks and other internet channels. Advertisement directed to the citi-
zen level, for parliamentarians, NGO’s and prominent societal figures. Establishing a 
WP website. 
b) Global lottery, face-to-face actions, short-term employed personnel in big cities 
around the globe. Other revenue and taxing resources. 
c) Establishment of global/regional political parties. 
d) “Collecting” a database of legal and political experts from law schools, universities, 
national ministries and other institutions, international and national courts etc.  
e) Organizing fundraising; setting up of a donation pool for the future benefit of the 
WP. 
f) Setting up the union of democratic states, international organizations and regional 
groups and/or organizations willing to establish a world parliament. 
g) Setting up of the World Parliament Secretariat (WPS), recruiting employees and 
researchers (scientific studies and reports on feasible measures of the WP). 
h) Draft of the WP Charter/Constitution according to results of meetings. 
 
 
2. step: 2020-2030 
 
a) Experts and parliamentarians (e.g. MEP’s with international experiences) organize a 
Model WP Conference to consider practical issues and potential problems. 
b) Report and monitoring of the results based on the model conference, improvement 
of the previous standards. 
c) Decision on the election districts, membership selection (total number of members 
in the 1st and 2nd chambers, number of national and regional members), selection crite-
ria for observer members. WSP to prepare for the execution of the coming elections. 
e) Review of the WP Charter/Constitution.  
 
 
3. step: 2030-2040 
 
a) Direct elections (around 2032) in the member states and organizations of the advi-
sory WP. Election of the expert members of the 2nd chamber. 
b) Agenda setting of the new elected WP. 
c) Beginning of the daily work of the WP. 
d) Decision on the selection criteria for future members. 
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e) Monitoring of potential cooperation mechanisms with other global, regional and 
national institutions and organizations (e.g. UNGA, IMF, WB). 
f) Independent reports on the success and failing issues of the WP. 
 
 
4. step: 2040’s un-
til late 2090’s 
(speculative)? 
 
a) Extension of the jurisdiction and legal powers of the WP chambers from an advi-
sory to a legislative status. Potential change in the election system (towards supra-
national suffrage and regional – non-national – election districts.   
b) Enlargement of the membership of the WP. 
c) Increasing number of democratic states at the global level. 
d) Potential EU federalism and intensification of other regional communities. 
 
 
In the first 2032 elections, the representatives would not be selected from non-
national regional districts but the states would set  up a candidate list  for their  citizens.  
Also non-governmental organizations accepted as permanent members of the WP would 
have a certain number of seats in the parliament, according to the size of the organiza-
tion. Little by little the suffrage could be extended beyond the national scope, depending 
on the development of non-national political parties. The elections would be executed 
every eight years, a frame long enough to support the efficiency of the parliament. The 
UN would not be able to participate as a member of the WP, since the WP needs to re-
main an independent body outside the UN system.  
As Table 5 indicates, not all of the aspects under each step must be taken, and the 
practical choices may be different, when the time is there. The individual points under 
each step and time frame are meant to be simultaneous, i.e. they take place within one 
decade. Step 4 in the table reveals the time frame beyond the experiment of futures stu-
dies which was intended here. The space devoted to further examination includes 
thoughts for the further development of this subject. The time spectrum tends to favor 
both drastic and short gradual changes in the international arena. The WP must remain a 
moral authority at all times, embracing the development of democratic standards, uni-
versal understanding of human rights (without the violation of cultural differences, as 
long as individuals are not harmed) and the equal worth of all citizens no matter of na-
tionality, gender, age, cultural and religious or social background etc. The WP must 
embrace secularism in its actions and in print: the WP Charter cannot have any elements 
of religious signs (refer to the discussion on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe and the desire of some parties to include the significance of the common Chris-
tian background in Europe). By avoiding any discriminatory measures, the WP remains 
an organization with a bright future.  
The scenario is intended to show a possible route towards a WP. Issues regarding 
revenue need further specification, as do the definition of democracy, legislative rules, 
functions and thematic topics. The main task of the WP, before its legislative powers 
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are extended, is to offer advisory opinion on legal, political, economic and other mat-
ters. At the time of the Charter amendment, the WP must acknowledge existing interna-
tional laws and treaties as well as national legislation that could affect its powers. To be 
honest, this scenario is very optimistic in regard to the level of achievement in the 
2040’s. In order for all the steps to be taken according to the time frame presented, the 
world parliament is very lucky. Some of the aspects of the step-by-step process are in-
tended as recommendable features, but usually the practice shows that best solutions are 
found outside the original plan. The intention is to normatively contribute to the discus-
sion on global parliamentary assemblies and democracy deficit in world politics.  
In the introduction, ten research questions were outlined. They have been answered 
throughout chapters 3 to 5, but short summarizing answers will be given to each ques-
tion. The time of thirty years was chosen because both the preparatory and actual steps 
concerning the establishment of a world parliament demand several decades. In regard 
to revenues and funding, the selection of members in the both chambers of the world 
parliament, the constituting of the WPS and the founding of real global parties need im-
plementation, planning and executive measures. These are among the steps to be taken 
during the first phase of implementation, so the actual organization of elections, drafting 
the Charter and revising previous plans on jurisdiction, legislation and the legal bounda-
ries demand more time. Therefore, twenty to thirty years are the absolute minimum for 
any desirable world parliament. 
Question (1) concerned feasibility, credibility and desirability. A world parliament 
that fulfills all three elements is constituted gradually by implying democratic and legal 
measures for members from exclusively democratic states and groups. A feasible WP is 
in the short run advisory but legislative in the longer perspective and it can cooperate 
with and advice other international organizations. On the question (2), the world par-
liament should adopt a cosmopolitan philosophy to guide its workings, but any consid-
erations of global federalism should be neglected both in the short and long term. If re-
gional entities embrace federalism and it becomes a feasible option at the global level, 
then cosmopolitanism could be reconsidered. Question (3) referred to the causal rela-
tionship between the world parliament and sovereign entities and the delegation of 
powers from the latter to the former. Only a feasible world parliament that has prede-
signed jurisdiction and legal boundaries can attract sovereign states and other organiza-
tions. As the body would be a coalition of the willing, the members of the WP would 
lose some of their powers at the global level but they would also gain more symbolic 
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powers in the coalition. The WP enthusiasts must make a visible campaign so that the 
sovereign states can enter into a new relationship with a global parliament.  
Question (4) implied structural elements. The main objective of the WP would be to 
safeguard peace and international law and offer legal and political advice in cases when 
international law has been violated. An advisory world parliament can adopt measures 
to pressure anti-democratic states and a legislative WP could influence national policy-
making and attract new members in the manner of the current EP. Question (5) dis-
cussed possible future challenges of the WP and the role of international law. A severe 
problem is the situation in which the WP evolution stops at a crucial point before its 
true powers are acquired or that it remains a closed circle of a small number of mem-
bers. It is similarly problematic if the WP is overrun by another organization or that its 
legal framework bears no efficient impact on the national or global decision-making 
structure. The fact that international law already influences global decision-making is a 
crucial asset than enables the functions of the WP. International law helps to maintain 
the important status of human rights and it can sanction violations.  
Currently, there is not an international body that considers the role and the rights of 
global citizens (question 6). By representing citizens, the dimension of global democra-
cy gains new ground and proves to be a vital element of promoting peace. In reference 
to question (7), citizens would have the right to vote for MP’s. The WP would have na-
tional quotas for persons but also for NGO’s and non-permanent members. As any legal 
framework, the Charter of the WP sets out the restrictive rules and mechanisms of the 
WP and decides on the election procedure. Question (8) is connected to question (3). 
The  colorful  members  of  the  world  parliament  would  invest  their  expertise  in  the  WP 
because modern statehood has transformed and global decision-making is becoming 
more important. Sovereign states are the strong force behind the success of a WP, there-
fore the retreat of the state theory in question (9) is still irrelevant at this point. Howev-
er, a new statehood has replaced the realist vision of world politics: states can cooperate 
with other global actors. Finally on the question (10), sovereign states that sign treaties, 
should realize that the postmodern statehood has become factual and understand the 
new rules of the game. The Westphalian system is a construction and it can be replaced 
by new forms of governance and imply democratic measures and efficiently maintain 
peace on Earth. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
What happens when you find – if you find – an animal believed extinct? (…) It happened so seldom. 
Something about a star of honor from the UN and a stipend. A reward running into millions of dol-
lars. (Dick 2009, 187-188) 
 
What one faces here is a familiar dilemma for humans. In the science fiction novel Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? by Philip K. Dick, the World War Terminus has 
filled Earth with dust. The UN has encouraged humans to emigrate to off-world colo-
nies. Humans remaining on Earth cling to Empathy Boxes linking them to a collective 
consciousness based on the religion of Mercerism. Fake or real animals are the true ob-
jects of human empathy and they raise one’s status in the dystopian society. The prota-
gonist in the novel manages to purchase a real goat that is killed by an android. After 
the loss of the goat, the protagonist almost finds an animal believed extinct. Animals 
with the label ‘extinct’ are like lottery prizes that are rewarded so seldom that the quest 
becomes a never-ending adventure. Establishing a world parliament after a long hour of 
stagnation in the Westphalian state system signifies a change in both scope and space. It 
might seem unlikely to establish a world parliament but many feasible elements speak 
in its favor. The parenthesis of a goat and a world parliament is not too far-fetched: 
cosmopolitan thinkers cling to the idea of a world parliament like the protagonist to his 
goat. There has never been anything of the multitude that a global legislative body 
would bring about. Initially, it might not seem as mentality-changing as it seems, but the 
fact that an initially advisory global institution would make binding decisions on politi-
cal, economic and legal affairs in the long run is revolutionary. Transformation always 
anticipates gradual movement: the scope and space of the procedural steps make the 
change relevant. However, if we consider a time span from 2011 into early 2040’s, too 
broad calculations cannot be made. The time span of thirty years is very short for 
ground-breaking inventions and interventions.  
In a dispersed multi-polar world, new solutions are needed as soon as possible. 
Cosmopolitan ideals have been on the philosophical agenda for several millennia. How-
ever, after the fixed establishment of the Westphalian state system, nationalistic poli-
cies, political games fought between states and economic competition have come to in-
terfere and often hinder global decision-making. Democracy deficit and the weakness of 
international law have caused many academics to develop ways of better global policy-
making. Hence, we arrive at the discussion on the parliamentary assemblies, world par-
liament and in some cases, even world government. Are the normative models doomed 
for failure, as has been the case with cosmopolitan theories so far? The sovereign state 
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does not date back but a few hundred years but it has invented a tradition, hard to 
amend and challenge. Sovereignty is a settled form of state execution because it is 
rooted in several international treaties, organizations and inter-state relations. The ques-
tioning of its legitimacy requires adequate and well-thought measures. However, de-
mocracy stands for representation of the peoples and this cannot be expunged from the 
individuals. Civil society actions, although they are mostly based in certain states, have 
the ability to cross state boundaries and find networks outside the borders. With the 
awareness of the individuals of their own powers and opportunities, the knowledge of 
civil society movements, groups and relations develop and bridge the gap between dif-
ferent peoples around the globe. Globalization, though it includes negative side effects, 
contains positive features in networking skills that people increasingly adopt, regardless 
of distance. 
What will happen with the WP campaign? Definitively, the impact and future of the 
world parliament or parliamentary assemblies cannot find an ultimate answer here, al-
though each contribution adds a new slice to the global cake. The process has begun at 
the ideational level, thus suggesting a transformation in the perspective to consider im-
proved global decision-making. The sovereign states are not wished to wither away, 
therefore the theory of the retreat of the state is premature. Most of the models agree 
that transformation has partially taken place, nonetheless a discussion on the retreat of 
the state is too early at the moment, since the nation-states are strongly holding on to 
their sovereignty. This cannot be neglected over a short period of time but sovereignty 
can eventually change its nature. Along the argumentation by Sørensen, transformation 
of the states is more factual than fictional. The question remains which one is more im-
portant, the states or the individual rights and human justice. Cosmopolitan democratic 
models, cosmopolitan philosophy in general and theories on world parliament tend to be 
of Western origin, and projects originating in the developed world pose a severe prob-
lem of universality. It is a matter of a long lasting rivalry between state-bound realism, 
Western liberalism and a third factor standing for the theories of the developing world. 
Europe has been under constant observation with its struggle over the Treaty establish-
ing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). The current economic and fiscal crisis is not con-
tributing to a brighter future either. Many WP and UNPA proponents have put great 
faith in the development of the political development at the EU level (including the 
practical establishment of the Lisbon Treaty), relieving the further progress of universal 
regional entities and eventually the finalization of the world parliament project.       
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Futures studies is a unique opportunity to consider possible and probable events in 
the future. It can be either normative or forewarning in nature, depending on the ulti-
mate perspective. In reference to Bell in Appendix 2, prospective thinking can improve 
human life on Earth. Futurists are interested in causal relationships and actions that lead 
to change. Probable futures are multiple, conditional and uncertain. We can give possi-
ble accounts on how the global policy and citizenship representation should best be or-
ganized, or we can give exemplary signs of how it should definitively not be done. The 
past teaches us lessons and the present is formed through experiences in the past. We 
can ask ourselves whether we can continue to make humble offers on the possible future 
path. The plan can be persuasive and epic, but we have to offer humble gradual steps 
regarding the practical execution of the master plan. Global networks and the social me-
dia are successful in engaging the citizen level and bringing the information of the vari-
ous reform proposals concerning global institutions to those interested in global affairs. 
It is vital to realize that the WP project needs the support of individuals before it can 
proceed to the first concrete step towards the establishment of a real parliament. The 
project is doomed to fail if it is only driven from above by persons themselves engaged 
in political processes and democracy.  
The European Parliament, other regional parliaments and NGO level organizations 
have become proponents of the UNPA campaign. Multiple signs are in favor of the 
UNPA campaign as the most feasible option to carry out a parliamentary assembly. 
Other regional communities are rather weak in comparison to the EP but they could get 
involved by the example of the Parliament. Individuals need feasible solutions, and by 
offering these the general public may find interest in institutional projects outside the 
UN realm. As has been suggested on many occasions in this thesis, the changes to 
reform the UNGA or amend the UN Charter are minor. Therefore, the WP manages to 
avoid heavy bureaucracy and the burden of inefficient decision-making at the UN level.  
One should not be overtly pessimistic if the world parliament is not established in 
thirty years. The constitution of large global institutions is slow but the biggest steps are 
taken in the development phase. After the ideational phase is bypassed, practical matters 
follow smoother. Gradually the comprehensive bigger picture is acquired, and after the 
first step, others are significantly easier to take. After the future establishment of a WP, 
the concept of sovereignty should be reconsidered. The global parliament could exercise 
global control over regions and states, dependent on the form of states at the time, 
which would enable the supervision of democratic actions. If such a mechanism was 
undertaken, the individuals would suffer less from political persecution as in the current 
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situation, since the sovereignty paradigm prohibits partial interference in intra-state af-
fairs. With the building of a world parliament the importance of international law and 
global judicial institutions would increase. E.g. the ICC could become a major player in 
international law after the establishment of the WP.  
Problems remain to be answered and further considerations can be made for future 
purposes. One question concerns a potential UNPA. How reasonably can a global par-
liament absorb anti-democratic fanatic groups that do not accept the legitimacy of en-
hanced democratic global institutions? The presence of the global parliament would af-
fect the power of anti-democratic forces and diminish their influence. The originally 
exclusive  nature  of  the  world  parliament  can  easier  answer  the  question  than  the  all-
inclusive UN. The campaign on the UNPA is generally speaking a liberal project, ac-
centuating secular visions and common understanding between different cultures, poli-
cies and ideologies. In the exclusive form, the WP would equally be, at least in the be-
ginning, a community of progressive states and organizations. Liberalism is not a tradi-
tional political ideology but it is nonetheless a strand of thought not welcomed by all. It 
can be criticized and praised for the same reasons: it is perceived as Western and, in re-
gard  to  world  parliamentary  proposals,  in  some  sense  cosmopolitan,  these  two  some-
times going hand in hand. Cosmopolitanism rarely finds support in non-Western re-
gions. However, there are also proponents of the WP in the non-Western world who can 
contribute to the establishing of a world parliamentary assembly and destroy the illu-
sions that the WP would only be intended for certain progressive Western states and 
groups. The future of global democracy would also have to find a compromise between 
conservative and transformative proposals, that is, between the adhering to the current 
systems and the change paradigm. The second issue is linked to the current UN institu-
tions that have undergone a process of downsizing, neo-liberalization and demoraliza-
tion during the 21st century. These elements combined with the current euro crisis and 
economic catastrophes in single European countries exacerbate the benign UN and EU 
projects. In these circumstances, the world parliament could strike foot.  
The aim of this thesis was to consider feasible aspects of models and to establish a 
new scenario based on the plausible elements in the analysis and to develop new meas-
ures to constitute a world parliament. The dissenting and critical opinions also gave in-
sight into the range and scale of the issue. A thorough assessment of the proposals pro-
vides for the possibility to find a quintessence between the different lines of thought. 
One must be realist in the sense that the project towards the world parliament demands a 
long-term plan with gradual steps. Compromises have to be accepted, otherwise the ad-
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vancement of the process will be hindered. As Held conveniently put it, advocating 
cosmopolitanism possesses no guarantees but it embodies a determinacy to strive for the 
reform. The excitement of uncertainty keeps the reformer alert and in the state of readi-
ness. At the same time, futures studies helps to face the uncertainties with probable and 
possible solutions.   
The topic of the thesis could be further developed by implementing a deeper exami-
nation  of  the  relationship  between cosmopolitan  models  and  state  sovereignty  by  ana-
lyzing for example Sørensen’s, Held’s and Archibugi’s theories with a new perspective. 
A progress of the WP project gives clues on how to compare state sovereignty against 
cosmopolitan projects. With new scenarios and models being published, new feasible 
elements can be collected and compared with the potential level of practical advance 
towards a WP. The significance of academia is powerful when the academic forces are 
combined with legal and political experts in the policy-making world.  
The academics in social sciences have elaborated the idea of returning hegemonies 
similar to the Roman Empire or to the Middle Ages when several centers of hegemony 
reigned the world. The empires have usually not been connected with sovereign states. 
However, large empires seldom represent themselves as proponents of a power center 
above them. The USA serves as a conceivable candidate for an empire and hence forms 
a threat to the campaign for the parliamentary assembly where the long-term goals aim 
at a diminished role for states. Adapting the original idea of Francis Fukuyama, the 
global sphere might some day experience a victory of value liberalism and the end of 
American neo-liberalism striven for by the United States. Empires have usually expired 
at some point in history, therefore, sovereignty and the institutionalized power of states 
cannot be regarded as sacred either. A probable alternative for the sovereign states are 
the city states – called a polis during the antique world. Scenarios that speak for the es-
tablishment of a world parliament often see regional areas coming into a closer coopera-
tion at the expense of states. What the world parliament could do is to gradually under-
mine the role of states by favoring cooperation with other entities as well. In order to 
safeguard peace and avoid war, peaceful nations could see the world parliament as an 
opportunity in a similar manner and time as when the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity was established. These elements would signify the return to history, to the birth 
time of cosmopolitan thinking, sprung into life by the Cynic movement in Ancient 
Greece. In the end, one remains in the hope that establishing a world parliament would 
not be as hard as discovering a thought-to-be-extinct animal species and have the UN 
grant a reward for it.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
 
The cosmopolitan model of democracy (Held 1995, 271-272.) 
 
 
1. The global order consists of multiple and overlapping networks of power involving the 
body, welfare, culture, civic associations, the economy, coercive relations and orga-
nized violence, and regulatory and legal relations. The case for cosmopolitan democra-
cy arises from these diverse networks.  
 
2. All groups and associations are assumed to have a capacity for self-determination which 
can be specified by a commitment to the principle of autonomy and specific clusters of 
rights and obligations. These clusters cut across each network of power and are sub-
sumed under the following categories: health, social, cultural, civic, economic, pacific 
and political. Together, they form the basis of an empowering legal order – a cosmopo-
litan democratic law.  
 
3. Legal principles are adopted which delimit the form and scope of individual and collec-
tive action within the organizations and associations of state, economy and civil society. 
Certain standards are specified for the treatment of all, which no political regime or as-
sociation can legitimately violate. 
 
4. Law-making and law enforcement can be developed within this framework at a variety 
of locations and levels, along with an expansion of the influence of regional and inter-
national courts to monitor and check political and social authority. 
 
5. The defence of self-determination, the creation of a common structure of political action 
and the preservation of the democratic good are the overall collective priorities; the 
commitment to democratic autonomy creates both an agenda of long-term change and a 
programme of urgent priorities, focused on transforming the conditions of those whose 
circumstances fall radically short of equal membership in the public realm.  
 
6. Determinate principles of social justice follow: the modus operandi of the production, 
distribution and the exploitation of resources must be conducive to, and compatible 
with, the democratic process and a common structure of political action.  
 
7. The principle of non-coercive relations governs the settlement of disputes, though the 
use of force must remain a collective option of last resort in the face of clear attacks to 
eradicate cosmopolitan democratic law. Cosmopolitan democracy might justify the dep-
loyment of force, after all other forms of negotiation and sanction have been exhausted, 
in the context of a threat to international democracy and a denial of democratic rights 
and obligations by tyrannical regimes, or by circumstances which spiral beyond the 
control of particular peoples and agents (such as the disintegration of a state). 
 
8. People can enjoy membership in the diverse communities which significantly affect 
them and, accordingly, access to a variety of forms of political participation. Citizenship 
would be extended, in principle, to membership in all cross-cutting political communi-
ties, from the local to the global.   
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Appendix 2 
 
Nine major tasks of futures studies (Bell 1997, 75-97 and 111-113)17 
 
1. The study of possible futures: Looking at the present in new and different ways, often 
deliberatively breaking out of the strait-jacket of conventional, orthodox, or traditional 
thinking and taking unusual, even unpopular, perspectives. It involves expanding hu-
man  choice.  Present  possibilities  for  the  future  are  real,  and  present  capabilities  for  
change and development are factual. The potential for future development and growth 
exists in the present and, thus, can be investigated.  
2. The study of probable futures: Focus on the question of what the most likely future of 
some specified phenomenon would be within some stated time period and under speci-
fied contingencies. The phenomenon may be nearly anything imaginable. One question 
is, what would the most probable future of some specified phenomenon be if things 
simply continue as they are? If the phenomenon whose future is under consideration is 
influenced by human actions, then the question can be rephrased, what would the most 
probable future be if we humans continue to behave as we do? Both questions invite the 
study of the present in order to have a base from which to forecast. They also invite the 
study of past trends up to the present. Scenarios make different assumptions about con-
ditions and then calculate probable consequences for the future. This requires know-
ledge, and the futurists are interested in cause-and-effect relationships. 
3. The study of  images of  the future:  A basic  concern of  futurists.  Most  futurists  share 
several important conceptual and theoretical commitments. One is the concept of “im-
age of the future”, or some nearly equivalent idea such as “developmental construct”, 
“expectations”, “anticipations”, “hopes” and “fears”. Another is the theoretical proposi-
tion that images of the future help share the historical actions that people take, i.e. futur-
ists see images of the future as being among the causes of present behavior, as people 
either try to adapt to what they see coming or try to act in ways to create the future they 
want. Images of the future are among the causes of the future as it becomes the present.  
4. The study of the knowledge foundations of futures studies: Any field of knowledge 
faces the question of how it knows what it claims to know, of stating and justifying its 
epistemological foundations. Another purpose of the futures field is to provide philo-
sophical grounds for the knowledge.  
5. The study of the ethical foundations of futures studies: Follows directly from the fu-
turist purpose of exploring preferable futures. In order to assess the desirability of alter-
native futures, futurists must study, evaluate, and apply human goals and values. They 
may also investigate human nature, the larger natural world, and even the cosmos in 
search of the meanings and purposes of life in order to find justifications for their value 
standards. It includes the exploration of people’s value judgments underlying their no-
tions of the good society. The study and fostering of deep caring about the freedom and 
welfare of future generations are among the most important purposes of futures studies.  
6. Interpreting the past and orientating the present: We use the past to guide our 
present behavior and to help construct our images of the future. Our beliefs about the 
past can help shape our beliefs about the future. To decide what to do now is largely 
what futures thinking is all about. Futures thinking is both indispensable to and conse-
quential for (1) interpreting the past, (2) understanding the present, (3) deciding and act-
ing in the present, and (4) balancing the use of present and future resources.  
7. Integrating knowledge and values for designing social action: Futurists must organ-
ize and focus a great deal of disparate knowledge and critically examine the relevance 
of many different values. Action, unlike research, is not granular, reductionist, and ana-
lytic. Things cannot be held constant, separated into small bits for investigation out of 
their context and function, nor can “other things” assumed to be equal. Action is holistic 
and synthetic. Values other than those defining the intended goals of action may be af-
                                               
17 This appendix consists for the most part of direct quotations but some sentences have been shortened.   
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fected, perhaps negatively, and they must be taken into account in decision making. Im-
ages of the future are involved in designing social action. They provide the goals and 
the motivation. Policymaking and decision making themselves always involve social 
science knowledge, since they are social processes.  
8. Increasing democratic participation in imaging and designing the future: Most fu-
turists include among the purposes of futures studies the goal of increasing democratic 
participation in the processes of imaging and designing the future. There is considerable 
evidence that such democracy contributes toward human betterment more than authori-
tarianism.  
9. Communicating and advocating a particular image of the future: Some futurists 
aim at overarching visions that have transcendent elements. They may include specula-
tive and creative images of “the other” perfect society, contradictions of the present, 
discontinuous futures that foretell the coming of new and different worlds. They aim to 
surpass the limits of the now, the limits of present understanding, and the limits of past 
experience. Drastic social change is sometimes envisioned. Futurists may be involved in 
all three – as well as imaginative visioning – as they disseminate particular images of 
the future, evaluate them as desirable or undesirable, and then advocate, more or less 
explicitly, practical social actions either to bring them into reality or to prevent them 
from occurring. They may construct and communicate images of global overshoot and 
collapse, while advocating policies to prevent such images from becoming reality. Such 
futurists become part of the political dialogue, since futurists are not imprisoned in an 
ivory tower. Futurists aim to contribute to human betterment by translating knowledge 
and values into action.  
 
Conclusion: The overriding purpose of futures studies is to maintain or improve human well-
being and the life-sustaining capacities of the Earth, the futurist’s distinctive contribution being 
prospective thinking. Futurists seek to know what causes change and seek to determine what 
anticipated changes may have to be accepted because they are, temporarily, that is, at a given 
time and place, or intrinsically and always, beyond human control. They also seek to determine 
what can be changed by human actions, what trends can be accelerated or prevented, or what 
phenomena are amenable to individual or collective human action. Additionally, futurists are 
concerned with prediction in the general sense of making assertions or statements about the fu-
ture. Although prediction is a necessary aspect of futures studies, futurists seldom predict a sin-
gle, unconditional, and certain future. Rather, futurists’ predictions are usually multiple, condi-
tional, contingent, corrigible, and uncertain. Finally, futurists have no intention of trying to mo-
nopolize futures studies. Nearly every discipline and field can include, if it doesn’t already, a 
future and future conditional tense.   
 
Key assumptions of futures studies (Bell 1997, 140-157) 
 
1. The meaning of time: Time is continuous, linear, unidirectional and irreversible. 
Events occur in time before or after other events and the continuum of time defines the 
past, present and future. Human conceptions of time rest in part on cosmology which is, 
after all, about the secrets of the universe.  
2. The possible singularity of the future: Not everything that will exist has existed or 
does exist. Past time may not be a good sample of all time. If we are not continually re-
living past time, nor always facing again the exact events that have occurred before, and 
if we are not moving in circular, repetitive time, then the future as it becomes the 
present contains some events, happenings, processes, structures that have never oc-
curred or existed before. Without social change, of course, societies and the repetitive 
patterns of social behavior that define them remain nearly the same, subject only to ran-
dom variations and errors in behavior that more or less average out around a norm and, 
perhaps, leave no permanent mark. Even when there is change, if it is slow enough, 
people may not notice the minor adaptations that they make and how their present cus-
toms slowly drift away from their past behavior. Without rapid social change, our cog-
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nitive maps of the past and present work reasonably well for the future, since the future 
is similar to the past, or at least is similar enough (…). But with rapid change, our cog-
nitive maps of the past and present may be so out of date that they no longer are accu-
rate or even recognizable representations of the future as it becomes present reality. 
When that happens, we need to construct new maps that correspond to the changed 
world, if we wish to act effectively. The awareness of the disjunction and the process of 
such construction obviously raise doubts about the moral bases of society and invite 
both social criticism and the effort to justify traditions in the face of new ways of doing 
things. In this way, crises of legitimacy of authority occur.  
3. Futures thinking and action: Futures thinking is essential for human action. Action 
requires anticipation. People have reasons to act. In this sense, action is explained by its 
final cause, its goal.  
4. The most useful knowledge: In making our way in the world, both individually and 
collectively, the most useful knowledge is ‘knowledge of the future’. We steer ourselves 
through time, as well as through physical and social space, according to our goals, our 
expectations of future happenings, and our anticipations of the possible and probable fu-
ture time trajectories of other people. The more we know about the possibilities and 
probabilities of the coming events of the future, the better able we are to plan the ac-
tions that create our lives. Whether we are remembering or forgetting the past, the most 
useful knowledge for the design of effective action is ‘knowledge of the future’. 
5. Future facts?: The future is nonevidential and cannot be observed; therefore there are 
no facts about the future. This assumption may be one of the few things on which al-
most all futurists are in agreement. The concept of future means something ‘not yet and 
nowhere’. The future is a domain of uncertainty. It is problematic. As cognizant beings 
and as researchers of the future, we face considerable trouble from this fact. Thus, we 
do the best we can, formulating assertions about the future – usually a range of alterna-
tive futures – on which we can act as if they were true. Yet there are some things about 
the future that appear to be so certain that for all practical purposes we can rely on them. 
The sun will surely appear to rise tomorrow morning. Death still looms as our individu-
al destiny, although we don’t know how, when, or where it will happen. These and 
many other future events appear to be sure bets. Yet, no matter how sure, they are still 
bets. What we can do in order to increase the effectiveness of our actions is to increase 
the probabilities that out statements about future happenings are presumptively true at 
the time we assert them. Assertions about the future can never be accepted as absolutely 
certain. They are not facts. But, if they pass objective and rational tests, they are conjec-
tural knowledge, that is, presumptively true, and can be used to design action as if they 
were true.  
6. An open future: The future is not totally predetermined. Futurists do not think of the 
future as fixed and existing out there in time bearing down on us in some inevitable 
way. The future offers opportunity and contingency. Thus, we don’t “discover” the fu-
ture, because there is no pre-existing future “out there” to discover. Within the limits of 
the possible, the future is open, and the domain of liberty and power. Liberty because 
people are free to conceive that something which does not now exist will exist in the fu-
ture. And power because people have some power to validate their conception through 
their willful actions. Some aspects or the future are more open than others. The future 
from this point of view is an assemblage of different possibilities, contingencies, near 
certainties and uncertainties, constraints and opportunities, some more probable than 
others. This raises the question of free will versus determinism.  
7. Humans make themselves: To a greater or lesser degree future outcomes can be influ-
enced by individual and collective action. This is one of the fundamental tenets of fu-
tures studies: we ourselves help to create the future with our own present decisions and 
actions. We seek not only to know the future, but also to control it. One has to deter-
mine how much of the contingent future is subject to human will and how much is not. 
What can be changed with what degree of likelihood and with what amount of human 
effort and what cannot be changed? One bias that must be guarded against is focusing 
too much on producing change and overcoming the status quo. This is not to say that 
“overcoming the status quo” is excluded from the futurist agenda. Quite the contrary is 
the case. But one option is to ask what parts of the present are of value and should be 
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preserved. Also, planned change often must be selective and carried out within a con-
text of maintaining and using some things in order to improve others. Although futurists 
generally believe that it is possible to create better worlds than existing ones, they tem-
per – or ought to temper – their general enthusiasm for change by reminding themselves 
and others that it is quite possible to create worse ones as well.  
8. Interdependence and holism: The interdependence in the world invites a holistic pers-
pective and a transdisciplinary approach, both in the organization of knowledge for de-
cision making and in social action. Futurists view the world as so interrelated that no 
system or unit can be viewed as totally isolated. One implication of the interrelatedness 
in the world is that a holistic, all-encompassing perspective is necessary for adequate 
decision making and social action.  
9. Better futures: Obviously, if futurists propose and critically assess preferable futures, 
they must believe that: Some futures are better than others. People judge outcomes as 
being more or less preferable. If this were not true, if any outcome were just as good as 
any other, then it would hardly be necessary to be concerned about the future and to 
work for one kind of future rather than another. Futurists accept, as part of their tasks, 
helping people to assess alternatives, to explicate value judgments, and to examine criti-
cally the basis on which such value judgments are made.     
 
 
General assumptions of futures studies (Bell 1997, 157-164) 
 
1. People and their projects: People are creative project pursuers; they are acting, pur-
poseful and goal-directed beings.  
2. Society as expectation and decision: Society consists of the persistent patterns of repe-
titive social interaction and the emergent routines of human behavior that are organized 
by time and space, expectations, hopes and fears for the future, and decisions.  
3. The existence and knowledge of external reality:  An  external  past  reality  did  exist  
and a present reality does exist, apart from the human knowing of them, and in principle 
they can be objectively known by humans more or less accurately. Additionally, futur-
ists assume that a future reality will exist, apart from the human consciousness of it, and 
that in principle assertions can be made about it that can be objectively warranted more 
or less accurately.  
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Appendix 3 
 
 
A Conceptual Framework to Evaluate World Parliament Proposals (excerpted) 
(Davis 2003) 
 
The footing of the objective lies in peaceful means only. “Our basic principles must attempt to 
encompass all of human behavior and to cover potential future scenarios. We would want to 
avoid, and would disavow, any violent actions undertaken as a pretext of establishing a WP, 
such as those from a lone terrorist, any terrorist groups, or any nation or group of nations seek-
ing global hegemony.” (Davis 2003, 130) The replacement of executive branches by legislative 
decision-making will help to avoid global risks. Today’s diplomacy, unable to handle issues of 
peace and justice, could be replaced by the global parliament, more ready to deal with global 
crises. An important embodiment of the world parliament would be the fact that it represents the 
possibility of a deep dialogue in politics. Politics is rather seen as a tool of discussion than as a 
fight paradigm. As the final step, Davis emphasizes the importance to define the ‘we’, since the 
Charter of the United Nations begins with the reference “we the peoples of the United Nations” 
(see United Nations 1945). The methodology is no less important because it is helpful for the 
evaluation. Further on, an inventory should be made of all the proposals for analysis, form an 
ideal group of proposals and begin discussing about the world parliament. The discussion is 
aimed to unite the individuals from anti-globalization protesters to the multi-national corporate 
world and to the individuals in general across the globe. (Davis 2003, 131-135) 
 
Proposals for Basic Design Principles 
 
1. Ultimate political sovereignty resides in the people and any institutional sovereignty is 
derived from them. Therefore, public bodies must yield if the people decide on institu-
tional change.  
2. The collective sovereignty of the people must be expressed through direct or representa-
tive democracy. The degree or extent of direct versus representative will depend on the 
scale of the body and the mix of checks and balances.  
3. The rule of law must be implemented as developed and approved, as opposed to the rule 
by specific individuals such as monarchs or dictators; this prevents arbitrariness and 
puts the rule of law above special interests.  
4. Implementation of the subsidiary principle, which means that local decisions are taken 
at a local level, and, concomitantly, that the World Parliament addresses only global 
problems. This principle is a constitutional principle of the European Union and is a re-
finement of a principle of federalism. The local levels will be defined and agreed upon 
as the WP develops.  
5. The transparency principle: complete institutional and procedural transparency is 
needed, as this is the only way to create the necessary trust and to prevent corruption.  
6. Use of peaceful means to build such an entity.  
7. Non-discrimination in accordance with Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  
8. Universal participation or inclusivity in the WP, to create a sense of ownership by the 
people. No person or persons should be excluded from participation in or knowledge of 
proceedings.   
 
The origin of every single one of these principles is derived from the philosophical and prag-
matic recognition that in today’s world, only a global body that is respected and trusted by the 
people will have the necessary moral authority to enforce its decisions. In order to earn the trust 
and participation of the world’s people, each of the above eight (8) principles must be imple-
mented.  
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Indicators of Evaluation for World Parliament Proposals 
 
What are the problems to avoid?  
 
a. Those that sometimes occur in national parliaments 
i. Top-down 
ii. Far away from citizens, no sense of ownership 
iii. Perceived as corrupt 
iv. Not independent: perceived as instruments of executive or financial powers 
b. Those inherent to the scale 
i. An escalation of the problems of national parliaments 
ii. An exacerbation of language and cultural differences 
iii. Could be viewed as a threat by national governments 
c. Those inherent in the lack of precedent 
i. Resistance to new ideas - particularly visionary ones 
ii. How can we actually begin? 
iii. Differences of opinion on basic structure and operation  
d. Lessons: only existing concrete example -the European Parliament 
i. Citizens do not emotionally connect – do not have a sense of ownership 
ii. Created in top-down way by governments, not inclusive of public opinion 
iii. Genesis in a succession of inter-governmental treaties rather than an innovative constitu-
tional beginning  
 
Examples of some questions to be asked of a World Parliament-type body that can be used to 
create a useful evaluation framework: 
 
External relationship factors: 
How representative is it? 
How accountable is it to the people of the world? 
How well does it succeed in creating (actual and practical rather than formal and theoretical) 
accountability to itself from other global bodies? 
How independent of existing institutions is it? 
How does it communicate with the peoples of the world? 
How does it maintain the trust of the citizens of the world? 
How close is it to the people? What is the accessibility factor? 
How efficiently does it impact global public opinion and do its decisions get carried out on the 
ground? 
 
Endogenous dynamic factors: 
How quickly can it respond to change? How can it avoid institutional crystallization? 
How can we build into it a corrective and evolutionary mechanism to improve its performance? 
 
Endogenous structural factors: 
How transparent is it? 
How well does it succeed in creating an environment of dialogue and trust among the represen-
tatives? 
How well does it embody itself the basic principles that it seeks to defend? 
How inclusive is it of the world’s population, of different political points of view, etc.? 
 
Process factors: 
How practical is it to establish? 
How quickly can it be established? 
How much public support can it be expected to muster in the process of its establishment? 
What might it cost to be established and what is the cost versus benefit ratio? 
How should location be established (fixed, rotating, floating seat)? 
How can the process of its creation avoid being tainted by the historical baggage of existing in-
stitutions?  
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Not all of those factors are equally important, so we must weigh them accordingly. 
 
Finally, we can also list issues to consider for the actual process of creation of a World Parlia-
ment: 
1. What are all the possible scenarios by which it can be created? 
2. Which among these are the ones that best suit the principles and conditions previously de-
cided upon? 
3. Do we need a World Constitution, and if so, how do we create it? 
4. What are the roadmaps and signposts that could lead to a WP? 
5. What are the pros and cons of each scenario according to our evaluation scheme? 
6. Is it necessary to obtain the “authorization” of nation-states, or is the expressed wish of the 
people enough? 
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Appendix 4 
 
Developing International Democracy – For a Parliamentary Assembly at the Unit-
ed  Nations.  A  Strategy  Paper  of  the  Committee  for  a  Democratic  U.N.  (Bummel  
2010b, 7-9) 
 
The UNPA project is based on the following conclusions of the Committee's strategy paper on 
international democracy: 
 
1. Mankind faces the task of ensuring the survival and well-being of future generations as well 
as the preservation of the natural foundations of life on Earth. The inclusion of the people into 
the institutional structure and into the decision-making mechanisms of the international system 
thereby has essential importance. 
 
2. The populations of the UN member states have to be better and more directly included into 
the activities of the United Nations and its international organizations. They must be allowed to 
participate in order to prevent growing discontent, to secure acceptance and legitimacy of the 
United Nations and international co-operation as well as to strengthen the United Nation’s ca-
pacity to  act.  The Committee for  a  Democratic  UN (KDUN) conceives the establishment  of  a  
United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) as a decisive step towards the introduction of 
a new quality, a new impetus and a stronger representation of citizens into the international sys-
tem. 
 
3. A Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations would not simply be a new institution. As 
the voice of citizens, taking a global view in the common international interest, the Assembly 
would be the manifestation and vehicle of a changed consciousness and understanding of inter-
national politics. To bring about such a change is of major importance in coping with the exis-
tential challenges facing humanity. 
 
4. The UNPA is to be regarded and designed as a parliamentary umbrella and parliamentary 
focal point of international cooperation. The commissions of the UNPA should regularly in-
clude national parliamentarians, who are not members of the UNPA, but are experts belonging 
to the respective commissions of their national parliaments. Delegations of the UNPA should be 
directly admitted to international governmental conferences. 
 
5. Addressing the possibilities and concepts for reforming the United Nations and the UN sys-
tem should be one of the thematic main tasks of the United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. 
As a unique and institutionalized hinge between parliaments, civil society, the United Nations 
and governments, the UNPA could become a political catalyst for further development of the 
international system and of international law. 
 
6. As a first step, the Committee for a Democratic UN recommends the creation of a Parliamen-
tary Assembly at the United Nations as new institution which is established as consultative, 
semi-autonomous secondary body to the UN General Assembly through a vote of the General 
Assembly  under  Article  22  of  the  UN  Charter.  Alternatively  to  that,  as  far  as  the  Inter-
Parliamentary Union is ready and fulfills the preconditions, the Inter-Parliamentary Union could 
be transformed into a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly in form of a secondary body or 
alternatively a special organization on the basis of a decision under Article 22 or on the basis of 
a cooperation agreement on the mutual relations with the United Nations. Both options are open 
for development. 
 
7. The Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations should be open to all member states of the 
United Nations which are provided with a constitutionally embodied parliament. 
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8.  The  Committee  for  a  Democratic  UN recommends  that  in  the  first  development  stage,  the  
delegates of the Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations are uniformly elected from the 
midst of the parliaments of the participating countries. 
 
9. The determination of the number of delegates per country in the UNPA should be left to the 
political negotiations of the governments during the preparatory process. Basis of the negotia-
tions should be a commitment to a graduation oriented according to population size, corres-
ponding, in principle, to existing parliamentary assemblies. Before entering into the negotiations 
on the actual distribution it is recommended that an upper limit for the total number of delegates 
be defined. This number probably lies between 700 and 900. 
 
10. The actual financial need for the first step can only be quantified if it is clear how the UNPA 
is to be designed, for example composition, voting procedure, participating states and legal ba-
sis. A first rough total estimate on the basis of the conclusions of the Committee for a Demo-
cratic UN comes to 100 to 120 million Euro [sic!] per year. This figure is based on the assump-
tion that all UN member states participate which possess a constitutionally elected parliament. 
 
11. According to the example of the European Parliament, the initially only consulting Parlia-
mentary Assembly at the United Nations should, within further stages of development, step by 
step be provided with genuine rights of information, participation and control. 
 
12. The establishment of a directly elected world parliament with political competences is the 
most far-reaching concept of global democracy. The Committee for a Democratic UN supports 
the idea of such a world parliament. Efforts for a democratisation of the international system, 
however, are inextricably linked with comprehensive questions of human development. The 
Committee for a Democratic UN explicitly supports the initiative of the Global Marshall Plan 
for a world-wide eco-social market economy, since it identifies in the surmounting of extreme 
poverty and of the prosperity gap in the world one of the conditions for a far-reaching democra-
tisation of international relations. 
 
13. Under existing conditions, a world parliament cannot be realized from one day to the other. 
There is need for realistic and pragmatic alternatives which, however, are open for further de-
velopment. In order to achieve the vision of a world parliament, a long-term development strat-
egy has to be striven for. Manifestation and vehicle of this strategy is the UNPA.  
 
 
 
